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This thesis is nbout the psychological concept of nttention in nssocintion with advertising. It
provides n rearrnngement of past discoveries, in particular, from the nreas of perception
psychology nnd brnin sciences. It is not my intention to claim any credit for the tremendous
effort by resenrchers that hnve nlready elucidated the concept of nttention, ns we know it
today. My contribution is to present some of these discoveries to the benefit of consumer
resenrchers. For that, choices have been made to select the material that is relevant; knowing
thnt other potentinlly relevant material is taken into account sometimes briefly, and sometimes
not denlt with nt all. Despite my search for comprehensibility, consumer researchers mny feel
thnt the way the topic of nttention is approached is not really designed for them when they
encounter the analogies between biologicnl processes and the most important psychological
theories of attention. Questions regarding 'selective attention" may find their answers in
psychology or biology; is selective attention psychological or (neuro)biological? The important
difference between psychology and biology is thnt psychology reduces complex psychological
processes to simple nnd understnndable processes, which are still of a psychological nature,
however. On the other hnnd, neuro-biologists explain these complex psychological processes by
simple non-psychic processes (LeVay, 1993). It is believed thnt ultimately the Q and A with
respect to selective attention nre found in the structures, mechanisms, nnd processes in the
human brain, which interact with the humnn, i.e. consumer environment. It is recognized that
there is an enormous gnp between the structure and strategies of the brain nnd the marketer
who is confronted with the task of breaking his ad through the ndvertising clutter. To be sure, I
hnve done my best to pnrtly fill this gap nnd not to omit mntters that the consumer researcher
may consider important.
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Chapter 1: 6enernl Introduction
On a daily basis, consumers nre, as part of the total flow of information, exposed to n stream of
information about products nnd brnnds from media advertising, packnging, point-of-purchase
displays, etc. It is importnnt to note that the information is often presented simultaneously,
rnther thnn only sequentially. In consumer research there is nn increasing academic and prnctical
importance of the questions how, when, nnd, why individual products or brands are selected or
better, hnve a higher selection probability from the multitude of competing products or brands.
The notion of informntion selection is insepnrably linked with the concept of attention (Pnshler,
1998). Attention serves as the important 'tuning" mechnnism in the selection of informntion. In
academia, all consumer information processing models plnce attention in on early and important
position (Olshavsky, 1994). It is widely accepted that nttention is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for information processing and the effectiveness of marketing communication.
"Every conceptunl model of advertising posits that consumers must attend to the nd ns a
necessnry first step; that is, they must devote processing capncity to it (Greenwald and
Leavitt, 1984; MncInnis and Jaworski, 1989). Thus, attention is perceived to be a critícal
mediating variable influencing the effectiveness of an nd" (Pechman and Stewart, 1990, p.
189)
For mnrketing practice, insight in selective attention is criticnlly importnnt for those who are
confronted with the task of breaking through the advertising clutter (Rntneshwar, Warlop,
Mick, and Seeger, 1997). So, what do we know about the nature, structure, and underlying
processes nnd determinants of selective attention? Because of the sketched academic and
prnctical importance one should expect to find n tremendous number of studies that examine
nttention systematicnlly. Paradoxically, in consumer resenrch, attention is being referred as an
enigmn (Jnniszewski and Bickart, 1994) and hns received very little research interest. Even so,
as inspection of the liternture shows, attention on nttention is becoming of interest.
"(...) Despite the tremendous amount of money spent on buying consumer nttention, little
to no research is done on consumer attention" (Janiszewski and Bricknrt, 1994, p. 329)
"To dnte, little is known about the processes of attention, in pnrticulnr of visunl attention
to ndvertising" ( Pieters, Rosbergen and Hartog, 1996, p. 242)
",(...) The role of nttention in consumer choice hns generated little resenrch attention"
(Pieters, Worlop and Hartog, 1997, p. 281)
"(...) Despite its importance, visual attention hns been disregarded in marketing resenrch"
(Pieters and Warlop, 1999, p. 1)
"As competition for consumers' limited attention is even greater concern in today's
crowded markets nnd media, it is importnnt to understand how and when consumers devote
ottention to commercial stimuli and whnt determines their nttentioral strategies and
patterns" (Rosbergen, Pieters and Wedel, 1998, p. 305)
'Understnnding the determirants of selective attention and elnborntion in cor~sumer
information processing is important since the outcomes are crucinl to product evaluation
and memory for information which, in turn, impact brand preferences and choice behavior"
6
ChnQter 1: óenernl Introduction
(Rotneshwar, Mick, nnd Reitinger, 1990, p. 547)
"Although attention is a key construct in models of marketing communication and consumer
choice, its selective rature hns rnrely been examined in common tíme-pressured
conditions" (Ratneshwar, Warlop, Mick, and Seeger, 1997, p. 245)
Lynch ond Srull (1991, p. 104 from Lynch and Srull, 1982) with respect to memory and
attentíonal factors in consumer choice: "(...) an explicit consideration of the underlying
{cognitive} processes is imperative for arry thorough theoretical analysis" (brackets ndded)
If we trnce the consumer literature for knowledge about selective attention, it becomes clear
thnt whnt is known is borrowed directly from other fields such ns perception psychology. The
conceptunlization of nttention that prevails in the aren of consumer behavior research is based
upon three theories of nttention viz. Filter Theory, Cnpacity Theory and Resource Theory. These
theories originate in the field of auditory and visunl perception resenrch during the 1950s and
1980s, where they primnrily were applied to the perceptual rystem. These theoretícal ideas were
transferred to the nrea of consumer behnvior. Note that in consumer research these three
theories hnve not been criticized or questioned. Rnther, they seem to have been adopted
unconditionnlly nnd taken for grnnted.
Is there any renson to question these theoreticnl contributions? Or, in other words, hnve we
been relying on the appropriate theoretical idens nnd associated assumptions? To put it yet
differently, are we still on the right path with our conceptualizntion(s) of attention or is it time
to critically assess the direction in which the theoreticnl rond is tnking us?
The reason why we ask this is twofold. One is the observntion that in visual perception research
the three theories of attention have been subject of debate over the Inst 30 years; focusing on
the questions why, how nnd when information is selected. Consumer resenrch ignored or
overlooked this debate. In any case, consumer research wns not involved. Secondly, an
interesting theoretical climate emerged in visual perception research some 15 years ago, which
provides new, nnd potentially important insights that mny impnct theorizing on the concept of
nttention.
This new theoreticnl climate is characterized by the assumption of a functionnl relationship
between perception and action. The relationship between perception nnd action hns brought
psychology closer to the biological sciences (see Prinz and Neumnnn, 1987 for an historical
overview). "Psychologists have come to recognize that the behavior they study depends on
biological processes (...) So the psychologist cnnnot feel that he has completed his work and
explnined a form of behavior until he has placed it in n biological perspective" ( Berlyne, 1971, p.
8). "To me a psychologist is first a biologist" (Krugmnn, 1977, p. 7). It is believed that the nction-
relnted approach to nttention is theoreticnlly nnd empirically relevant to consumer research. The
relationship between perception and action has been the object of a mnjor and longstanding
interest ín consumer resenrch. In this area, the question if the consumer can be given too much
information remnins important, however, unresolved (Bettman, Johnson and Payne, 1991). This
question is still puzzling and Bettman et al. suggested almost a decade ngo to examine 'how
consumers select their informntion" ( 1991, p. 67). This question and its resenrch on information
(over)load is driven by the possibility that consumers make less accurate choice decisions (thnt
7
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is, nction) with more information (that is, perception). Nevertheless, the relntionship between
perception and action has never been directly examined in consumer research (Pieters and
Warlop, 1999).
In sum, despite its ncademic nnd practical importance, consumer researchers (1) have not
examined systematically selective attention issues; (2) simply borrowed theories of attention
from visual and auditory perception research; (3) have not discussed these theories of nttention,
which were developed outside of the field of consumer research; and, finnlly, (4) have not yet
been persunded into studying the functional relationship between perception and action.
Where do we take it from here? We stnrt off by reviewing the classic visual perception
literature up to the current paradigm of the action-relnted approach to attention [t]. Then, we
will nttempt to transfer these idens to the consumer behavior resenrch area.
Let us begin by describing the historical development of the three classic theories of attention
viz. Filter Theory ( Brondbent, 1958, 1971), Capacity Theory (Kahneman, -icJ73j;nnd Resource
Theory (e.g., Nnvon and óopher, 1979; Norman nnd Bobrow, 1975; Wickens, 1980, 1984).
Secondly, we will present the debates with respect to the why, how, nnd when of selective
ottention. These three questions are asked with the new theoreticnl climnte in visunl perception
research in mind, i.e., with the nssumed functional relntionship between perception and nction.
Thirdly, we propose the attention-selection-model (ASM), which builds upon the theoretical
nnalyses so fnr. Fourth, the attention-selection-model is empirically tested and the results are
discussed. In particular, we explain why, how, nnd when conspicuous brand names vis-à-vis their
contextual brands hnve different selection probabilities. For this, the effectiveness of briefly
presented brand nnmes wns examined under different conditions of visual search and stimulus
exposure durations. Recognition nccurncy is chosen as the proxy for brand name effectiveness.
Finnlly, the ASM is transferred to the nren of consumer resenrch, nnd its implications nre
brought in conjunction with some open questions in consumer research.
1 Note thnt a choice is mode with respect to the enumerated citation.s. It is believed that theorizing on the concept of
ottention requires ezactly whnt the respective nuthors in the field of visual perctption and consumer resenrch have
communiwted. The reason for the relatiNely large number of citntions is to conMey their ideas os precisely as possible.
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CHAPTER 2: TOWARDS THE THEORIES OF ATTENTION
Chapter Introduction
Brondbent's Filter theory, as formulated in 'Perception nnd Communication" (1958) and in
"Decision nnd Stress" (1971), is the nnturnl stnrting point for any discussion of modern theories
of attention because it provides the first formal theoretical elnborntion on this concept. The
second forma) theoreticnl elaboration in the style of Broadbent is Knhneman's Cnpncity theory
and is found in Kahneman's monogrnph 'Attention and Effort" (1973). Resource theory, the third
theoretical elaboration, is formalized in diverse contributions by various authors (e.g., Navon and
óopher, 1979; Norman nnd Bobrow, 1975; Wickens, 1980, 1984). These three theories of
attention are described because of the significant role they play in consumer research. In order
to clnrify the debates with respect to why, how, and when attention is selectíve, some other
related theories are referred to as well.
Broadbent's Filter Theory (1958, 1971)
In Broadbent's originnl Filter theory (see Figure 1), concurrent information enters the
processing system via our senses in pnrallel nnd is temporarily'placed' in a short-term store (the
so-called 5-system). The theory assumes no limit on the structurnl capncity of the short-term
store. Then, the information is relayed to the so-called P-system (P for perceptual) for further
processing. At the entranceof the P-system, a'selective filter' hns to 'regulnté nnd 'protect' the
arrived information in order to prevent its limited cnpncity channel from overload and confusion:
thus, some stimuli (e.g., the relevant) will pass at the expense of others (e.g., the irrelevant).
The P-system is responsible for further processing i.e., stimulus identification, recognition and I
or cntegorization. Irrelevant informntion decays in the 5-system without undergoing further
processing. The rules nccording to which the filter operates (selection is not completely random)
nre specified by properties of the stimuli and by physical, mental, or emotionnl states of the









Figure 1: A dingram of the flow of information as conceived by Broadbent (1958, 1971)
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Deutsch nnd Deutsch (1963) Response Selection Theory of Attention
Deutsch nnd Deutsch (1963) by their 'response selection theory of attention' (Figure 2) contrnst
Broadbent's entrance-by-filter-selection theory of attention. They rejected, on the basis of
empirical evidence, both Brondbent's filter concept and the notion of limited capacity of the P-
system. According to Deutsch nnd Deutsch nll information that reaches our senses is
perceptually nnalyzed at the highest possible level. In other words, nll stimuli receive semantic
processing (that is, the relevant and irrelevant stimuli). Unlike the P-system, they postulate n
system containing n Inrge number of 'central structures' which have n preset weighting of
importnnce of information. This system determines what is selected for 'further processing',
such as motor output nnd memory storage. The weights of importance, depending on the general
nrousnl of the system, play n cnusnl role in whnt is selected for subsequent processing. "Because,
with adequnte genernl arousal, it is the weights of importance that determine whether a
message is selected or not, it is of fundamental importance to know what determines, in its turn,
these weights of importnnce" (VnnderHeijden, 1992, p.47). While the rules are not very clear, it
is assumed thnt the centrnl structures are linked together by connections that are estnblished
by experience (past learning). In turn, via these connections both the arousal of the system nnd
its weighting of importance are determined (VnnderHei jden, 1992). This is assumed to occur
relntively late in the processing system and therefore the theory by Deutsch and Deutsch is
characterized as a late-selection theory ns contrasted by Brondbent's early-selection theory.
Deutsch and Deutsch' (1963) 'response selection theory of nttention' assumes capacity




AttentKtt ion'f í lt,xr
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Figure 2: A diagram of the flow of information as conceived by Deutsch nnd Deutsch (1963)
Treismnn's (1960, 1964) Theory of Attention
Treismnn (1960, 1964) proposed a theory, in which she combined two simultaneously opernting
selection mechanisms (Figure 3). Treisman modified and replnced Broadbent's (1958) filter
concept by nn attenuation-filter. Brondbent's filter passes the relevant information and blocks
the irrelevnnt information. Treisman's nttenuntion-filter weakens the irrelevnnt information (and
pnsses the relevnnt information). Treismnn's centrnl structures denoted as 'dictionary units' are
in close resemblance with Deutsch and Deutsch' central structures. The importance of the
information sets the threshold level of the dictionary units (VanderHeijden, 1992). The
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processing system is nssumed to be limited in cnpacity. Note that the attenuntion-filter mnkes
selections on the bnsis on the physical characteristics of the stimuli, and the low threshold
settings of the dictionnry units induce that attenuated messages can still affect responding. In
other words, Treismnn's theory allows for two distinct loci of selection, that is at the input of
the system (early selection) and nt the output of the system (late or response selection).
Interestingly, Inter on, Broadbent (1971) partly adopted Treisman's theory but termed some of
parts of the processing system differently. Yet, Brondbent continued to use the term'filtering'
(Treismnn's attenuation filter), nnd suggested the term 'pigeon-holing' or 'cntegory-states' for






Figure 3: A diagrnm of the flow of information as conceived by Treisman (1960, 1964)
These three theories (Broadbent, 1958, 1971; Deutsch dc Deutsch, 1963; Treisman, 1960, 1964)
were mninly formulated in the nuditory domnin. Likewise, Sperling's (1960) theory of attention in
the visual domain assumed early visunl selection; only relevant visunl stimuli receive semnntic
processing. In Coltheart's (1984) visunl counterpnrt of the Iate selection view, all visual stimuli
(the relevant and irrelevant) that enter our eyes receive full semantic processing.
Knhneman's Unspecific Cnpacity Theory (1973)
The Cnpacity theory of nttention (Kahneman, 1973) builds upon the assumption thnt there is n
general limit on human capacity to perform mentnl work. Another assumption is that this limited
capncity cnn be allocnted with considerable freedom among concurrent activities.
As Kahnemnn puts it:
"Selective attention to inputs is the allocation of capacity to the processing of certain
perceptual units in preference to others. The focussing of attention is very effective in
preventing the irrelevant stimuli from interfering with the primary tnsk, but there is
evidence that irrelevnnt stimuli are sometimes processed nt lenst up to the level of
recognition units. In addition, one often perceives such stimuli, if they tend to be grouped
with the message, if they represent obvious physicol changes, or if they are both familinr
and highly significant. These observations are consistent with the hypothesis thnt spare
capacity is continuously allocated to the processing of perceptunl units that are not
emphasized. The present theory assumes a mechanism of unit information, which performs
some functions that Neisser [1967j attributed to pre-attentive mechanisms. The stage of
figural emphnsis selects some of the units for especialfy detailed processing, much in the
11
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manner of Brondbent's filter. The emphasis on the selected messages is a matter of
degree, ns suggested by Treisman's [1960, 1964] concept of attenuatíon. The distinctive
predictions of the present theory are that the effectiveness of selection depends on the
ense with which relevant stimuli can be segregated at the stage of unit formation, and
thnt the effectiveness of rejection of irrelevant stimuli depends on the amount of
cnpacity demanded by the primary task" (Kahneman,1973, p. 135).
On the one hnnd, Knhneman's Cnpacity model contrasts Broadbent's Filter Model by presenting a
view that is different in two wnys. First, Kahneman (1973) departed from the theoretical
mainstream that sought the inspirntion for theories of attention in communicntion sciences, i.e.,
Shannon and Weaver's (1949) 'Mnthemnticnl Theory of Communication', rather than in brain
sciences (Neumnnn, 1996). Second, Knhnemnn did not adopt the filter notion. Kahnemnn's (1973,
p. 12) criticism on Broadbent's Filter theory (1958) is presented here in the form of several
quotes.
" "As initially stated (...) Filter theory is wrong"
" "(...) parallel processing of simultaneous stimuli does occur"
" "Furthermore (...) the content of an irrelevant messnge is ideritified, at least dimly and at
least some of the times even when the subject nttempts to ignore it"
" "Finally, the ideo of n slow-moving filter that selects one stimulus at n time is not viable"
" "Thus, virtually all the predictions of Filter theory about what people cannot do have been
disproved"
" "However, Filter theory provides a useful npproximation to what people uswl~ydo'
On the other hnnd, Kahnemnn did not present his capacity model as a replacement for
Broadbent's filter model. In fnct, he argued thnt both models are needed to explain nttentional
phenomenn.
"A contrast wns drawn between a structural model [Broadbents' Filter model, 1958], in
which cognitíve activity is limited by a bottleneck, or station at which parallel processing is
impossible, and a Capncity model in which the limited capncity determines which nctivities
can be carried out together. Neither model is adequate alone, but each captures some
important nspects of cognitive activity" (Kahneman, 1973, p. 12)
'The Capacity model (...) is intended to complement rather than supersede models of the
structure of information-processing (...) [both models] (...) in fact, belong to different
types: [structurol models] (...) describe the sequence of operations that are applied to a
set of simultaneously stimuli. In contrast, [the Capacity model] (...) describes the relntions
of influence nnd control between components of the system" ( Kahneman, 1973, p. 11)
While Knhnemnn made the nrgument that both models complement one another, he also points to
the opponent theoretical explanntions with respect to interference. Interference refers to an
incompntible task interaction.
'Both types of theory predict thnt concurrent nctivities are likely to be mutunlly
interfering, but they ascribe the interference to different causes. In a structural model,
interference occurs when the snme mecFwnism is required to cnrry out two incompatible
operations nt the same time. In n Cnpacity model, interference occurs when the demands
of two activities exceed nvailable cnpncity. Thus, a structural model implies thnt
interference between tasks is specific, and depends on ihe degree to which tasks catl for
12
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the same mechanism. In a Capacity model, interference is nonspecific, and it depends only
on the demands of both tasks" ( Kahneman, 1973, p. 11)
Neumann (1987, 1996) pointed out thnt Kahnemnn's nonspecific interference, ns an empirical
genernlization, wns not correct because of numerous demonstrations of specific interference.
Note thnt the nssumption that cnpacity is unspecific predicts that dual-tnsk interference should
depend on task difficulty, and be equal for all tnsk combinntions at a given level of difficulty
(Neumnnn, 1987). Kahneman tried to account for these findings that violate his explanation by
postulating structural interference as a type of interference that was not nttentional. Knhneman
suggested that, besides capacity interference, there is structural interference. This occurs
becnuse the activities occupy the same mechanisms of perception or response (Knhnemnn, 1973,
p. 196). However, this solution lost plnusibility as more exnmples of specific interference
accumulated (Neumann, 1987, 1996). In particulnr, Wickens (1980, 1984) analyzed the dual-task
liternture on interference and argued that interference depends on the structure of the
competing tasks, not simply on their difficulty. It "(...) snved the idea of unspecific cnpncity, but
at the price of excluding conflicting results (nnmely, nll cnses of specific interference) from the
rnnge of explanntion of the [cnpacity] theory" (Neumnnn, 1996, p. 405). For this renson it "has
since led most students of attention to abandon the idea that capacity limits are due to n
scnrcity of general, unspecific capncity" (Neumann, 1987, p. 365).
~ Resource Theory
Resource theory tried to nccount for the empirical demonstrntions agninst unspecific cnpacity.
In contrnst to capacity theory, resource theory postulates specific resources instead of a
single, undifferentinted cnpncity (resource). 'The concept of multiple processors or multiple
resources imposed itself as the consequence of the fnilure of undifferentiated cnpncity"
(Neumann, 1996, p. 405). Instead of a single type of central capncity, a set of different
resource pools is postulated.
Resource theory is bnsically worked out in two ways. At first, Norman nnd Bobrow (1975; see
also Navon and Gopher, 1979) introduced the distinction between resource-limited nnd dnta-
limited processes, nnd came up with the performance-resource function nnd the performance-
operating chnracteristic (POC). The distinction between resource-limited and data-limited
processes refers to performnnces thnt cnn be less than perfect either because of the
insufficient quality of the data, or because an insufficient amount of capacity allocation.
Performnnce can only be improved in the latter case by nllocating more nmounts of capacity to
the task. Note that the term 'resourcé is largely synonymous with 'capacity' (Heuer, 1996).
Capacity is n hypothetical variable with a certain relation to performance that is specified by
the performance-resource function. The performance-resource function refers to the level of
performnnce relative to the amount of invested resources. The performance-operating
characteristic (POC) refers to n function in which the performnnce ín tnsk 1 is related to the
performance in task 2; in other words, the POC describes how tasks affect ench other in n dunl-
task situntion.
The second way in which the resource theory is worked out is proposed by Wickens (1980, 1984),
who proposed three main dimensions of resource pools: (1) processing stnges, (2) modalities and
13
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(3) brnin hemispheres. The first dimension, stages of processing, refers to one resource pool
reserved for centrnl processing, and another resource pool for responding (Heuer, 1996). The
modality dimension refers to the distinction between the visual domain nnd the auditory domain.
The third dimension, brnin hemispheres, includes verbal nnd spatial codes. The verbal code is
nssociated with the left hemisphere, which plays an important role in the processing of verbal
information, while the right hemisphere pl~s nn important role in the processing of spatial
information. Later on, Wickens (1984) organized these three dimeruions into a scheme of
resources in which ench cell in the mntrix referred to n conjunction of processing
chnrncteristics. "This revision had the advantage of providing a coherent, well-orgnnized schemn
of resources. Its disndvantage was that it predicted no interference between tasks that
belonged into different cells of the schema, which was empiricnlly untenable. As Wickens
pointed out, specific interference cnn be found between tnsks that shnre only one of these
processing chnracteristics, even if they differ on the other two dimensions. This cannot be
explained by the dimensional model" (Neumann, 1996, p. 406I7). In addition, Wickens presented
a second and alternative hierarchical model of resources, but like the dimensional model, did not
come to grips with the empiricnl data either, and hnd to be abandoned ns well. From the fnilure
of the dimensionnl model nnd the hiernrchical model Neumann (1996) concluded that the pattern
of empirical results does not seem to lend itself to a simple schemn of resources. Resource
theory, ín genernl, contributed to our understanding of attentional phenomena, but did not
contribute thnt much to n theoretical understanding of limited capacity. Like Knhneman's
capacity theory, it does not account for the empiricnl observations. Neumann describes this in
detai I.
"(...) the description that subjects share their attention between the tasks remnins
correct as long as one considers only overall performance measures, such as mean tracking
error or the avernge number of correct additions per time unit. The concern with overall
performance rather than detailed mechnnisms explains marry of the strengths nnd
weaknesses of capacity supply theories. Their mnin strength hns been that they have, at
the macroscopic level of nnalysis, contributed considerably to a refined empiric
description of dual-task dnta" (Neumann, 1996, p. 402).
"It is less certain that this approach [Resource theory] has added much to n theoretical
understanding of limited capacity. In particular, the hope to discover quantitative
relationships between invested cnpncity or resources and measured performance
(performance-resource functions), and thus predict performance from resources, has
proven futile (Nnvon, 1984). As has been pointed out by Neumann (1995), the fundamental
problem is that, unlike economic resources in microeconomic theory, which are observables
that cnn be directly measured, the hypotheticnl resources of cnpacity supply theories cnn
be determined only indirectly via performance measures. This means that the intervening
variable (resources) thnt is intended to predict n dependent vnriable (performance) is
anchored only in this dependent variabte, rendering their relationship circular.
Performnnce-resource functions can therefore not be determined empiricnlly; their shnpe
is a matter of definition, not of discovery. In principle, this difficulty could be overcome
by using converging operations, i.e. by anchoring capncity and resources in vnrinbles other
than performance" (Neumann, 1996, p. 403).
"It seems, then, thnt the belief in an undifferentiated cnpacity supply wns motivated more
by a theoretical conviction thnn by the empiric facts" (Neumann, 1996, p. 404).
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"There is a risk that the empiric observntions about he phenomena of nttention (it is
limited, can be shared between different tnsks, cnn be nllotted voluntary nnd involuntary,
etc) are simply reworded ns theoretical statements about the construct of capacity,
suggesting an explanation where there is actually only a redescription" ( Neumnnn, 1996, p.
404).
"Despite their insistence on multiplicity of resources, resource theories such as those of
Navon nnd óopher (1979) nnd Wickens (1980, 1984) were unitary theories in the sense
that they postuloted a single functional cnuse of nll attentional phenomena, namely, nn
insufficient supply of something that is required for processing. In this respect, they did
not differ from previous cnpocity theories. This common conviction of all dominant
theories between the 1950s and 1980s had two implications, one for the theoretical view
of interference, and one for the conceptualization of the relntionship between
interference and selection. As to interference, it was deemed to be n direct consequence
of the limitntion. If there is not enough capocíty (trnnsmission cnpacity, effort,
computational power, etc.) for perfect performance, then the quality of the output will
suffer, resulting in interference. This was such a simple and powerful idea that alternative
causes of interference seem to hnve been substnntially overlooked by most theorists"
(Neumann, 1996, p. 409)
Let us look how Navon (1984) in hindsight looked at the testability of the Resource theory. The
reason to cite Navon here is because he is one of the original proponents of Resource theory. As
Navon notes in his article "Resources; A Theoretical Soup Stone?":
"It is fortunate (. ..) that an author can point to its limits of a methodology he or she
advocated and do it before its use has prolifernted (. ..). In this article I discuss the
weakness of inethods for dingnosing resource competition (...) on a rntionale I found n
little more attractive several yenrs ngo (see Navon and óopher, 1979, 1980)" (p. 216).
"It is often taken for granted that processes demand processing resources that are
available in limited amounts and thnt the task of the researcher is to measure that
demand (...), the problem is usually regarded as a problem of ineasurement" (p.216)
"Why people nccept this notion so rendily is understnndable. After nll, in a very rough
sense it is triviolly true: The human processing system in toto is, by some loose definition,
a resource, and because selection among stimuli of thoughts, or actions surely occurs, it
rray be viewed ns the commitment of that resource to those objects of processinq" (p.
217)
"Authors who did nttack the notion (e.g., Allport, 1980; Neisser, 1976) simply refused to
accept the existence of n reservoir of genernl purpose resources ns a postulate becnuse it
was thought to have failed to function as a productive guide for research or because it
was not compntible with their own views of the mind" (p. 217)
"(...) Like other proposed unifying principles, the notion of resources is valuable if it
gienerally affords reasonably precise predictions, for exnmple, about the omount of dunl
task decrement in ihe performance of any task, x, when conjoined with arry other task, y
(or at lenst within some well-defined and relatively large subsets of tasks). If it does not,
we have yet to see good arguments about why it is more than a conventioral way of
speaking - a way of restating empiricnl observations in a language thnt goes beyond the
observnbles. To be sure, conventions ore typicnlly convenient or else they would die out.
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However, from a scientific point of view they may constitute some risk. Apnrt from being
excess that Occarris rozor would bid us to dispense with, the speculative cnusal mechanism
sometimes implicated by the usage of a conventiorol terminology, perhaps also acts ns a
red herring. It might be used as a ritual offering to nppraise the gods of science and to
divert their attention from the nbsence of substantive explnnntions for behavior" (p. 232)
'If the concept wns not sufficient to impose conceptual organizntion on phenomero in the
field, then it might be suspected that that concept is actually a theoretical soup stone:
Take the stone out, nnd the soup is still as good as it was. This article hns demonstrnted
how gratuitous the stone may be" (p. 231)
In sum, Knhneman's capncity theory wns not able to explnin the empiricnl dnta (Neumnnn, 1996).
This led to the current situation thnt resenrchers in attention have abandoned capncity theory
nlmost completely. Resource theory (Navon nnd Gopher, 1979; Norman and Bobrow, 1975;
Wickens, 1980, 1984) was nlso unable to explain the data, which ns the cited references of
Neumnnn show (1987, 1996; see also Heuer, 1987, 1996; and even (!) Nnvon, 1984, 1985) hnve
cnused some serious complexities with respect to the explanation of nll kinds of nttentional
phenomenn.
The concept of resources lacks explanatory value (Navon, 1984). Also, Neumnnn (1995) showed
that both Wickens (1980, 1984) nnd Navon and Gopher's (1979) variants of the Resource theory
nmount to a redescription, rnther than nn explanntion, of the observed dntn. 'In view of these
shortcomings, it seems fair to say that the resource concept hns failed as an heir to Broadbent's
chnnnel cnpacity and Kahneman's unspecific capacity, i.e. as nn explanatory concept for all kinds
of nttentional phenomena" (Neumann, 1996, p. 395; see also Neumann, 1987 and Heuer, 1985 for
n full account).
TOWARDS THE ACTION APPROACH TO ATTENTION
So, where do we it take it from here? Are their other new developments regarding attention
thnt nre worthwhile to tnke as a point for further theorizing about attention? In fact, there is
one importnnt other theory of attention, i.e., Treisman's model for the perception of visual
objects, which is known as the Feature Integratíon Theory (FIT) (Treismnn, 1988).
"A basic nssumption of the model is that all features of objects - their colors, sizes,
orientntions, (direction) of movement, etc. - are coded autorratically and spatially in
parallel. They simply 'trigger activation' on ihe npproprinte position in the nppropriate
mnps (...) This nutomatic coding, however, is not regarded as sufficient for object
perception and object recognition. Then combinations of features, called conjunctions, are
required. And here, according to Treisrran, visual spntial nttention comes in. When
features must be locnted and combined or conjoined to specify objects, attention is
required. Attention provides the'glué (Treisnan and Gelade,1980, p. 98) which integrntes
the separated features in oparticular ~ocotion so that the conjunction, i.e., the object, is
perceived as a unified whole (...) In Treismnns model 'Attention selects within a'master
mnp of locations" that shows where all feature boundaries are located, but not which
features are located where. Thus it distinguishes 'filled" from 'empty" locations, where
"filled implies the presence of nny discontinuity nt the feature level' (Treisman, 1988, p.
203). In other words 'The medium in which attention operates, ..., is a master map of
locations that specifies wlrere in the display things nre, but not whot they are. It
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indicates the number of elements, or filled locations, but not which fentures occupy which
locations' (Treisman and Gormican, 1988, p.17)" (VonderNeijden, 1992, p. 248I9).
On the one hnnd, Treisman's FIT (Figure 4) is an important model because it accounts for a large







Figure 4: A diagram of the flow of information as conceived by Treisman (1988)
On the other hand, there is something else, which seems very trivial but is probably the most
important point ns it suggests a complete different theoretical approach. "[Treisman's] main
ambition is in finding out what perceptual operations tnx the system most and which appear to
tnke plnce nutomntically (Treismnn, 1988, p.201). It is, however, very easy to defend the general
point of view that the perceptual systems are not just for'perceiving' and the particular point of
view thnt the visunl system is not just for 'seeing'. The most important function of the visual
system lies in the transformation of information in light into actions (reading, naming, walking,
grasping, etc.). Vision, and all other'perceptunl systems have evolved in all species of nnimals ns n
menns of guiding and controlling action...' (Allport, 1987, p. 395). Exactly this point of view brings
theorists like Allport and Neumann to questions like'whaT action?','how is the action directed?',
etc. (...). This importnnt 'nction' aspect is, however, completely neglected in Treismnn's model"
(VanderHeijden, 1992, p. 250), just ns it is neglected in all theories thnt we have discussed up to
this point. So far only input nnd processing system reasons hnve been discussed with respect to
selective attention. To put it differently, the models discussed so far are all interested in
perception as such. We now turn to n different wny of theorizing in which the relationship
between perception and action plays a central role. We are strongly influenced by and borrow
theoretical ideas from Allport (1987), Neumann (1987, 1996) and VanderHeijden (1992, 1996).
Before we review a model of attention based upon the nction-related npproach we make a detour
to and a lead start on the debates with respect to attention.
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The view thnt processing capncity is limited is so widely accepted nnd taken as a given fact that
one may forget it is the result of conviction (VanderHeijden, 1992). "The question wirynttention
is limited hns so fnr attracted comparntively little interest" (Neumann, 1987, p. 361). So, why
are humans limited information processors? Whnt is exactly induced by selections? These kinds
of questions yield a'new' development in visual perception research that "benrs the hallmark of a
parndigm shift in the sense put forward by Kuhn (1962), i.e., n scientific revolution in which the
bnsic nssumptions within a field are being reconsidered nnd redefined" (Prinz nnd Neumann,
1987, p. 2).
Allport (1987) gnve the nnswer when he cnrefully entailed whnt was meant by the notion of
'selection'.
"In (...) so-cnlled 'early' or 'precntegorial' selection (...) there is a strong implicit assumption
that selection, defined as the cuing or designnting of task-relevnnt informotion, must
imply the rejection or exclusion of the noncued information from levels of nralysis beyond
thot at which the selective cuing is held to occur. The conception that commonly underlies
this assumption is that, beyond the level nt which the 'selection' (that is selective cuing)
occurs, all further processing is intrinsically serinl; or, if not strictly serial, it is liable to
'overlond' should the unwnnted information not be successfully excluded (...) The
assumption, that selective cuing of certnin information necessarily entails rejection or
exdusion of all other information beyond the level of processing ot which the selective
cue itself is encoded, is evidently unchonged when the assumption of strict seriality (...) is
replaced by a unitary'limited capacity'system. (...) The really ímportnnt point to recognize.
however, is that selection, in the sense of selective cuin,Q in no sense loqicnlly entails
rejection or exclusion of the noncued informntion from further processin4; (...) To put it in
another way, the controversy regarding 'early' versus 'laté selection hos systematically
confused 'selection' as selective cuing and 'selection' as selective processing. Once the
distinction is made clear, there may even be no controversy" (Allport, 1987, p. 408I9,
underlined added)
Allport (1987) explnined that the debnte at what loci (early or Inte) in the processing system
selections tnke place in principle deals with the question nt what level information is cued -
relatively early or late in the system, i.e., at a smaller or larger time distance from the senses,
or at a lower or higher level of processing. Irrespective of the level at which the information is
cued, the informntion is perceptually analyzed, i.e., processed at the highest level. In other
words, if there is no cnpacity limit to process information, it seems thnt there is unlimited
cnpacity to process. If this were the case indeed the implications would be quite dramatic: nll
informntion would be perceptunlly nnnlyzed at the highest level, and there would not be a need
for selection at nll.
"The selectivity of attention has traditionnlly been viewed as its second rrajor attribute,
besides limited capacity. Limited cnpacity theories did not ignore the selection aspect, but
regnrded it ns a secondary consequence of limited capacity (...) as Broadbent (1971) put it:
"The obvious utility of a selection system is to produce nn economy in mechanisms. If a
complete analysis were performed even of the neglected messages, there seems no renson
for selection at all (p. 147)" (Neumann, 1987, p. 3731374)
"there is no need for selection of processing (...) [there) is need for selection for other
purposes than the processing of information" (VanderHei jden, 1992, p. 343)
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Neumann (1996) notes thnt selection mry have functions other thnn mere coping with limited
capacity. VanderHei jden (1992; pp. 243-244) cites several nuthors who refer to these different
functions: "One view emphasizes the richness and complexity of the informntion that is
presented to the senses at any one time and the consequent risk of confusion and overload
(Brondbent, 1958). The other view emphnsizes the diverse nnd incompatible response tendencies
thnt may be instigated at any one time and the consequent risks of paralysis and incoherence
(Posner, 1978). (...) It is of course quite possible - indeed likely - that the organisms nre
threntened by perceptual overload and by response incoherence, nnd that different selective
processes must be employed to control the two threats" (Kahneman and Treismnn, 1984, p. 29).
Thus, the view that the function of selection is to overcome the limited capacity may be
supplemented by a second possible function of selection - the prevention of response
incoherence. VanderHei jden (1992) even questions the first function of selection. He argues
that the information processing rystem does not need to be more protected from information
overlond thnn it already is by natural, biological filters. His point is that if, in the humnn brain,
the number of cells denling with the processing of, for exnmple, visual informntion is much larger
(50 million) than the number of cells involved with visunl information transmission (2 million
ganglion retinnl cells per eye), there is no need for nn additional filter or selection device on top
of the 'already built-in' capncíty limitations of the eye nnd the optic nerve. VanderHei jden's
(1992) reasoning (bnsed upon empiricnl evidence) "does not recognize a central processing
problem as a result of the richness and complexity of nvnilable intormation, or a thrent
introduced by perceptunl overload. Rnther, (...) "We have to find the diverse and incompatible
response tendencies thnt mny be instignted at nny one time". And "We have to derive the need
for nll forms of selection from properties and requirements of actions" (VanderHei jden, 1992,
p.244). Thus, the alternntive view stresses that selection is rendered necessary not by the
limited cnpacity to process but by the unlimited capncity to process.
"Just as Kahneman and Treismnn (1984), both Allport (1987) nnd Neumann (1987)
recognize two essentinl forms of selection. The first from of selection is needed because
there is one real 'capncity' limitntion: human beings have only a limited number of
e ectors. So, there is a difference in capacity between the centrnl information
processing system (no capacity limitations) and the action system or effectors (a very
limited capacity; generally only one action at o time can be performed). This form of
selection has therefore to solve the problem, which action, or more precisely, which
category or mode of action, from the total repertoire of possible actions, has to be given
temporal priority (Allport, 1987, p. 395). It determines which skill is allowed to recruit
what effectors at a certain moment in time (Neumann, 1987, p. 376). The second from of
selection is needed because a selected action can generally be directed to only one among
a number of simultaneously availnble objects at a time. In most nnturnl situation, and also
in most Inboratory settings, there are, however, more potentia) targets to which a
selected nction can be directed. This form of selection hns therefore to solve the problem
of which object to nct upon at a certain moment in time, i.e., the problem of where the
action is now to be directed (Allport, 1987, p. 395). It determines from what region in
space the set of pnrnmeters is taken that is allowed to specify the action in detail nt a
certain moment in time (Neumann, 1987, p. 376)" (VanderHeijden, 1992, p. 245, add
underlining).
From VnnderHei jden's (1992), Allport (1987) nnd Neumann (1987) it follows thnt it may not be
'limited cnpncity to process', but 'unlimited cnpncity to process' which makes selection necessnry.
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"Although the senses nre capable of registrating many different objects together, effector
systems are typically limited to carrying out just one action of a given kind of time. Hence the
biologicnl necessity and theoretical importance of selection-for-action." ( Allport, 1987, p. 396-
7). "The problem (...) is how to avoid the behavioral chnos that would result from an attempt to
simultaneously perform all possible actions for which sufficient cnuses exist." (Neumnnn, 1987, p.
374). According to the latter nppronch, the limited number of effectors implies the function of
selection for action. Therefore, the problem to solve is 'which category or mode of nction, from
the total repertoire of possible actions, has to be given temporal priority." (VanderHeijden,
1992, p.245). This selection mechanism is not needed to prevent information overload, but finds
its reason in the simple observntion that "a selected action can generally be directed to only one
among a number of simultnneously avnilable objects at a time" (VnnderHeijden, 1992, p. 245;
underlining added). The problem to solve is "which ob ject to act upon nt a certain moment in
time" (VnnderHei jden, 1992, p. 245), which is, according to VanderHeijden, exnctly the function
of selection provided by (visual) nttention.
In addition to the selection-for-nction view Neumann (1996) nlso suggested another renson for
selection, i.e., the selection-for-memory view. The selection-for-memory view refers to another
function of selection that serves the selective storage of experiences, 'we need not store
everything, but we should store what is important for the future" (Neumnnn, 1996, p. 438).
Neumann refers to the two different functions of selections as follows.
"(...) One [function] is thnt attention serves as the selective stornge of experiences; the
other is that selection is needed for the control of action. (...) The notion that attention
may be related to memory has played n certain role in modern theorizing, although it hns
rnrely been proposed that controlling access to memory is n function of nttention. Deutsch
and Deutsch (1963) proposed that the consequence of attentional selection is to "switch in
further processes, such as motor output, memory storage, and whntever else it mny be
that leads to conscious nwareness" (p.84). Both filter theory and corresponding models of
visual information processing such as thot of Sperling (1960) assumed ihat nonselected
stimuli do not contact short-term or long-term memory. VanderHeijden (1981) proposed
explicitly thnt attention has the effect of preventing 'short term visual information
forgetting'" ( Neumann, 1996, p. 438I9).
The following quote by Berlyne (1971) demonstrates implicitly the selection-for-action view.
'We can at arry one time respond to only a small number of stimuli. Stimuli will thus be
competing for control over our behavior, and there must be wnys of determining which
stimuli will win the contest". (Berlyne, 1971, p. 100)
Zeki (1999), a foremost resenrcher on the brain, points to the functionnlity of selection in
relation with the memory storage of information.
"Vision, in brief, is an active process that depends as much upon the operatiorLS of the
braín as upon the external, physical environment; the brnin must discount much of the
informntion renching it, select only what is necessary in order to obtain knowledge about
the visual world, and compare the selected information with its stored record of all that it
has seen" (Zeki, 1999a, p. 78).
"(...) We see in order to be able to acquire knowledge nbout this world" (Zeki, 1999b, p. 4)
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Ergo, there are two views, i.e., the limited capacity view nnd the unlimited capncity view. Both
views ngree about the necessity of selection. They differ, however, with regnrd to the presumed
reason ~ selection tnkes place. The view assuming selection for reasons of processing
limitations (selection-for-processing) may need to be supplemented with the view nssuming
selection for rensons relntíng to action possibilities (selection-for-nction) and memory stornge
(selection-for-memory). The criticnl point to note here is thnt the assumption of limited capacity
has put forward a way of theorizing which seems to lead to n dead end. It is important to
recognize thnt also the unlimited capacity view is bnsed on convictions. However, the unlimited
capncity conviction builds on relevnnt nnatomical and physiological evidence, as we will see later
on [2].
The nction nppronch to nttention is rather positively formulated ns compnred to the traditionnl
views of attention. The selective aspect of attention as n consequence of the limited capncity
view hns n protective nature nnd function. The task that is provided by visual selective attention
is to act in a gonl-directed mnnner.
"Regarding the relationship between selection and interference, there was likewise n
broad consensus from the 1950s to the 1980s. Since Brondbent's (1958) filter theory,
attentional selectivity was viewed ns a secondary consequence of limited capncity:
selection is required to come to grips with capncity limitntions. It was largely overlooked
that even an organism whose brain enjoys an (for all prncticnl purposes) unlimited capacity
would hnve to select between nlternative nctions, nnd between alternative stimuli thnt
control these actions. According of the view of capacity thnt will be discussed (...), ihis
means thnt unwanted actions have to be suppressed, and unwnnted stimuli hnve to be
prevented from gaining nccess to the control of behnvior, causing a type of interference
that is an achievement rather than a shortcoming". (Neumann, 1996, p. 409).
Resenrchers in visual perception, in pnrticular Allport (1987), Neumann (1987, 1996), and
VnnderHeijden (1992) focused on some of the complexities regnrding the classic psychological
theories of attention. These scientists provided the bnsis of one importnnt development that
emerged in visunl perception resenrch in the last 15 years. This theoretical development
concerns the proposed functional relotionship between perception ond oction. The relationship
between perception nnd nction hns brought psychology closer to the biologicnl sciences (see
Prinz nnd Neumnnn, 1987 for nn historical overview). Note that Filter Theory, Capacity Theory
nnd Resource Theory are based on information technology (cf. Shannon and Weaver, 1949),
which linked psychology to communication technology. However, 'the relntionship between
perception nnd nction is a question, at least, a log unit more complex than questions concerning
their separate functions (...) [becnuse] (...) the variety of vnriables influencing the observed
relationship between perception and action precludes any hope for a simple solution (...) [which]
(...) illuminates (...) how much of the problem is empiricnl nnd not simply theoreticnl" (Massnro,
1991, p. 134I5).
2 Also Treisman's FIT is consistent with anatomical nnd physiological evidence, and also compatible with the notions of
unlimited capacity. The FIT can be chnracterized as unlimited capacity to process and sekctive enhancement by
selective ottention (VanderHei jden, 1992, p. 250). We abandon the FIT, because the action part, which seems so
relevant for consumer research, is missing.
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SELECTiONS aND TYPE OF RE5PON5E
To pick up Massaro's point, how can we artificially induce selection-for-action nnd selection-for-
memory in nn experimental set-up? In other words, what is the researchers' tnsk given that the
rensons of selective nttention nre found in the control of nction and in the stornge of
experiences?
"(...) the selection of the action - is nrtificially induced in (...) simple information processing
experiments (...) The experimenter 'simply insiructs the subject which category or mode
of nction has to be given temporal priority. In one or another this instruction (...) not only
prevents 'the behavioral chnos that would result from on nttempt to simultaneously
perform nll possible actions for which sufficient causes exist" (Neumann, 1987, p. 374);
the instruction nlso has the quite remnrkable result that subjects generally stnrt to
produce the unique, nnd the only unique, behnvior requested". (VanderHeijden, 1992, p.
246)
In other words, if the resenrcher instructs subjects how to nct and where to act upon, then the
researcher prevents behaviornl chaos, i.e. action interference nnd response inconsistencies. The
required response mny be nssociated with the selection-for-nction view. On the other hnnd, if no
specific instruction is given to the subjects to memorize the presented information, then what is
memorized is likely to be the result of the second function of selection, i.e., selection-for-
memory. Here, we denote this second type of response as nn effectiveness response. An
effectiveness response is induced without nny specific instruction to memorize items in the
stimulus environment. Both functions of selection are brought nbout by selective attention
(Table 1 summarizes).
iABLE 1 pifferent funcfions of selection




The question is if both these functions of selective attention can occur simultaneously. In other
words, nre selection-for-nction and selection-for-memory mutually exclusive?
(...) The ideas that selection is in the service of action control and that it serves memory
storage nre not mutually incompntible. Neumann (1990) has suggested thnt there nre
phylogenetically old selection mechanisms that subserve the immediate control of action
(selection-for-action in Allport's, 1987, terms), ond thot the evolutian of mammnls has
produced a secorá function of attentioral mechanisms, the updating of nn internal
representation of the world" (Neumnnn, 1996, p. 43819).
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VanderHeijden's Post-cntegorical Filter Model (1992)
VanderHeijden's Post-cntegorical Filter Model (1992) is discussed next. The first reason is that
it builds upon the theoreticnlideas of the nction-related approach to attention. Second, the
report task methodology is associated with his model (discussed in Chapter 3), thnt is conducted
in consumer research experiments ns well. Finnlly, yet a third reason is thnt the model is also
npproprinte to visual search (Theeuwes, 1992). A little later on we denl with visual search.
VanderHeijden's (1992) model is fundnmentally at varinnce with nll views that postulate that
there is limited processing cnpncity, nnd that far this reoson on~y selections are necessary to
protect this limited cnpacity centrnl system against overlond. In his view, the central system is
characterized by unlimited processing capacity. As noted enrlier, he argues that the informntion
processing system does not need to be more protected from informntion overlond than it already
is by natural, biological filters. The basic structure of his model consists of an 'input mnp', nn
'identity domain' and a'locntion map'. Information enters the input map (IN) and is sent in







Figure 5: A dingram of the flow of informntion ns conceived by VnnderHeijden (1992)
Information of stimuli is represented in the input mnp (IN), albeit not yet explicitly. Identity
information of stimuli is transferred to the identity domain and positional information of n
stimulus is transferred to the location map. Identities nre triggered (VanderHei jden, 1992) or
calculated (VnnderHeijden, 1996) in the identity domain nnd positions nre coded (VnnderHei jden,
1992) or calculated (VnnderHei jden, 1996) in the locatiom m~p. To put it differently, nll
Processing thnt can be done is in fact done (VnnderHeijden, 1987). Thus, explicit
representations of stimuli nre found in the identificntion domain (ID) and the locntion map (LO).
The model so far nssumes thnt identity and position processing are independent. Although his
datn showed (see VanderHei jden, 1992, p. 252, Tnble 8.3.1) that 'the probability that there is
identity informntion given that there is no location information is very low ns compnred with the
probnbility thnt there is identity informntion given that there is locntion informntion"
(VanderHei jden, 1992, p. 252I3). Menning nnd suggesting that, the processing of position nnd
identity is not independent but dependent. The simple nnd elegant solution to solve this empiricnl
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finding was provided by adding a'feedbnck" loop from the locatiom m~p (LO) to the input mnp





Figure 6: A diagram of the flow of information as conceived by VanderHei jden (1992)
"The operation of the feedback loop can be regarded as n visual-perception internal kind
of selective attention triggered by position informntion or the onset of position
information. So, in this view, it is not attention, coming from nowhere, that is directed at a
position in a map of locations. The map of locotions is the source of the nttention. Location
information - if fed back to the input module - isthe attention. Not attention directed at
position, but position directed as ottention (...). The assumption, however, is that this loop
is triggered by position information and contnins no identity information (...). We
therefore propose that the operation of the feedback loop has no function ín the
identification of the information but only in the selection of identified infornation (...)
Tnken all together, the scheme depicted (...) can be regnrded ns a kind of basic circuitry
combining identity processing, location processing and a built-in or hard-wired form of
'selective attention'. It implements something like'postcategorical filtering' and'selection';
the addressing sequence is: position - features on position (all features; not only relevant
features) - identíty (...) it can be regnrded as the kernel of the 'difference generator'
which attention resenrch in visual information psychology seeks" (VanderHeijden, 1992, p.
254I5).
Position processing nnd identity processing occurs in pnrallel. However, the identity information
cannot become nvnilable without the position information from the position channel. 'The
location chnnnel feeds bnck in parallel the location informntion of all stimuli represented in the
input module; yet, the position that receives ndditional nctivation is thought to be selected"
(Theeuwes, 1992, p. 44).
Allport (1987) made some importnnt notes with respect to the confusion of 'selection' ns
selective cuing nnd 'selection' as selective processing. 'Selecti~ cuing operates predominnntly in
terms of physicnl, or 'precntegorial', sensory attributes, whereas processing of both cued and
noncued informntion proceeds nt lenst to categorical levels of annlysis. VnnderHei jden has cnlled
this 'postcntegorical filtering'. In this cnse we would hnve 'early selection', in the sense of
selective cuing or specifying of task-relevant information, and 'late selection' as regards the
further processingof both relevnnt and irrelevant informntion' (Allport, 1987, p. 409).
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So far we hnve described the historical development of the three theories of nttention that
were trnnsferred to the consumer research nrea (Filter theory, Capacity theory, nnd Resource
theory). In addition, we have referred to some other relnted theories (Deutsch and Deutsch's
theory, Treisman's early accounts (1960, 1964) and late account (1988)). Further, we introduced
the nction-relnted npproach to attention by the nssumption of n functionnl relationship between
perception nnd nction. And finally, we presented VanderHeijden's model, which builds on this
npproach. We now turn to the debntes, which are generally ignored and overlooked in consumer
resenrch.
THE WHY, HOW AND WHEN OF SELECTIVE ATTENTION
WHY IS ATTENTION SELECTIVE?
Why is nttention selective? To answer this question, one has to focus on two central aspects, (1)
capacity and (Z) selection. These aspects nre bnsic and inescapnble if one deals with the concept
of attention (Pnshler, 1998). Capacity and selection are two sides of the same attention coin.
In Broadbent's (1958, 1971) Filter theory the capacityof the information processing system (P-
system) is metaphorically conceptualized ns the trnnsmission cnpacity of a channel, nnd a filter
performs selection. This filter either blocks (Brondbent, 1958) or attenuates (Broadbent, 1971,
ndopted from Treisman, 1960, 1964) the flow of information. In Knhneman's (1973) capacity
theory the metnphor for capacity became thnt of a'supply', and selection wns its allocation.
Finally, in Resource theory (Navon nnd Gopher, 1979; Normnn nnd Bobrow, 1975; Wickens, 1980,
1984) capoocity was metaphorically conceptualized ns (pools of) resources (each) with limited
capncity. The selection problem receded into the bnckground relative to the capacity problem.
The topics were the nnture and mensurement of resources (in dunl-tasks), while the mechanisms
that supposedly nllocated these resources remnined Inrgely unspecified (see Neumann, 1996).
All three approaches have shared the conviction that the bnsic charncteristic of nttention is
limited capacity. In pnrticulnr, selection wns conceptunlized as a functionnl consequence of
limited capacity. For exnmple, because Brondbent's (1958) central channel had a limited
trnnsmission capacity there wns n filter thnt protected it from overload and confusion. Similnrly,
becnuse there existed only n limited supply of Kahnemnn's (1973) unspecific capncity, it hnd to
be strategically allocated. Selection was viewed as the way in which the system copes with its
limited capacity (Neumann, 1987, 1996; VnnderHei jden, 1992). Allport (1987), therefore,
denoted this form of selection ns selection-for processing. In sum, one of the fundamental ideas
nbout the processing system is that it is limited in capncity and thnt selection is selective
processing. In contrnst, Allport (1987), Neumann (1987, 1996), and, VanderHeijden (1992, 1996)
nll share the view thnt the processing mechnnism is characterized by its unlimited cnpncity to
process information. Selection is n functional consequence of the limited number of effectors
that do not allow that simultaneous actions can be performed at one time. Selection is selection-
for-nction nnd selection-for-memory. Note that the unlimited capncity view as proposed by
Deutsch nnd Deutsch ( 1963) 'nssumes that there are processes, occurring subsequent to
stimulus identification, thnt demnnd capncity (...) [However,j it is not ensy to see how it can
interpret cnpacity limitntions ns simply due to ihe brain's functionnl capnbilities. If the brnin is
capable of processing nll stimuli completely, why should it not also hnve the capability to perform
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all further processing operations without capacity limitntions? Thus, it is within the logic of the
'late-selection' approach to look for functionnl reasons of limited capacity" (Neumnnn, 1987, p.
367I8).
Ergo, ns noted enrlier, there nre two views, i.e., the limited capacity view nnd the unlimited
cnpncity view. Both views agree about the necessity of selection. They differ, however, with
regnrd to the presumed renson w~h ~ selection takes place. The view nssuming selection for
rensons of processing limitations (selection-for-processing) may need to be supplemented with
the view assuming selection for reasons relnting to action possibilities (selection-for-action) and
memory storage (selection-for-memory).
HOW or WHERE IS ATTENTION SELEGTIVE?
The traditional approaches discussed so far hnve either shared the conviction that the basic
charncteristic of nttention is ~imited capoacity (e.g., Brondbent, 1958, 1971; Sperling, 1960,
Treisman, 1960, 1964) or that the bnsic charncteristic of attention is unlimited copocity (e.g.,
Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963; Colthenrt, 1984). In the limited capacity view, selection occurs
relatively early and precedes stimulus identificntion (e.g., semnntic processing). In the unlimited
capncity view (Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963), selection occurs relatively Iate nt n stage contniníng
information that is identified. VnnderHei jden (1996, p. 18) chnrncterized these views ns the
'early-selection limited-cnpncity' view and the 'late-selection unlimited-capacity' view,
respectively. In similnr vein, Treisman's (1960, 1964) mnrringe of these two views can be
charncterized as 'early selection allowing for Iate selection limited-cnpacity' view. Remember
that Treisman's model hns two selecting mechnnisms: nn enrly nnd a late one, but considers the
centrnl processing system as limited in capacity. In essence, given that the capacity nnd
selection issue are in principle independent (VanderHei jden, 1987), we have two plnusible options
left: the 'early-selection unlimited-capacity' view and the 'enrly selection nllowing for late
selection unlimited cnpacity' view (see Tnble 2). Note that n'late selection limited cnpacity' view
is unlikely on logically grounds.
TABLE 2: Capacïty and Seiection
5electïon lámïted Gopncïty Vnlïmited Capocity
Early Brondbent,1958 VanderHei jden, i992
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Enrlyl lnte Treismnn, 1960, 1964 DeNeer, (this thesis) .
(Attenuntion model) (Attention-selection-model;
to be described later on)
Broadbent,1971
(revised Filter model)
As Keele remarks (cited in VnnderHeijden, 1987, p. 422): 'if selectivity occurs nt the level of
physical characteristics of the message, why does the meaning of the ignored message affect
response to the selected message? If, on the other hand, selectivity occurs nt the level of
activnted memory, why do physical characteristics of the sound, namely direction and frequency,
nffect selection?"
VanderHei jden ( 1992, see also VanderHei jden, 1987) explained these two completely different
models ( enrly versus late) by looking very carefully at the factors that were experimentally
varied and at the fnctors that were experimentally fixed. He pointed at the crucíal experiments
in which subjects were given auditory tnsks thnt looked rather similar (nt first sight!). These
experiments were close to orthogonal in what was varied and what was fixed. Brondbent vnried
'chnnnels' (e.g., left versus right ear, enr versus eye, et cetern) while keeping the contents of the
stimuli fixed (e.g., digits). Thus, Brondbent experimentnlly fixed 'expectation' (digits nnd digits
again were presented to the subjects) nnd varied channels. Deutsch and Deutsch experiments
varied the contents of the stimuli as well: something like 'meaning' vnried, i.e., expectation
varied. 'experiments led to the conviction that what is varied, just becnuse it is varied nnd
shows differentinl effect, exists and is important, while what is fixed and therefore shows no
differentinl effects, does not really exists or is of no importance" (VanderHei jden, 1992, p. 48).
In sum, there nre two selection factors which mny revenl themselves simultnneously: "in nenrly
all attentive acts at least two factors can be recognized: attention and expectation"
(VanderHeijden, 1992, p. 49). Yet, a third attentional fnctor, which cnn not be omitted, is
denoted as ' intention' (VanderHeijden, 1992 which he ndopted from Gibson, 1941). This third
factor ' intention' is associnted with 'nction set' and is concerned with 'what to dó consisting of
'an intention to nct' and 'to nct in a specific wny'. "This analysis of selection (...) suggests the
conclusion that (. ..) more nttentional factors or selective processes hnve to be distinguished: one
process concerned with the 'where' (i.e., controlling the source of stimuli to be responded to), a
second concerned with the 'what' (i.e., controlling what aspect of the stimulus is importance) nnd
a third concerned with 'what to do' (i.e., controlling whether, and if so, how, to react)"
(VanderHeijden, 1992, p. 55). Table 3 summarizes some related terms to early and Iate selection.
TABLE 3: Terriiinoloyy ear.fy r` !aée seiection
~~~ ~ r!y 5~eteetion late Sclection
Where What
Location Identity
Chnnnel variations Meaning variations
Stimulus set Response set
Input selection Output selection
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The Winner Takes All - n computotional solution
In nddition to the early-late selection debnte, various computntionnl hypotheses for modeling
visunl nttention hnve been proposed that solve the problem how selective attention operates
(e.g., Bundesen, 1990; Olshnusen á Koch, 1995; Tsotsos, 1998). Note thnt the present discussion
on where and how items in a visual scene are selected slowly changes over to the next debate
concerning when attention is selective. Computational solutions are nll based on similar principles:
"selection of items to process is implemented by n winner-take-all mechanism using n
representation of saliency based on the early representntions" (Tsotsos, 1998, p. 216). Like the
trnditionnl models of attention, computational modeling assumes thnt there is insufficient brain
capacity to process all visual stimuli to the same degree of detail. On the other hand, the model
proposed by Koch and Ullman (1985), which is at the basis of several other computational models
(Itti, Koch and Niebur, 1998) is related to Treisman's Feature Integration Theory. Computational
approaches to attention have not yet looked nt the action-relnted npproach to nttention.
Remember, however, that Treismnn's FIT is not incompntible with the unlimited capncity notion
(VanderHeijden, 1992). Another renson why we discuss Koch and Ullman's (1985) model (see
Figure 7) is that it builds on a plnusible biologically architecture (Itti and Koch, 1999a, b; Itti,
Koch and Niebur, 1998). In other words, the model is biologically convincing nnd, therefore, fits
nicely with the action-oriented approach to attention. Both the computationnl appronch to
nttention and the nction-related approach to nttention bring biology closer to psychology and
psychology closer to biology.
Attended location
Figure 7: A diagram of the flow of information as conceived by Koch and Ullman (1985)
28
Chn~ter 2: Towards the theories of nttention
'Visunl input is first decomposed into n set of topogrnphic feature mnps. Different spatial
locations then compete for saliency within each map, such that only locntions, which locnlly
stand out from their surround, can persist. All feature maps feed, in a purely bottom-up
manner, into a rraster `snliency nap", which topographically codes for local conspícuity
over the entire visual scene. In primates, such a map is believed to be located in the
posterior parietal cortex as well as in the various visual maps in the pulvinar nuclei of the
thalamus. The model's snliency map is endowed with interral dynamics, which generate
attentional shifts. This model consequently represents a complete account for bottom-up
saliency, and does not require arry top-down guidance to shift nttention" (Itti, Koch and
Niebur, 1999, p. 1).
VanderHei jden (1992, p. 264) also points to the structural solution of the visual system how to
deal with multiple stimulus onsets in order to overcome behavioral chaos.
"With multiple simultnneous onsets the input-module-location-module-input-module
feedback loop is activated for several positions at the same time (...) this stimulus
situntion results in an nmbiguous system situntion: or hypotheticnl attentional circuit gets
jnmmed or confused. But 'something' has to be done, and it is not surprising that the
system has its own solutions for hnndling such a situation and that ns a result unique
phenomena nre observed" (VnnderHeijden, 1992, p. 264). 'The system itself gives
tempornl priority to one abrupt onset from among a number of simultnneously occurring
abrupt onsets" (VnnderHei jden, 1992, p. 266).
The solution provided by the computntionnl npproach is thnt the most conspicuous item in the
visual scene is selected on the bnsis of a WTA procedure. Note thnt this solution concerns
unintentional acts, i.e., it is a bottom up, stimulus driven solution. The computntional solution to
intentional ncts is found "in the 'guided search' feedback from higher corticnl nreas (e.g.,
knowledge nbout targets to be found) (...) to weight the importance of different fentures" (Itti,
Koch nnd Niebur, 1999, p.l). Itti et nl. (1999) here point to the 'knowledge nbout targets to be
found' in intentional visual search tasks. At the present time, however, computntional solutions to
intentionnl acts have not come further thnn computer simulations. These simulntions are based
theoretical ideas on humnn visual senrch nnd psychophysicnl studies. Here also the computntional
nppronch relies on the classic idens on visual senrch guiding principles, nnd does not yet take the
action-relnted approach into nccount. We borrow from Prinz (1986) who illustrates some
difficulties with the traditional npproach to visual senrch. The traditionnl idea is that the tnrget
of interest (the item to be found) is represented internnlly and is senrched for until a stimulus
object in the environment is identified as the object that matches it. This view assumes thnt
"tnrget detection is brought about by target identification. (...) At lower levels, (...) where
feature recognition occurs, these mechanisms are entirely stimulus-driven, and no selective
preparntion is possible. However, nt the cognitive level where [stimulus, i.e., IetterJ recognition
occurs, top-down directed processes do provide task-specific prepnration. (...) As a consequence,
nontargets nre never identified, nnd targets are detected by virtue of the fact that they are
identified" (Prinz, 1986, p. 231). According to Prinz 'tnrget detection sometimes occurs without
(before) identification (...) [whichJ seems to indicate that detection and identification can
become dissociated under certnin conditions" (Prinz, 1986, p. 231). Therefore, Prinz (1986)
suggested a dífferent guiding principle for visual senrch that looks quite similar but in fact is
not. He assumes that search is not guided by tnrget control, i.e., relevant target information
given by instruction, but rnther 'to assume that targets are detected by default. With this
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explanntion, a target is detected because it is a nontnrget" (Prinz, 1986, p. 232). Prinz (1986)
argued thnt experimental studies nre biased to exnmine intentional tnsks (controlled by
instruction) ns compnred to unintentional tasks. He nssociates an unintentionnl task with
unspecific selection, thnt is selection by defnult with respect to some internal model of the
environment. Therefore, "the traditionnl theories of attention that cover mninly intentional,
relevance-bnsed 'specific' selection must' be complemented by theories of unintentional,
pertinence-based, 'unspecific' selection" (Prinz, 1986, p. 23718).
'The issue of whether the detection of targets presupposes the identification of the
items in the list, or whether it cnn nlso be based on n analysis of their physicnl (visunl)
features, is clenrly a task-specific version of the early-versus-late selection debnte in the
literature on attention. Students of seorch paradigms have tended to claim that, in
principle, selection does and can occur at both levels and that the actual task demands
determine which level is used (...) I(...) adopt o stronger version of this claim, namely, that
selection cnn occur nt both (or perhaps more) levels simultaneously (...). [This] makes sense
in the framework of models, which mointain that processing is independent from selection,
i.e. that the locus of selection has nothing to do with the depth of processing
(VanderHeijden, 1987; Allport, 1987). With this view, selection is no longer selection in
the sense of rejecting or attenuating irrelevant information, but rother in the sense of
creating some functional difference between relevant nnd irrelevant information. When
this framework is adopted, the assumption of simultaneous selection at different levels of
processing poses no problem at all" (Prinz, 1986, p. 232~3)
The implications of the view Prinz (1986) proposed ore not incompatible with the computntional
solution if we assume that the winner-tnkes-all procedure operates as follows. The solution thnt
is proposed here is that the most salient or conspicuous item vis-à-vis its contextual items is
cued (for memory storage, nction). A second implicntion of Prinis contextual nppronch is that
selections at different processing levels (enrly or where level and late or what level) are possible
nnd cnn occur simultaneously.
WHEN IS ATTENTION SEIECTIVE?
Vision has evolved so that we continuously select useful information that enters the visunl
processing mechanism (Prinz, 1986), but we also search for useful information in our
environment. Eye movements play an important role in making parts of the visual environment
accessible for inspection. During visunl orientntion our eyes move four or five times per second,
nnd each time a saccadic eye movement is made, the eyes briefly fixate nt one particular region
in the visunl environment. Two research approaches to visual search nre associated with eye
fixntions and saccadic jumps (Snnders and Donk, 1996). The structural constraint resenrch
trndition is concerned with the question 'What kind of information is extracted nt each fixation
time?' (Snnders nnd Donk, 1996). The concern of resenrchers thnt follow this tradition is, where
in the processing mechanism selections nre mnde. In other words, is the locus of selection early
or Inte? The other tradition, known ns the functional strategic research tradition, is concerned
with the question 'What determines the position of the next fixation; is the locus of control in
visual search externally or internally guided?' (Snnders nnd Donk, 1996). Note here that the
aforementioned computational solution to guiding principles regarding visunl senrch is closely
related to the functional strntegic research tradition. The structural constraint research
tradition is related to the early I late selection debnte. Both resenrch trnditions find their
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connection in visunl senrch. Other terms thnt relnte to internal nnd external control, which are
treated ns synonyms and are used higgledy-piggledy in visual perception liternture nre denoted in
Table 4.
TABLE 4: Terminology External ! Internal cantrol




Un i ntentional Intentionnl
Enviranmentnl I world Person
Bottom-up Top-down
In general, nll resenrchers do consider that both external and internal control should be viewed
as endpoints on a continuum, but in normal circumstances it is most likely thnt an interaction
between them guide the search process (Folk and Remington, 1996). Thus, resenrchers that
follow the functional strategic tradition are concerned with when selections are made. Sanders
and Donk (1996) nrgue thnt the subdivision between the two traditions is not nbsolute: n
combination of structural constraints and functional strategies is thought to determine the finnl
search pattern to extrnct the information that may be useful in n natural environment. In fact,
also Brondbent (1987) argued for a hybrid between a structural and strntegic appronch.
"The search for structure is n very rational hope that we can find variables whose
relationships stays constant. If we would find such variables,then we would not need to
hedge every psychological finding by confining it to particular circumstnnces (...) Certainly
strategic factors penetrate very far into the most apparently simple tnsks. If, therefore,
we senrch for structure (...), we shall keep getting defeated, because there are in fact
hardly nny mechanisms that operate the same way regardless of circumstances. One
person is quite different from nnother, and the same person changes, depending on post
experiences and on the momentary situation" (Brondbent, 1987, p. 78)
Therefore, "We need a kind of structure that allows for strategy" (Broadbent, 1987, p. 79).
In sum, three debates have been discussed. The first debate concerns whether the processing
system is limited or unlimited in copacity to process information. The limited cnpacity view
rendered selection ns selective processing. The unlimited cnpncity to process view opts for two
different functions, i.e., selection ns selection-for-action and selection as selection-for-memory.
The second debnte concerns how nnd where in the processing mechnnism selections are made,
i.e., nt an early stage or nt a late stage. For that, the computationnl solution suggests a winner
tnkes all procedure that operates nt an enrly level. The computational approach to selective
attention recognizes the intentional guiding aspect to visual search, which it does by postulnting
different weights of importance thnt can be attached to individual stimuli. The third debate is
concerned with the question whether the subject is in control or the world is in control over
what is selected. Consumer research was not involved in these three debates. The renson is
unclear, however.
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THE ATTENTTON SELECTION MODEL (ASM)
Based on the theoreticnl annlyses so far it has become clear that there is no single model thnt
explains the selectivity of attention for nll nttention phenomena. Here, we mnke an inventory of
the vnrious comments that have been produced on the various appronches to selective attention.
1. Broadbent's (1958) Filter theory is wrong but provides a useful approximntion to whnt people
usua~~ydo (Kahnemnn, 1973).
2. Kahnemnn's capacity theory of nttention let us to abandon the idea that cnpacity limits are
due to n scarcity of general, unspecific cnpncity (Neumann, 1987).
3. The resource concept hns fniled as nn heir to Brondbent's channel cnpacity and Kahneman's
unspecific cnpacity (Heuer, 1985; Neumann, 1987; 1996).
4. Treisman's Feature Integrntion Theory does not nccount for action as the function of vision
(VanderHeijden, 1992)
5. Neither a structural constraint view or a functional strategic view by itself determines
visunl senrch pntterns (Sanders and Donk, 1996)
6. VnnderHeijden's (1992) postcategorical model of attention hns not produced conflicting
results, but does not account for nll different kinds of nttentionnl phenomena.
Two conclusions m~ be stnted after the observation thnt no single model explains nll nttentionnl
phenomenn. First, there is no single model of nttention. Second, n single model of nttention thnt
cnn be trnnsferred to the consumer resenrch nrea is better than a number of clnssic theories of
attention that all can be criticized on inconsistencies. Therefore, an nttempt will be made to
propose a single model of attention that, theoretically, tnkes these inconsistencies into account
nnd that may be applied in a consumer behavior context. VnnderHeijden's model provides a
valunble starting point, because it has not produced conflicting results. However, there are quite
some pitfalls thnt mny lend to the conclusion that this model does not provide nn adequate
approach of attention for the field of consumer resenrch. We now turn to these pitfalls in order
to find out if a solution is possible.
First of all, VnnderHeijden's mode) is a structural model thot is based on empirical evidence that
does not go beyond a single eye fixation. As Sanders and Donk (1996) have nrgued, structurnl
models follow the research tradition guided by the question which information is extracted
during a single eye fixation. This implies that ihe stimulus exposure time does not exceed 150
milliseconds. It seems fair to conclude that this exposure duration and this model cannot provide
the starting point for n theoreticnl approach of consumer attention mechanisms and processes
ns in consumer resenrch stimulus exposure times range from a few seconds to self-selected
exposure time.
A second point concerns the menníngless nature of the experimentnl stimuli. VnnderHei jden used
stimuli such as squares and circles to exclude memory variance. His model does nccount for
spntial position and spatinl relations, but it does not nccount for identity relations. Stimuli in
consumer research experiments tend to be far from menningless, however. This leads to the
conclusion that his model cnnnot be regarded nt the bnsis of nn alternative model for a field in
which stimuli are often meaningful.
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A third pitfall concerns the pnthways from the input map (IN) to the locntion map (LO) and to
the identity domain (ID). These two pathways are bnsed on studies in neuro-physiology.
VnnderHei jden suggested that 'Visun) information enters the central processing system in nn
'input map' (the striate cortex?) (...) The informntion is sent on in an identity channel (the pnrvo
channel) nnd a location channel (the magno channel)" (VnnderHei jden, 1996, p. 31). Zeki (1993), a
foremost resenrcher on the brain, explnined in his book 'A Vision of the Brnin' that supposing
only two cortical visual pnthways is an oversimplification with regard to the cerebral machinery
involved in vision. The so-called 'what and wheré doctrine supposes thnt these two cortical
pathways are conceived as being mutually exclusive and hiernrchically organized. One of these
dual cortical pathways is thought to be specialized exclusively for 'form vision' or with 'what' an
object is; the other pathway for 'spatial vision' or with 'wheré an object is. These two cortical
pathwnys originnte from nrea Vl (the primnry visual cortex or striate cortex) and are viewed as
corticnl prolongntion's of pathways that are mediated by two sets of different Iayers of the
lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) and start from the retinn itself and are known as the
pnrvocellular or P and the mngnocellular or M pathways. In turn, the parvocellular and
magnocellular pathways hnve their origins in two different types of retinal gnnglion cells: P nnd
M type cells. Viewed from the retina, the P nnd M type cells terminate in the P and M Inyers of
the lateral geniculate nucleus (L6N} respectively nnd nre further relayed to area Vl that
further connects to the 'what' and 'wheré cortical systems (see Figure 8). "Hence, the fnte of
the two systems, the P nnd M on the one hnnd nnd the 'what and wheré on the other, have
become inextricnbly linked" (Zeki, 1993, p. 188).
Wherc
V(
Figure 8: A dingrnm of the flow of information ns conceived by Zeki (1993)
VanderHei jden based his model on the 'whnt nnd wheré doctrine. According to Zeki, the 'what
and wheré doctrine that, though attractive in its simplicity, turns out to be invnlid. Zeki
concludes that 'whichever way one turns, the evidence spenks agninst the kind of segregation
into two separate, isolated and hierarchically organized systems [where and whnt], denling with
object [whnt] nnd spatial vision [where] respectively, that the doctrine seek to establish. (...)
Perhaps a far better wny to look at this system is to accept that ench area will draw on arry
source to undertake its specialized task. Examples of one source of mnterial providing materinl
for another are common (...) The precise position of an object [where] nnd its relationship to
other objects (spatial vision) can give the vital clue to the identity of the object [what], nnd the
precise shape of an object [what] can give the vitnl clue to its position [where]" (Zeki, 1993, p.
194). In particular, Zeki's last point is in pnrt recognized by VanderHei jden when he added the
feedback loop from the location module (LM) to the input module (IN). Note that theoretically
the implication Zeki suggests here is a second feedbnck loop, that is one from the identity
module to the input module.
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A fourth and a final point relate to the enrlier discussed debnte: when is nttention selective?
Here VanderHei jden acknowledges the point rnised enrlier by Prinz (1986) that experimental
studies to selective attention nre biased towards intentionnl tasks and required responses.
VnnderHeijden recognizes this point by the following quote.
"And, because 'In practice, the observable criterion for successful 'attention' to (or
awareness of) an environmental event invariably turns on the ability of the subject to act
voluntarily, or, arbitrnrily, in response to that event" (Allport, 1987, p. 408), as a devoted
information processing psychologist, I especially looked for the effects of voluntary
attention. But, and for me quite unexpected, still two different notions seemed to be
involved in shifting compositions: two separate modes of control over the allocation of
attention. Often not the subject, but the visual world seemed in control (...) still nowadays,
passive involuntary nttention is nearly completely neglected (...). In most experiments
subjects receive an instruction. Then a stimulus is presented. Sub jects are expected to be
completely in control ond have to behave as specified in the instructions. (...) In general,
only a theory that acknowledges the existence and cooperation of attention, expectation
and intention and, within attention, both the contributions of involuntory and voluntary
attention, will be oble to elucidate the real function of attention in visual information
processing tasks. Both the subject and the world have to find their place" (VonderHeijden,
1992, p. 281I2)
It is noteworthy that, in contrnst to visual perception research, consumer resenrchers seem to
neglect the voluntary aspects of nttention. That is why responses in consumer research are
hardly required responses, but far more effectiveness responses. The combinntion of these
points also lend to the conclusion that VanderHeijden's model is not a useful cnndidnte for a
single alternative model of attention.
VnnderHeijden's theoreticnl notions (cf., Allport, 1987; Neumann, 1987) seem worth pursuing
becnuse the model has not produced conflicting results. However, because it does not fully
account for all different kinds of attentional phenomena, the model must be extended if we are
to accept it in consumer research ns a valunble alternative to Filter theory, Capacity theory and
Resource theory. Here, we will mnke an attempt to provide n solution to three problems
simultaneously. First, it should be possible to falsify the extended model on empirical grounds.
Second, we hnve to go beyond position relntions by also nccounting for identity relntions. Finnlly,
we should go beyond the domnin of n single eye fixation by nlso accounting for visunl search
strategies. Snnders (1998) suggested similnr ideas to this view. According to him, future
research that aims to check VnnderHeijden's theoretical notions will have to denl with less
constrained conditions. As Snnders point out, studies should go beyond n single eye fixation and
should add the relevnnt question if the identification module in his model is n tobula rasa when
the stimuli are presented.
The attention-selection-model (ASM) proposed here builds on VnnderHei jden's postcntegoricnl
model of nttention in thnt it departs from the unlimited capacity to process information. The
ASM captures the structure of VnnderHeijden's model. The model can be specified ns follows:
Informntion enters the input map (IN) nnd is further rel~ed to two sepnrnte modules thnt
undertnke specialized tnsks (Figure 9). The ASM denotes VanderHeijden's Identity Module (IM)
as the Identity Conspicuity Domain (ICD) and the Location Module (LM) as the Location
Conspicuity Map (LCM). The LCM is a snliency mnp just like the computationnl solution presented
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Figure 9: A dingrnm of the flow of informntion as conceived by DeHeer (this thesis)
earlier. A winner-takes-nll (WTA) procedure cues the most conspicuous location in the visual
scene. The most conspicuous location is based on the spatial relations between the items in the
visual scene, i.e., where-relntions. It is proposed here thnt also n similar WTA procedure cues
the most conspicuous item in n visual scene on the bnsis of its identity or meaning. Just like the
LCM the ICD is nssumed to be a saliency domain. In the ICD item conspicuity is bnsed on the
identity relntions between the present items, i.e., the what-relations. This proposal is consistent
with Prinz (1986) who argued that the most conspicuous item vis-à-vis its contextual items can
be simultaneously selected at the where (enrly) or what (late) level. At the LCM item conspicuity
is bnsed upon crude sensory features, such as contrast, brightness, color, outline, size, shape,
movement, etc. vis-à-vis their contextual items. At the ICD item conspicuity is based on the
(lack of) fit of its meaning with its surroundings - their placement vis-à-vis their context
contrnsts with expectntions. Note here that the ASM captures and extends VnnderHeijden's
model. It captures his model by accounting for spatial relations between items in the visual
scene; it extends his model by nlso accounting for identity relations between stimulus items.
There nre two feedbnck loops, (1) one from the location conspicuity map (LCM) to the input map
(IN) (in a similar vein as VanderHeijden, 1992), and, proposed here, (2) one from the identity
conspicuity domain (ICD) to the input mnp (IN) (as suggested by Zeki, 1993). Agnin note here
that the ASM extends VanderHei jden's model by the second feedback loop. The operation of
the feedback loops can be regarded as selective nttention triggered by position informntion and
~ or by identíty information. The map of locations and the domain of identities are the sources
of the attention. Both location information - if fed back to the input module - nnd identity
information - if fed back to the input module - isthe nttention. We therefore propose that the
operntion of the feedbnck (oops have functions in the selection of identified information and in
the selection of locnlized information. Conceptually attention is defined as the selector of
locnlized and identified information in the function of inemory storage and aÉtion.
So fnr, the ASM is a structural model based on the unlimited cnpacity to process and nccounts
for enrly selective cuing nnd for Inte selective cuing. Enrly selective cuing tnkes place at the
level of the locntion conspicuity mnp (LCM), nnd late selective cuing takes place at the level of
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the identity conspicuity domain (ICD). Early selective cuing at the LCM level is associated with
spatinl relntions (where-relations) between stimulus items nnd Inte selective cuing at the ICD
level is nssociated with identity relations (whnt-relations) between stimulus items. At both levels
all items thnt make up the visual scene nre important. Conspicuity is calculated by a winner-
takes-all procedure, and is based on the relations between índividual items present in the visunl
scene.
It is proposed here that the most conspicuous item (either nt the where or what level) in a visual
scene is cued for an effectiveness response (selection-for-memory) in the case of unintentionnl
acts. In other words, we propose here thnt the default value of the visual system is build to
select the most conspicuous item in n visual scene. In the cnse of goal-directed or intentionnl
acts, the subject is in control to nttach weights to individual ítems that make up n scene
irrespective of their conspicuity (that is conspicuity based on the where or what item
relationships). In principle, the subject is nble to overrule the defnult value of the system in the
cnse of intentional acts. In other words, the ASM is a structural model that allows for
strategies. 'Structurnl' refers to the way in which the visual processing system is organized, and
'strntegies' refer to the external or internal control within the system. Two visunl senrch
strategies nre distinguished: intentional or goal-directed visunl senrch and unintentionnl or
explorntory visual search.
The ASM, in the tradition of the nssumed functionnl relationship between perception and action,
considers two functions for selection, i.e., selection-for-memory nnd selection-for-action but
does not consider selection-for-processing [3]. Earlier we associated selection-for-memory with
the effectiveness response, and selection-for-action with the required response. It is
hypothesized that the most conspicuous item (either nt the LCM level or at the ICD level) in a
visunl scene has a higher probability to be selected for memory storage when the subjects' task
is unintentionnl, i.e., performs an explorntory visual senrch task. In other words, conspicuous
items in a scene incrense memory nccuracy, and therefore nre more effective in terms of
memory storage ns compared to inconspicuous items. In the cnse of a goal-directed visual search
task, it is suggested that all items present nt the same time in a visual scene have equal selection
probabilities to be stored for memory. Note that this latter case holds if there nre more items
in the scene, and subjects hnve not been specifically instructed to use some kind of selection
criterion, i.e., to set weights of importance for any specific item. For exnmple, by instructing
subjects that all items are equnlly important nnd no one in pnrticular.
3 Recently (see Deubel, Schneider Q Pnprotta, 1998 for references), various other models of attention have been
postulated based upon the where and whnt pathway, for exnmple, the Visuo) Attention Model (VAM) by Schneider (1995).
The VAM also suggests a common sekction mechnnism for both processing streoms. The VAM considers both processirg
strenrrts limited in capncity and considers ihe function of tht whnt-pathway as sekction-for-perception, nnd selection-
for-action is considered the function of the where-pathwny. ASM and VAM nre similar concerning selection in both the
where and what pathway. The VAM is in the tradition of the clossic npproaches to visual nttention in contrast to the
ASM. The ASM and VAM differ in one important aspect, i.e., ASM dau not consider sekction-for-processing in contrnst
to VAM. Also, VAM nims to exnmine of there is a unitary selection mechanism that operates in both pathways. The
question if multiple attentionol sekction centres versus one unitary sekction centre e~tists, is beyond the scope the
ASM.
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In sum, the ASM is chnracterized by:
1. Its structure consisting of an Input map (IM), Locntion Conspicuity Map (LCP), and an
Identity Conspicuity Domain (ICD);
2. Its account for spntial relntions between items and identity relations between items in n
visual scene;
3. Its allowed strategies, i.e., gonl-directed visual search and explorntory visunl senrch;
4. Its nssumption with respect to unlimited cnpacity to process information, and to the
functionality of selection in the control of nction (selection-for-action) and memory stornge
(selection-for-memory); and,
5. Its differentia) effect on the a priori selection probnbility of items bnsed upon the strategy
i nvo Ived.
The ASM contrasts VanderNei jden's model by:
1. Its account of identity relations (the identity module is not a tabula rasa);
2. Its account for both intentional and unintentional tasks; and,
3. Its nssumption of visual search strategies (that is, the ASM goes beyond single eye-
fixntions)
These differences between the models are functionnl becnuse we have concluded that
VanderHeijden's model cannot provide the starting point for a theoretical npproach of consumer
attention mechanisms nnd processes. In contrast, the ASM overcomes the pitfalls we have
illustrated earlier with respect to his model. In brief,
1. The ASM nllows for longer stimulus exposure durntions;
2. The ASM nllows for meaningful stimuli;
3. The ASM is in line with recent neurophysiological evidence; and,
4. The ASM accounts for initiatives taken by either the subject or the outside world.
In conclusion, the ASM explains why (unlimited capncíty to process; selection-for-action;
selection-for-memory), how(the WTA procedure at the location conspicuity mnp level and at the
identity conspicuity domain level), nnd when (explorntory visual senrch nnd goal-directed visunl
search) a pnrticulnr item (among other items in a visual scene) mny sort an effectiveness
response, i.e., be stored in memory.
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CHAPTER 3: TOWARDS A NEW METHODOL06Y
Chnpter Introduction
This chapter develops and proposes the serinl multi item recognition (SMIR) tnsk ns the
approprinte task to test the attention-selection-model (ASM) outlined in chapter 2. Further, it
deals with the experimentnl design, the hypotheses and the procedures that were followed to
collect the empiricnl data.
Resenrchers in the area of visual nttention use many variations on a limited number of different
tasks, viz. filtering tasks and monitoring tasks (Pnshler, 1998). VanderHeijden's model is based
on findings from filtering tnsks (Theeuwes, 1992). We start of with reviewing three variants of
filtering tasks. More specifically, pros and cons of the whole report, partial report and the rapid
serial visunl presentation (RSVP) task nre discussed. The SMIR task combines a report tnsk and
n rapid serinl visunl presentation (RSVP) task. In the larger context of consumer research, it is
importnnt to note thnt the SMIR task is built ns such to genernlize it ensily to more real life
consumer environments.
Report tnsks
In genernl, in a report task experiment subjects nre briefly shown a visual stimulus contnining a
number of items (e.g., letters or digits) and are instructed to report as many of these items as
possible immedintely after each stimulus offset. This task cnn be regnrded ns a multiple-item
task because at the same time multiple items are presented simultaneously. Basically, two
varinnts of the report-task have been used frequently in experimentnl psychology: the whole-
report task (Mackworth, 1959, 1962, 1963) nnd the partial-report task (Sperling, 1960, 1963,
1967). In the whole report task the subject is required to report as mnny items from the total
number of exposed items. In the pnrtial-report tnsk subjects hnve to report only a particulnr
snmple from the totnl number of items presented that satisfies a selection criterion (given by
instruction) nbout the nature of the stimuli.
In order to explain this type of data, a simple serinl two-store model for visual information
processing was postulnted (VanderHeijden, 1996). The visunl representation wns put in the first
store and reflects whnt the subject sees. Identified items were put away in the second store
and reflects what the subject knows. In essence, the whole-report tnsk examines the cnpncity
of the second store and the partial-report insk examines the capacity of the first store
(VanderHeijden, 1996).
Another important difference between the whole-report and the pnrtial-report tnsk is the
moment of instruction given to the subjects. In the whole report-task subjects are instructed
before the experiment starts. In the pnrtial report tnsk the time of instruction cnn be given at
nny moment before, duringand afterstimulus presentation by a so-called coded instruction. In a
whole report tnsk, subjects are confronted with, for example, a matrix of 3 x 3 stimuli. After
the mntrix is tnken nway, they are to report as many stimuli ns possible. No selection criterion
about the nnture of the stimuli is provided. In the partinl report task, the snme matrix is
presented nnd taken nwny without any support being provided. Before, during or after
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presentation, a tone is presented of which the pitch indicates whether the subject is to report
the top row, the medium row or the lower row of stimuli. The tone pitch specifically refers to
the type of response that is to be given.
Independent of the moment of instruction stimulus retrievnl [a] is observed to be superior in the
pnrtial report task ns compnred to the whole report tnsk. This result can not be attributed to
stimulus charncteristics because stimuli were selected on the basis of their equivalence in
physical appearnnce and cognitive connotations. According to Sperling (1960, p. 21) 'information
is initially stored as a visual image (...) Ss can effectively utilize this information in their partial
reports'.
Rapid Serial Visunl Presentation (RSVP) tnsk
The whole-report and partial-report tasks have in common that nfter stimulus presentation (and
instruction) the responses of subjects are collected. An example of a technique where subject
responses are not collected nfter each stimulus presentntion but after all stimuli have been
presented is the Rapid Serial Visual Presentntion (RSVP) task. In the RSVP task a sequence of
items is presented in a rapid rate, one after nnother, at the snme retinal position. This tnsk can
be regnrded as a single item task because, nt ench moment in time, only one item is presented.
Thus, the RSVP tnsk differs with respect to the whole-report nnd partial-report in two ways.
First, in the RSVP tnsk items are presented in series one by one versus multiple items at one
time in the whole-report and partinl-report tnsk. Second, in the RSVP task subjects' responses
are collected nfter all stimuli have been exposed to the subject versus the whole-report and
partial-report task where responses are collected after each stimulus presentation (after ench
trinl). Just like the partial-report task the RSVP tnsk allows for the possibility to vary the
moment of instruction. For example, in Eriksen á Collins' (1969) RSVP task the digit series 1 to 9,
with one out of nine digits missing, were briefly presented. In an instruction before stimulus
presentation condition subjects were told a digit nnme prior to ench trinl. The task was to
determine whether it wns presented or not. In an instruction nfter stimulus presentation the
nnme of the tnrget digit was given after all stimuli were presented. So, the task here wns to look
for the gap in the series. The unique feature of the RSVP task, of course, is that there is no
uncertninty with regnrd to spatial position; all items nre presented on the same spatia) position.
Table 5 summarizes the differences between the report tnsks and RSVP tnsk.
TABLE 5: Differences befween Re rt and R~VP tasks
WholslPartïn! r~eport ~~~~~` ~~~ ~ .~..á -~~ .~ .~-.. .,~ t . ~~.~ .,,~r
Multiple items parallel 5itgk items scttial
Spatial uneertainty, in principk No spatinl uncertoínty
Response colkction nfter ench singk stimuku prescntntion Respanse colkction nfter nll stimuli prescntntions (after
(nfter each triol) all,tràfs)
4 Consumer research denotes this type of stimulus retrieval as (unaided) recall and the data are usually depicted ns
number of items rewlled. Perception reseorchers often speak of the nccurary the stimuli are recognized, hence the data
are reported as recognition accuracy. Consumer research speaks of recognition or aided recall in the ca.se earlier
exposed stimuli ( seen item.s) are responded as has seen (thnt is, known) in n second exposure when the subjects response
is required.
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Towards the Serial Multiple-Item Recognition (SMIR) task
The pnrtial report nnd RSVP tnsks both allow for instructing the subjects how to act and where
to act upon n ter stimulus presentation. In this pnrticulnr case, it is nrgued here thnt durina
stimulus presentation selective nttention reveals itself by default. In other words, if there is no
specific gonl or intention to perform the tnsk, then the world (stimulus environment) is in control
and the default value of the visunl system selects the most conspicuous item for memory
storage. One of the importnnt differences between the partial report nnd RSVP relates to the
moment of response collection. For the RSVP the response(s) islare collected after all stimuli
have been presented. In contrast, response collection in the partial report task takes place
nfter ench stimulus presentation. The importnnt point here is that in the partial report task just
one trínl turns the unintentionnl task to an intention or goal-directed task even though subjects
still do not know where to act upon. The RSVP task becomes goal-directed in the case when it is
presented to subjects for a second time. If the researcher wants to study unintentional acts in
n series of stimulus exposures then the RSVP task (instruction afterwards) is suggested over
the pnrtinl report. On the other hnnd, the RSVP tnsk presents single items in series at fixed
positions in the visual scene, while the report task presents multiple items in parallel nt random
positions in the visunl scene. If the researcher wants to study conspicuity effects (ns defined in
this thesis) on memory accuracy then slhe should expose subjects to multiple items and allow
for spntinl relations between the items. In the case of exnmining conspicuíty effects on memory
accuracy, the report task is the appropriate tnsk. Yet, the nttention-selection-model wants to
study both selection-for-memory under intentional and unintentional task instructions, nnd wnnts
to study spntinl relntions between items and identity relations between items. In other words,
the appropriate task to test the ASM should meet the following requirements: (1) its account
for spatial relntions between items, (2) its account for identity relations between items, (3) its
account for spatial uncertninty, (4) its nccount for different task instructions. Therefore nnd
because of these rensons we here propose a tnsk thnt combines the report nnd the RSVP task.
The combination of the report tnsk and RSVP task results in the selection of a more complicated
technique: the Serial Multiple-Item Recognition (SMIR) task.
The spatial layout of the visunl scene is depicted in Figure 10. The visual scene consists of forty
squares (5 rows x 8 columns). At each stimulus exposure in each of four odjacent squares (upper
left, upper right, lower left, nnd lower right) n word [5] is presented. In other words, nt ench
stimulus exposure 4 items are presented simultaneously. Thus, 4 words make up one stimulus.
The SMIR contrnsts the RSVP by the presentntion of multiple items instead of a single item nt
one time. Second, the SMIR contrasts the RSVP by the random locations in the visunl scene. The
number of spntinl positions nt which a stimulus can appear is 28 (4 (rows-1) times 7(columns -1)).
The stimuli nppear at random locations within the visual scene. Note thnt the RSVP presents
single items nt the snme location. In contrast to the RSVP, there is uncertninty about the
locntion of the stimulus in the SMIR task. In the experiments described in this thesis, subjects
5 To illustrate why the ~15M model and the proposed SMIR task may be fruitful and mny mnke a difference to our
current thinking nbout consumer behnvior, let us take n well-krawn general behavior phenomenon as an example. More
specifically, let us consider a consumer standing in front of shelves with different brands or with a consumer that is
simultaneously exposed to a number of print nds in a magnzine or newspaper. The SMIR is built so that the artificially
visual scene (a rtatrix of 8 x 5 squares) nay be associated with renl shelrrs is a superrtarket, with a newspnper or
magnzine, and with the spatial Iayout of an Internet homepage for a business in e-comrt~erce. The products, brnnds, nds
and the like nre operationalized by the words placed in the squores. In this study the words presented are brond names.
40
Chapter 3: Towards a new tnethodology
nre exposed to n series of 56 stimuli. Therefore, the total number of words is 224 (56 trials
times 4 words). The stimuli nre briefly exposed (0.5, 1, or 2 seconds; depending upon
experimental condition). The time interval is fixed at one secand. The task given to the subjects
is relntively simple but specific: "press a button on each stimulus onset ns quickly ns possible".
Immedintely nfter nll stimuli are presented n recognition tnsk follows, in which one word at the
same time is presented on the screen. Here the SMIR contrasts the report tasks in which
responses nre collected after each stimulus presentntion. The response of interest here is
recognition accuracy, not reaction time. Subjects are required to press either one of two
buttons (yes or no) if they snw that word in the SMIR task. This is done for 448 words; 224
words nppeared as stimuli and 224 other words not.
Figure 10. The spntial Inyout of the SMIR task
Overnll conclusion
In sum, the theoretical analysis (Chapter 2) proposed the attention-selection-model (ASM). The
structure of the ASM nccounts for spatinl relntions nnd identity relntions between items
present in a visual scene. The strategies allowed by the structure of the ASM were denoted ns
goal-directed or intentional visual search and exploratory or unintentional visunl search. Further,
the ASM argued that the default of the visua) processing system was directed to select the
most conspicuous item at either the where-level or what-level during unintentional ncts. The
most conspicuous item is cued by a winner-takes-all procedure nnd is considered selected for
memory storage. On the other hnnd, if the tnsk is gonl-directed, it is nssumed that, with multiple
items in the visunl scene, in principle any item can be the cnndidate for memory storage. That is
when the instruction does not explicitly set the selection criterin regarding the nature of the
words in the stimulus.
Our methodological nnnlyses revealed thnt the report (whole and partinl) task nnd the RSVP task
are both important methodologies in the study of attentionnl phenomena. Ench task presents the
stimuli in its own wny (single items in seríes versus multiple items in pnrallel) and collects the
responses nt different times (nfter each stimulus trinl versus after all stimuli trials). It is
nrgued that specific parts from each task need to be combined to test the ASM. Because of the
requirements such ns spatial uncertainty, location and identity relations between stimulus items
both report nnd RSVP tnsk were combined nnd resulted in the SMIR task. The serial multiple-
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item recognition (SMIR) task combines the report tnsk (that is, position uncertainty, multiple
items) and the RSVP (that is, response collection after all stimulus trnils) in one methodology.
The SMIR tnsk proposed here nims to test the ASM empirically. Further, the SMIR tnsk is
easily transposed to more renl consumer environment situntions (see footnote 5).
6oal of the study
The central research question concerns the internal mechnnisms thnt mnke selective attention
possible. The nppronch we followed is consistent with the information processing npproach. The
information processing nppronch "tries to infer nspects of the internal structure and functioning
of n behnving orgnnism from the overt behavior of that organism, so that it becomes possible to
explain the orgnnism's behavior in terms of its internal structure and functioning"
(VanderHeijden, 1992, p.2).
The ASM accounts for visual search strategies (exploratory or unintentional visual senrch nnd
gonl-directed or intentional visual senrch) and the structure of the ASM predicts enhnnced
selection-for-memory probobilities regarding conspicuous items in the visual scene. Selective
attention shows up as superior in recognition performance.
The items in the visunl scene
The four words that mnke up one stimulus were not nrbitrarily chosen. One out of the four
items, i.e., one out of four brand names is manipulnted so that it is conspicuous vis-à-vis the
other three brand names. In total 224 (4 brand names times 56 trials) familiar brnnd names
were cnrefully selected. Two independent types of brand name conspicuity are distinguished:
visual brand name conspicuity and cognitive brand name conspicuity (e.g., Engel, 1977). Visunl
brand name conspicuity is understood as the degree of perceptunl prominence of n visible brnnd
nnme in its context. Visunl conspicuity is based upon crude sensory fentures, such ns contrast,
brightness, color, outline, size, shape, movement, etc. Cognitive brand name conspicuity is taken
ns the degree of cognitive prominence of a visible brand name nnd is based on the (lack of) fit of
its meaning with its surroundings. Cognitively conspicuous brand names nre not necessnrily new,
but their placement vis-à-vis their context contrasts with expectations.
Two independent types of brand name conspicuity make up four conspicuity conditions. A(target)
brand nnme can be (1) inconspicuous, (2) visunlly conspicuous but not cognítively conspicuous, (3)
cognitively conspicuous but not visually conspicuous, and (4) both visunlly conspicuous and
cognitively conspicuous vis-à-vis its contextunl brnnd names (see Tnble 6). Figure 11 translates
the conspicuity conditions in the operationalizations as visually depicted in the spatinl Inyout of
the SMIR tnsk. Figure 11 shows the letters A nnd B, which refer to brand nnmes. Brand names
denoted as A nre derived from the same product category, e.g., nre all beverages. The brnnd
nnme denoted ns B is from a different product category in comparison with A, for example, cnrs.
In this example, B is the cognitively conspicuous brand name. A white background versus the
gray background for the contextual brnnd nnmes operationalizes visually conspicuous brnnd
nnmes.
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TABLE 6; The conditions of brnnd name conspicuity
Candition Visuatly conspicuous vis-à-vis Cognitively conspicuaus vis-c-









Figure 11. The spatinl layout of the SMIR tnsk. The conditions: Top left VoCo; Top right V4Co;
Bottom left VoCt; Bottom right V;C..
We have distinguished two types of visual search strategies. It is nssumed that subjects either
follow an exploratory visual search or a goal-directed visunl senrch strntegy. We mnnipulated
visual search in the following wny. The subjects were instructed to press a button ns quickly ns
possible nt each stimulus onset. Our cover story was thnt we were interested íf subjects were
able to maintain their reaction times consistently in a series of stimuli exposures. Note that we
instructed the subjects about the specific oction thnt is required and we have informed the
subjects how to nct (press the button) and where to act upon (stimulus onset). Whnt is
importnnt to observe here is that the required response is pressing the button, which is entniled
by the selection-for-action view. The instruction does not inform the subject about the rea)
purpose of the experiment. The renl purpose is to exnmine if the conspicuous brand nnme in the
visual scene has n higher probability to be selected for memory storage, i.e. the second function
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of selective attention (selection-for-memory view). Higher recognition accuracy for conspicuous
brnnd names as compared with the contextunl brand names indicates that selective attention
revealed itself. Because it is the stimulus onset that triggers the renction time response we
nssume that subjects in this condition examine the brand names in nn exploratory and
unintentional manner. In other words, in this case subjects ndopt the exploratory visual search
strntegy. Subsequently, after nll 56 stimuli were presented, n recognition tnsk followed, in which
one brand name at one time was presented on the screen. Subjects were instructed to press
either one of two buttons (yes or no) indicating if they had seen that pnrticular brnnd name or
not in one of the previous exposures. Subsequently, after the recognition memory task, exactly
the snme procedure wns repented for each subjects. Subjects were required to perform the
same task for a second time. The instruction for the second time was exactly the same as the
first time. There is one important difference: we implicitly induced n second goal, i.e. brnnd name
recognition. So, now subjects had two gonls. The first is to give a fast but consistent reaction
time, nnd the second is to remember as many brand names. It is assumed that subjects this
second time are more goal-directed towards the brand names. In other words, in this case
subjects adopt the gonl-directed visual senrch strategy. Subjects now know how to act (give
reaction times as quickly nnd consistently as possible, nnd remember brand names), but they stil)
do not know which specific brand names to remember. In other words, there is no specific
selection criterion regnrding the nnture of any particulnr brand nnme to nct upon (e.g., the most
conspicuous one, the most interesting one, the one that is most personally relevant, the one that
sounds grent, etc). In other words, there is no a priori or specific target communicated to which
the nction should be directed, therefore, each brand name is a potential target for action (nnd
memory stornge). The argument ís made here that in this porticular cnse subjects deliberately
may choose one but not one in particulnr. In other words, nny brand name goes. In sum, in task 1
subjects exploratorily examine the stimuli and the default of the attention selection mechanism
selects the most conspicuous brnnd names for memory. In task 2 subjects adopt a gonl-directed
senrch strategy, which implies that nny brand nnme can be the candidnte for memory storage
but not necessarily the most conspicuous brand, depending upon the individual subject's goal
orientation.
Consumer research versus Viwal Perception research
One importnnt point deserves some more attention and concerns the difference between
consumer research studies nnd visual perception studies. It is recognized that the following
distinction is very broad and general. However, it is believed to be relevnnt to the present
discussion. In general, visual perception experiments nre chnracterized by (1) intentional tnsks,
(2) required responses, nnd (3) explicit selection criteria regarding the nature of the target
stimulus. These points nre inherent in the instruction given to the subjects, i.e., the subject
knows how to act (e.g., press the button) nnd what to act upon (e.g., the red item among greens
or the letter nmong digits). Further, this type of research is also chnracterized by the fairly
short stimulus exposure durations in the range of 50 milliseconds - 1 second. In contrast,
consumer research is, in general, charncterized by (1) unintentiona) tnsks, (2) effectiveness
responses, and (3) no explicit selection criterin. In genernl, the instruction given to the subject
is very broad like "we are interested in whnt you think nbout a series of ndvertisements that will
be presented to you". In consumer research, the factor exposure durntion is a criticnl factor in
need for cnreful consideration. Yet, the choice for a particular level of exposure duration in
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ndvertising research often seems determined by subjective criteria, which usually are not
communicated by the respective researchers. Instead, there seems to be a rnther broad rnnge
within which the manipulnted or nllowed exposure durntions may fnll, and from which a seemingly
rnndom nnd ad hoc sample seems to be made. By consequence, exposure time is not
systemntically varied, nor are compnrisons allowed between studies. To complicate matters even
more, some authors use self-selected exposure durntions by subjects or viewing time to infer,
for exnmple, the level of inessage elaborntion, thereby risking the confusion of confusing cause
and effect. Stimulus exposure durations in consumer research vnry, in general, between 1 second
and 30 seconds. Table 7 summarizes the differences between consumer research and visual
perception research.




Stimulus duration range [50ms - I sec]
Intentionnl tasks
Specific selectian criterin instructed
Required response
5election-far-memory
Stimutus durntion range [2 sec - 30 sec]
Unintentionnl tnsks
Pb specific selection criteria instructed
Effectiveness response
An important conclusiom m~y be stated nfter this observation: both arens lack n specific type of
response, i.e. consumer research lacks the required response and perception research lacks the
effectiveness response. There are two possibilities we might consider. First, typicnl consumer
resenrch studies should be extended to account for intentional tasks. Second, visunl perception
research should be extended to nccount for unintentional tasks as well. The first option
suggests that consumer resenrch should also be concerned with required responses, and the
second option suggests that perception resenrch should also be concerned with effectiveness
responses. óiven the complexity of the stimulus materinl (remember VnnderHei jden's notion
nbout studying real world phenomena), it seems premature at this point to opt for the first
option. Therefore, the approach taken here is to study selective nttention in a rather typical
visual perception experiment (with some methodological vnriations, and by using meaningful
stimuli) under both conditions of intentional and unintentionnl behnvior. It is recognized that the
more hnrd-to-collect evidence of the other type as sketched nbove must pnrallel this rnther
easy-to-collect type of resenrch, otherwise we do not get the full picture.
With respect to the factor exposure duration we opt for the point of intersection between
consumer research and visunl perception research. The renson is that we want to join consumer
research nnd visunl perception research, because of the gnp between the very short nnd
relatively long exposures used by the separate disciplines. Therefore, the stimuli exposure
durntions used in this study nre in the rnnge of 1 second. In fnct, three different stimulus
exposure durntions are used: 1 second, n fnctor 2 less (0.5 seconds), and n fnctor 2 more (2
seconds). The renson that we use fixed durntions is because we aim to compnre brand nnmes
conspicuity effectiveness between relatéd experiments. These relatively short exposure
durations do not contrndict our enrlier conclusion regarding the pitfalls with respect to
VanderHei jden's model. VanderHei jden (1992) bnsed his model on studies with stimulus exposure
durations of less than 150 milli seconds. Here we go beyond that by using longer durations. Also
the relatively short durations chosen here are not completely contradictory with exposure
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durntions in consumer resenrch. Recently, there seems to be an increasing interest within the
area of consumer research to exnmine the effects of briefly nnd initially exposed brand names
on the probabilities for inclusion in the consideration set to choice (MacInnis, Shapiro, and
Heckler, 1992; Jnniszewski, 1988).
The Theory - Methodology link
One finnl comment should be made regnrding the link between the ASM and the chosen
experimentnl method effectuated by the SMIR. If we nssume that the ASM is in principle
correct then the question about its falsification immediately follows. Basically nny task that
meets the following requirements is approprinte to falsify the ASM on empirical grounds. Tasks
should account for (1) spntinl relations between items, (2) identity relations between items, (3)
spatial uncertninty, and (4) different task instructions. It is outlined thnt the SMIR does meet
these requirements. In the larger context of consumer research (for which the ASM is
proposed) it is nlso important that n Iaboratory type of tnsk is generaliznble to realistic
consumer environments. Though it is possible to critically test the ASM by a number of variant
tasks, the SMIR, in pnrticular, nccomplish the Intter within the larger context of consumer
resenrch. In addition, the stimulus mnterial hns been chosen carefully to examine whether the
conspicuous brand nnmes vis-u-vis their contextunl brand names does have higher memory
selection probnbilities. The ASM proposes thnt conspicuous items in n visunl scene under
unintentionnl tasks are selected by default for memory storage. In fact, throughout this thesis
it has been argued that the conspicuous items in a visual scene hnve higher selection
probabilities. This seems reasonable because it is consistent with earlier findings for the visunlly
conspicuous items andlor with suggestions for the cognitively conspicuous items. A more
conservative point of depnrture might be considered given the nature of the stimulus material.
So far, the literature hns not described studies that explicitly examined memory accuracy
effects for brand nnmes that are exposed simultaneously at one time. Let nlone the
manipulations nnd operntionalizations of visually and cognitively conspicuous brnnd names. For
example, to manipulate a brand nnmés visual conspicuity we used contrast (tnrget on n white
background versus the contextual brnnd nnmes on grny bnckgrounds). Instead of contrast we
could have used, for example, different colors or luminnnce for target nnd flanking brand names.
Therefore, there are two possibilities we might consider. First, we might depart from the
conservntive view that nrgues thnt the recognition nccurnry di fers between the target nnd
contextual brnnd nnmes. Secondly, we might take a more progressive stand nnd depnrt from the
targets' hi her memory selection probabilities as compared to the contextual brnnd names.
There is advantage for the first option over the second given the (1) explorative nnture of this
type of resenrch, (2) the menningfulness of the stimulus material, and (3) the one (nrbitrary)
manipulation chosen for the brand name conspicuity manipulations. On the other hnnd, memory
effectiveness is expected to increase and not decrense for the conspicuous brand names.
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Hypotheses
The foregoing leads to the following hypotheses.
Hypotheses for the exploratory visual search condition in which the conspicuous brand names
serve as pre-defined tnrgets:
H1:
Torget brond names that nre inconspicuous to the contextual brond nnmes have equal
selection-for-memory probabilities under the unintentional and explorotory visual search
strotegy. Operationnlly, we expect to find that memory accurocy for a pre-defined torget
brond nnme is equal to the memory occurocy for its contextuol brond names.
H2:
Visually conspicuous brond nnmes have a higher selection-for-memory probability ns
compnred to their visually inconspicuous contextual brand names under the unintentional and
explorotory visunl search strotegy. Operotionnlly, we expect to find that memory accurocy
for a visually conspicuous brand name is higher than the memory accurocy for its contextual
brond names.
H3:
Cognitively conspicuous brond nnmes have n higher selection-for-memory probability ns
compared to their cognitively inconspicuous contextual brand names under the unintentional
nnd explorotory visual search strotegy. Operotionally, we expect to find that memory
accurocy for a cognitively conspicuous brond name is higher thnn the memory accurocy for
its contextual brand names.
H4:
Brand nnmes that are visunllytcognitively conspicuous have a higher selection-for-memory
probnbility as compared to their visuallyrcognitively inconspicuous contextual brond nnmes
under the unintentional and explorotory visual search strotegy. Operotionally, we expect to
find that memory nccurocy for o visuallytcognitively conspicuous brand name is higher than
the memory accurocy for its contextunl brond nnmes.
Hypotheses for the gonl-directed visunl senrch condition:
H5:
Visunlly, cognitively, nnd viwollytcognitively conspicuous brond nnmes have nn equnl
selection-for-memory probability as compnred to inconspicuous brond names (contextunl
brond nnmes) under the íntentionnl or gonl-directed visual senrch strotegy. Operntionolly,
we expect to find that memory accuracy for those conspicuous brond names are equal to
the memory accurocy for their contextual brond names.
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Experiments
All experiments hnve the same format and share the same approach. The reason is that we want
to study the dynamics of selective nttention and the effectiveness of brnnd nnme conspicuity
systematically. It is important to note that there are two ways to interpret these experiments:
as one overnll experiment containing 10 sepnrate conditions, or as a design consísting of 10
related experiments. The Intter option is preferred over the first because the experiment is
especinlly designed to study conspicuity effects in interaction with stimulus exposure duration
as well ns in isolation from stimulus exposure durntion. Yet, instead of describing each
experiment separntely, the general outline of all experiments is described here.
Subjects
In total, 250 first-year undergraduate psychology students [6] from Tilburg University
participnted in the experiments on an individual basis. Subjects were randomly nssigned to one
of ten experiments (N-25 per experiment). Subjects did not participnte more than once.
Subjects received credit points for their participntion as pnrt of course requirements. All
subjects hnd normal to corrected normal vision and visunl ncuity. None of the subjects were
fnmilinr with either the parndigm or the goal of the experiment. Subjects were carefully
debriefed not to tell others nbout the experiment.
Stimuli
In total 448 brnnd names were used as stimulus material in this study. From these 448 brnnd
names, 224 were actually presented in the visual search tnsks. The other 224 brands served ns
decoys for the recognition task, in which 448 brnnd names were presented. We assumed that nll
brand names were familinr to our subjects. The reason we used familiar brnnd names is obvious
because otherwise a brand name cnn not be cognitively conspicuous vis-à-vis its contextual brnnd
names. A stimulus example is provided in table 8. [7] See Appendix A for the brand names used
during the search tasks.
TABLE 8: An example of the brnnd names for ench conspicuity condition






The experiment was performed with an Olivetti P90 PC with a 17' NEC monitor. In order to avoid
glare on the screen, the lights in the room were dimmed. Each subjects' chin was plnced in n chin-
rest to keep their viewing distance nt 50 cm. A button-box was used to give the reaction-time
responses (ihe measurement of the RTs wns beyond the goal of this thesis. In fact, none were
mensured).
6 Details obout subject sample is owilable by outhor on request.
7 Note that this is an example using US brnnd nnmes. In the study only Dutch brand nnmes were used.
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Procedure
The experiment consisted of three phnses: (la) the exposure to the stimuli followed by (lb) a
not-expected recognition task, (2n) a repetition of the first phnse with the major difference
that the (2b) recognition tnsk was expected the second time, and (3) a questionnaire. The
pnrticipants were instructed to press n button nt ench stimulus onset ns fast nnd ns consistently
ns possible. It was explained that ench stimulus consisted of four brand nnmes nnd that all
stimuli appearances required the button to be pressed. Further, it was explained that on each of
56 trials the stimuli could nppear nt random locations within the 8 x 5 matrix. Stimuli locations
were randomized and on ench of 28 possible locntions a stimulus wns presented twice. The
location of the pre-defined tnrget (left up, left down, right up, right down square) was
randomized as well so that the predefined targets were equally distributed over the positions.
The serial order of stimulus trials was not varied between conspicuity conditions and subjects.
In other words, the stimulus order was fixed. Immedintely after all 56 stimuli exposures, the
subjects were confronted with a recognition task. In the recognition tnsk brand names were
presented on the monitor individunlly at a time. Subjects had to judge whether thnt brand name
wns previously presented or not; they did so by pressing the appropriate button. This was done
for 448 brnnd names (56 stimuli x 4 brnnd nnmes - 224 listed brand names and 224 not-listed
brnnd names). After the recognition tnsk the second phase stnrted. The second phase equaled
the first phase that is, exactly the same instruction wns given, the same stimuli were exposed,
and the snme recognition task had to be performed. We like to stress that the subjects had no
idea about the nature nnd goal of the experiment. Their comments afterwards suggested thnt
they thought the researcher was interested in the difference in recognized brand names
between the two exposures since in the first phase the recognition task was unexpected and in
the second phnse the recognition tnsks wns expected. Finally, in the Inst phase subjects had to
fill in a questionnaire. The questions related to (1) the familinrity of the brand names, (2) if
brand nnmes were personnl relevant, (3) brand experience, (4) the intention nspect to perform
the two tasks et cetera. Thése questions served as manipulation checks (e.g., (un)intentional
ncts, known brand names) All subjects were tested individually. The total time to test one
subject was approximntely 1 hour (instruction 5 minutes, tnsk 1 15 minutes, task 2 15 minutes,
questionnnire 25 minutes).
A point thnt needs to be discussed is n possible critique [8] on the experimental design that
might be the risk of a sequence or transfer effect that might contaminate the brand nnme
conspicuity manipulation. It could be argued that the recognition task, whích follows the first
series of stimulus exposures should be considered the experimental treatment in the design and
thnt the treatment mnnipulntes the search strntegy, i.e., subjects become goal-directed. If the
nrgument is valid a typical pretest-posttest should be conducted. To mnke sure that the
obtained effects of the second recognition task can be attributed exclusively to the renl
experimentnl manipulation (brand name conspicuity), one should include a control group to
exclude the plausible rival hypothesis, concerning a sequencing effect. If the sequence effect
occurs then this would amount to nn inseparable effect of carry-over and brnnd name conspicuity
in the recognition scores. These effects cannot be separated from one nnother without the
inclusion of a control group. We did not include a control group, however, for reasons to be
explnined below.
8 The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for his helpful comments on this point.
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First, the suggested pretest-posttest design with a control group is not possible. If the pre-
response mensure in our design (the first recognition task) is considered the trentment than
this suggests that no responses can be collected for the control group after the exploratory
search condition. The trentment effect cannot be assessed by compnring the difference
measures between the experimental group nnd control group, simply because there are no
pretest scores avnilnble for the control group. One may compare the posttest-scores between
the experimental nnd control group but the possibility of a sequencing effect for the
experimental group still holds. In other words, a pre-posttest including a control group ns was
suggested by the reviewer does not seem to exclude the rivnl hypothesis.
Second, it mny be argued that the first recognition tnsk should not be considered the
experimental trentment. On the contrnry, it is the subjects' expectntion that a second
recognition tnsk would follow, which altered the visual senrch strntegy, i.e., from exploratory to
goal-directed search.
Third, there is no reason n priori to expect a carry-over effect becnuse the rnndomization
procedure [9J (stimulus order, stimulus locntion, target position over subjects, experimental
conditions, nnd first and second series exposures) highly decreases the possibility of cnrry-over
effects. If and only if the second recognition scores include cnrry-over effects from the first
recognition nssessment, then the effects nre equnlly sprend over nll experimental conditions and
do not systematicnlly affect the results. It mny, therefore, be hypothesized thnt nny
conspicuity effects found for the explorntory visual search condition are captured nnd equnlly
extended (whntever direction) in the recognition scores for the goal-directed visunl search
condition. We return to this point in the discussion section.
9 The order in which the 56 stimuli were presented was randomized over subjects, experimental conditions, and first and
second series exposures. The locations of the stimuli in the visuol scene (in principle, each stimulus could appear on 28
different locotions) was randomized over subjects, experimental conditions, and first and second series exposures. The
position of the target within the stimulus (upper left, upper right, lower left, and lower right) wns randomized over
subjects, experimental conditions, and first and second series exposures. Both the stimulus location and target position
randomization procedure nade sure that the location of the stimuli were equnlly distributed over the 28 possible
locations and the position of the target wns equally spread out over the 4 possible positions. Hence, a stimulus appeared
twice at each location in the visual scene and targets appeared 16 times at each possible target position.
50
-- -~ --..- - -.-,--- ---.-, --. .-.-..-.-- Chapter 4: Results discussion and concluSions
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Empiricnl results
Mnnipulntion checks
Three manipulntion checks were conducted, one with respect to the subjects' familiarity with
the brand names, the second regarding the operationnlization of the conspicuous brand names,
and the third one concerned the visual search strategy manipulation. The data for the
manipulation checks were taken immediately after the recognition accurncy data collections by
means of a questionnaire. For the brand names familiarity check each subject simply reported if
they were familiar with the individual brand nnmes or if they were not. These assessments were
taken for the 224 exposed brnnd names. Subjects had also to choose the most conspicuous
brand names out of 4 brnnd names that made up one stimulus. All subjects did this for all 56
stimuli, irrespective the nnture of the experiment. In addition, we asked subjects to what
extent they were motivated to see I rend the stimuli in the first part of the experiment (which
we denoted as the exploratory senrch condition) and the second pnrt of the experiment (which
we denoted as the goal-directed visual senrch condition).
1. There was no reason to believe thnt subjects were not fnmilinr with the brnnd nnmes. Over all
conditions and subjects 91.3'~0 of the 224 brand names were reported ns familinr and 8.7'~0
were not. Based on these figures it is concluded that the subjects were highly familinr with
the a priori chosen brnnd nnmes.
2. The correlation between the predefined target (as set by the experimenter) and the most
conspicuous brand name chosen by the subjects wns calculated for each condition. Note we
nvernged over stimulus exposure conditions. The correlation between the inconspicuous pre-
defined brnnd nnmes and the conspicuous brand names chosen by subjects wns not
significant (r--.006). The correlation between the predefined cognitively conspicuous brand
names and the ones chosen by subjects was significnnt (r-.759). It is concluded that the
manipulntion of conspicuity worked as intended. The white background for the target as
opposed to the gray background for the contextual brand names was not in need of n
manipulation check. It is assumed that the target brand names were nppropriately visually
manipulated.
3. On a 7-point scnle with end-points 'not at nll' (-1) and 'very much' (-7) and no semnntic labels in
between, the menn score wns 2.65 regarding the motivation to see I read the stimuli during
the first part of the experiment versus 5.96 for the second pnrt of the experiment. These
scores differed significnntly from one another (tc~. z,s~ --25.076; p- 0.008). This result is
tnken ns the indication that the visual search manipulation worked as intended.
Analyses
What needs to be compared and why? Two kinds of nnalyses will be performed (1) within
conspicuity condition nnalyses and (2) between conspicuity condition analyses. The first type of
nnalyses is directed nt the exnminntion of the hypotheses for ench individual experiment thnt is
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for a pnrticular brand name conspicuity condition, n particulnr exposure durntion condition, and
for a particular visual search condition. The general question to solve in this type of nnalyses is
whether the predefined tnrget (conspicuous brand nnme) is differently recognized as compared
to the contextual brnnd nnmes. The second type of analyses examines the interaction of
conspicuity nnd stimulus exposure durations on recognition accurncy for ench visual search
strategies. The relevant question is to whnt extent brand nnme effectiveness depends on the
duration of exposure. The question regarding visunl senrch is under whnt search strntegy nre
conspicuous brnnd names effective? The SMIR task allows us to exnmine interactions between
exposure duration and visual senrch for each conspicuity condition. Note that with 4 conspicuity
conditions, (1) inconspicuous brnnds, (2) visually conspicuous brands, (3) cognitively conspicuous
brands, nnd (4) both visuallytcognitively conspicuous brands, nnd with 3 stimulus exposure
conditions (1) 0.5 seconds, (2) 1 second, and (3) 2 seconds, twelve experimental cells result.
Table 9 summarizes. The inconspicuous brand names condition serves ns a control condition
(exposure durntion is chosen to be 1 second) [10]. Hence, datn for two cells have not been
collected. In sum, the independent vnriables in this study are brand name conspicuity and
stimulus exposure duration (both between subjects) nnd visunl senrch strategy (within subjects).
The dependent variable is recognition accuracy.
No a priori or post hoc criteria were made that might have excluded data. Hence, dnta from all
subjects were used for dntn analyses. For each condition of exposure durntion and visunl search
the recognition accuracy scores were nveraged over subjects for ench brnnd nnme conspicuity
condition. A Chi-square test was used for the proportíonal differences in recognition accuracy
between target and contextunl brand names. A repeated mensures design was used for the
second type of nnnlyses with visual senrch strategy as the within subject vnriable and stimulus
exposure durntion nnd brnnd name conspicuity ns the between subject fnctors. For reasons of
clnrity the empirical results are presented in tables (like Table 9) and figures.
Table 9 depicts the experimental design. In totnl we had four different conditions of brand
name conspicuity (rows) nnd three different stimulus exposure durations (SED) (columns). The
layout of the design is followed throughout tnbles 10, 11, and 12.
TABLE 9: The type of target cons icwty within tht 30 ex imentcl conditions
~ ~ ~ ~ p`.~
~ ,,,~,..
- Inconspicuous (VoCo) -
Visually (V~Co) Vsunlly (V~Co) Visually (V.Co)
Cognitively (VoC4) Cognitively (VoC4) Cognítively (VoC~)
Visually~Cognitively (VEC~) Visunlly.Cognitively (V~G) VisunllytCognitively (V~C4}
Table 10 depicts the total numbers of brnnd names that were correctly recognized for each of
four brand name conspicuity conditions nnd stimulus exposure duration ns well ns for the two
different search strntegies.
10 Note thot at first we stnrted out to run the experiment just for the one-second-exposure duration. It became clear
that the inconspicuous targets were not differently recognized as compared to the contextual brand name. Hence, we
left the control conspicuity condition out for the other levels of stimulus exposure durotion.
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TABLE 10: Total numbers brand names correctly recognized~ , ~~,~ , ~ a„~,,
~~~ SED-0.5 scconds S~-~. ~
p ~ ~x ~~~.9,
;i~m..
ExQlorntary Gáa!-drrect~~ ~F ~ ~,,~,;., ~ ,, ~ ~. .I~~~; ~.,~ - ~ ~"
- - - - 250 779 471 1382 - - - -
427 1030 643 1568 346 968 516 1462 471 1271 655 1964
238 753 293 955 248 201b 467 1423 332 l159 599 1761
335 572 435 622 242 557 375 1152 36i 800 583 1632
Total number target brand nnmes was 25 (subjects) x 56 (trinls) x 1(target brand names per stimulus) -
1400; Totnl number contextual brand names is 25 (subjects) x 56 (trials) x 3(flanking brand names per
stimulus) - 4200.
Table 11 depicts the same results in recognition accurncy converted to percentnges.
TASLF 11: percentnges (~o) brand nnmes were correctl rec nized
SEb-t).5 x~zconds 5ED-1 sé ,~r `` ~ ~~i~~
, ~ ~ .~s ,~, r~ ~~ ~ ~T~ ~ e,~ . ~ ~
ExptnreztorY ~ ~~::.. ~~' T ~ ~-
`1ft~gef coèrte~rr Tá~9ex`
y,,.
W. ~~~ ~' `
~ s,~,;~ ~.
n~
- - - - 17.9 18.5 33.6 32.9 - -
30.5 24.5 45.9 37.3 24.7 23.0 36.9 34.8 33b 30.3 46.8 46.8
17 I7.9 20.9 22.7 21.3 24.2 33.4 33.9 23.7 27.6 42.8 41.9
23.9 23.b 31.3 14.8 17.3 13.3 26.8 27.4 25.8 19.0 41.b 38.9
Table 12 provides the calculated x2. The general hypothesis tested wns if the tnrgets were
significnntly different recognized ns compnred with the contextunl brand nnmes. The a á b's
indicate the significantly differences, where a denotes that the target is recognized over the
contextunl brand nnmes and b denotes that the contextunl brnnd names are recognized over the
target brnnd nnmes. Figure 12 depicts the results visunlly.
TABLE 12: Recognition occuracy differences between target nnd contextuol brnnd nnmes (x2
ore depicted)
S~f3-0.5 seconds SEi~-1 secohd , v~'~y ~ ~. :,
enx'r~~,.. s~ „~,m~ ~r-,-n ,~.:, ~ 9NPE P i R"
~, o,~i,, S ~,"~~x~i0~~ .,~ ~~.. ~.x,~
- - 0.333 0.258 -
29.482 n 32.465 n 1.624 1.927
0.621 1.985 4.933 b 0.172






xzcv - 3.841, ~-.05, n- significant target i context, b- signifiwnt torget ~ context, ](2 -(Total targets 4 Totnl
contextunls) x(Yes responses target x No respon.ses context - No responses target x yes responses context) z I[(yes
responses target ~ no responses target)(yes responses context t no responses contextxyes responses target f yes
ruponses context)(no responses target ~ no responses context)]
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Figure 12: Recognition memory for the conspicuous brand nnmes and the contextual brand nnmes for
the two visual senrch strntegies and three different stimulus exposure durations
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The repeated measures [ll] nnnlyses with visual search strntegy as the within subject factor
with two levels (explorntory search and goal-directed senrch) and the two between subject
factors ench with three levels (stimulus exposure durntion with levels 0.5, 1, and 2 seconds and
brand name conspicuity with levels visually, cognitively, nnd visually.cognitively conspicuous brnnd
nnmes) eventuated in the following results for the conspicuous targets.
The test of the within subject effects showed a main effect of visunl search strategy [ F(1,
12599) - 693.970; p-0.000 ]. More tnrget brand names were recognized correctly under the
goal-directed visual senrch ns compared to the explorntory visual search routine. The interaction
with type of conspicuity was significant [ F(2,12598) - 3.135; p-0.044 ] and the interaction with
stimulus exposure duration wns significant ns well [ F(2,12598) - 21.410; p-0.000 ]. Also, the
three-way interaction with type of conspicuity and stimulus exposure durntion was found
significant [ F(4,12596) - 10.758; p-0.000 ].
The test of the between subjects showed n main effect for brnnd nnme conspicuity on
recognition memory [ F(2,12598) - 89.172; p-0.000 ] and a main effect for stimulus exposure
duration on recognition memory [ F(2,12598) - 71.493; p-0.000 ]. The interaction between
stimulus exposure duration and type of brnnd name conspicuity on recognition memory wns
significant as well [ F(4,12596) - 20.699; p-0.000 ]
Note thnt no specific hypotheses on the effects of exposure duration on recognition memory
were formulated because of the exploratory charncter of this study. On the other hnnd, as
shown, a significnnt internction between type of conspicuity and stimulus exposure duration
should not be excluded. Scheffës multiple compnrison t tests [12] were used for the post-hoc
test and revealed that recognition nccuracy is different between condition levels. Tnble 13a
visualizes the results for the explorntory visual senrch condition nnd Tnble 13b for the goal-
directed visualsearch condition.
11 The measurement of recognition accurary, i.e. the dependent variable, hos either of two volues. Therefore, the nature
of the data is ordinal (e.g., recognized - 1; not recognized - 0). If we sum aIl resporues we generate metric data. This
gives us the opportunity to go beyond descriptive statistics. If we do this for each subject separately then is it allowed
to use a parametric statistical test like an ANOVA - repeated measures.
12 Scheffês multiple comporison t tests are available by author on requut.
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Visuoly (V~Co) VisUCfy (v~CO) i
L
~
Cognitivey (vaG) Cognitivey (Vot~)
Visuafy.eognitivey (v.G) Visuafy.eoynitiesy (v.c,) YisunfytCognitivcM (VK~)
The black lines indicate that the differences between those levels were significantly different wherea.s the gray
indicates that the difference in recognition memory was not significant.
TABLE 13b: Post-hoc tests for yoal--dïrected visuaV search
; SED-0.5 seconás SED-1 second SED-2











Vls,aly.Cognitivey (V~G) Visuofy~Cognitivcy (VK~)
The black lines indicote thnt the differences between those kvels were significnntly different wherens the gray
indicates ihat the difference in recognition memory was not signifícant.
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~iscussion and conclusion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effectiveness of conspicuous brnnd
names. It was predicted by the ASM thnt brand nnmes, which are conspicuous vis-à-vis the
contextual brnnd names nt the where-level, what-level, or both would differ in the selection-for-
memory probnbilities when consumers adopt nn exploratory search strntegy (hypotheses 1, 2, 3,
and 4). This wns empirically supported. In fact, visually conspicuous brand nnmes increase the
probability to be selected-for-memory (for all exposures) [13], while cognitively conspicuous
brand names decrense the probability to be selected (for 1 and 2 seconds exposure durations
but not for 0.5 seconds). Visuallytcognitively conspicuous brand names, which are conspicuous at
both the where-level nnd what-level, increase the probability to be selected for all exposure
durations. It was also predicted by the ASM that recognition nccuracy for the conspicuous
brand names would not be different from recognition accuracy for the contextual brnnd names
under the goal-directed visual senrch condition (hypothesis 5). This was empirically supported ns
well. Contrary to our predictions the recognition nccurncy were found to be different for the
0.5 second stimulus exposure duration in the case of visually, and visuallyicognitively conspicuous
brand names. Not surprisingly, recognition accuracy is enhnnced by incrensed stimulus exposure
duration, nnd for intentionnl ncts (goal-directed visual senrch). Nere we point to the risk of a
sequence effect that wns raised earlier in the method section. We argued thnt any conspicuity
effects found for the exploratory visual senrch condition are captured nnd equnlly extended in
the recognition scores for the gonl-directed visual senrch condition. Although it is realized that,
in principle, the experimental design may not be legitimized on the basis of results obtained with
thnt same design, we may observe that the data does not support thnt n sequence effect
occurred.
The main conclusion is that the obtained results support the predictions by the nttention-
selection-model. Not expected wns thnt the cognitively conspicuous brand names had lower
selection-for-memory probabilities. On the other hand, the unexpected results were
consistently found nnd therefore call for nn explanation that should mnke it possible to adapt on
the ASM in order to account for these findings. Later on, we will speculate nbout n possible
solution. First we elnborate on the results some more.
Explorotory visual search
Stimulus exposure durotion: Half-second
The finding that visunlly conspicuous brnnd names nnd visually4cognitively conspicuous brand
nnmes have a higher recognition accuracy ns compared to the contextual brand names was
predicted. Not predicted wns thnt cognitively conspicuous brand nnmes hnve equal selection
probnbilities ns compared with the contextual brand names. Important is, thnt visually
conspicuous brand names have higher recognition nccuracy as compared with the cognitively
conspicuous brand names and the visually.cognitively conspicuous brand names.
At first sight, these findings suggest that at a stimulus exposure duration of 0.5 second
13 Note that the effect was not found for the one-second exposure duration. If we drop just n few subjects from the
analyses the effect becomes significant, howeMer. The few subjects that were deleted in this second analysis performed
terrible on both search conditions. Therefore, the fact that the interpretation is biased for the one- second exposure
durotion is in line with the other findings nt the half-second and two-second duration.
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conspicuous identity information cnnnot become availnble for responding. On the other hand, a
cnreful inspection of the datn shows that conspicuous identity information has an impnct on
recognition accurncy if the informntion is also visually conspicuous. In fnct, visually4cognitively
conspicuous brand names hnve lower recognition accuracy ns compnred to visually conspicuous
brnnd names but higher recognition nccuracy ns compared to cognitively conspicuous brnnd
names. Because the only difference between these conditions is the pre-defined tnrget (the
contextunl brnnd nnmes nre equal for all conditions), the effect is attributed to the type of
brnnd nnme conspicuity.
Stimulus exposure duration: One-second
The finding was predicted thnt visually conspicuous brnnd names and visunlly.cognitively
conspicuous brnnd names hnve higher recognition accuraty as compared to the contextunl brand
nnmes. The important finding is thnt cognitively conspicuous brand names hnve lower selection
probnbilities than the contextual brand names. Visually conspicuous brnnd nnmes hnve equnl
recognition accurncy as compnred with the cognitively conspicuous brand names nnd higher
recognition nccuracy ns compnred with the visunllytcognitively conspicuous brand names. As
compnred to the results for the 0.5 seconds exposure durntion the first result to note is that
cognitively conspicuous brand names have lower selection probnbilities nnd not equnl selection
probnbilities.
Stimulus exposure durotion: Two-seconds
The finding that visually conspicuous brand names nnd visuallytcognitively conspicuous brand
names have higher recognition accurncy as compared to the contextual brand names was
predicted. The important finding is that cognitively conspicuous brand names hnve lower
selection probabilities than the contextunl brand names. Visually conspicuous brand nnmes have
higher recognition accurncy than the cognitively conspicuous brand names and the
visually}cognitively conspicuous brand names.
As compnred to the results for the half-second nnd one-second exposure durntion the first
result to note is thnt cognitively conspicuous brand names hnve again lower selection
probabilities (such as in the one- second exposure) and do not have equal selection probnbilities
as found in the 0.5 second exposure.
Gool-directed visual seorch
Stimulus exposure durotion: Hnlf-second
We did not predict the finding that visually conspicuous brand names and visunllytcognitively
conspicuous brnnd nnmes hnve higher recognition nccuracy ns compnred to the contextual brnnd
nnmes. Predicted was that cognitively conspicuous brand names have equal selection probabilitíes
as compared with their contextual brand names. Important is, that visually conspicuous brand
names hnve higher recognition accuracy as compnred with the cognitively conspicuous brnnd
names nnd as compnred with the visunlly;cognitively conspicuous brand nnmes. Also, thnt the
visually4cognitively conspicuous brnnd names have higher recognition accuracy as compared with
the cognitively conspicuous brand names.
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These findings are exactly similar to the findings for the unintentional visual senrch task. In this
particular cnse the default value of the visunl system accounts for the dntn. The most plausible
explnnation is that if stimulus exposure durntion is very brief, then the goal-directed visunl
search strategy that is allowed for by the structure of the ASM is not nble to reveals it self.
Stimulus exposure duration: One-second
As predicted, the recognition accurncy between nny type of conspicuous brnnd name and
contextual brand names are not different. Any brnnd nnme within each stimulus has nn equnl
probnbility to be selected for memory storage. Subjects knew that they had to perform a
recognition memory task but were not given selection criterin where to act upon, i.e., which
brand names from the set of simultaneously presented brand names.
Stimulus exposure duration: Two-seconds
Consistent with the one-second findings, nlso here no differences in recognition accurncy were
found for any type of brand nnme conspicuity ns compared with their surrounding contextual
brand names.
Towards a solution
How cnn we account and explain the findings that were not predicted by the ASM. In other
words, how can we account for the findings that cognitively conspicuous brand nnmes hnve equnl
nnd lower selection for memory probnbilities than their contextual brand nnmes? And, why is it
thnt the contextunl brand nnmes nre recognized over the cognitively conspicuous brnnd names?
Together, our findings suggest that the feedbnck loop from the location conspicuity mnp (LCM)
facilitntes responding regarding visually conspicuous brand names in n visunl scene, and thnt the
feedback loop from the identity conspicuity domain (ICD) does not facilitnte responding
regnrding the cognitively conspicuous brand nnmes in the visual scene. In fnct, if we nccept
inhibition rather thnn facilitation for the second feedback loop from ICD to IN then we nccount
for the unexpected findings. Apparently, the stimulus exposures 1 nnd Z seconds show this
empiricnlly. If we are willing to accept that the feedback loop form the Identity Conspicuity
Domain to the Input Map inhibits rather thnn facilitates memory stornge, then the ASM
accounts for the unpredicted effects found for the cognitively conspicuous brand nnmes.
Second, if we are willing to nccept that very brief exposure durntions prevent a goal-directed
strategy to take over the defnult selections, then nll effects are accounted for. The question
here is if there is a rationnle for the acceptance of these ASM ndjustments nnd extensions.
The winner-takes-nll rule at the identity conspicuity domain (ICD) is bnsed on the meaning fit of
individual items. It was suggested thnt n brnnd name thnt does not fit, bnsed on the identity
relationship between all brand names present in the visual scene, is cued for memory storage
(that is, under the explorntory visual search condition). In other words, we expected thnt
memory stornge was facilitnted by conspicuous brnnd names. There were two rensons to expect
this. First, it was in (ine with the reasoning thnt items in a visual scene are completely annlyzed in
parallel up to the identity level. Second, the facilitation etfect for cognitively conspicuous brand
nnmes at the ICD is in line with the facilitation effect suggested for the visually conspicuous
brand names at the location conspicuity map. In contrnst with n facilitntion effect an inhibition
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effect was observed for cognitively conspícuous brand names. This leads to the suggestion that
brnnd names thnt do not fit with the surroundings at the identity level are inhibited nnd
therefore have a lower probability to be selected for memory. Parnllel distributed processing
(PDP) models or connectionist networks to memory mny provide the solution to understand and
explain this finding. Though several PDP models hnve been proposed (see McLelland and
Rumelhenrt, 1986a,b) the assumptions common to these models is of interest here. In essence,
PDP models assume thnt the information nbout a person, object, or event is stored in several
inter-connected units rather than in a single place. In our brnnd names exnmple, it is assumed
that brnnd names nre stored in separate units and that, over time, learning and experience
increase the connection strengths among these units. When one of these units is activated, it is
nssumed thnt other connected units are activated as well. If we nssume thnt in our study four
brnnd nnmes nre simultaneously nctivated, then three contextunl brand names nre related,
meaning that the connection strengths between these brand names may enhnnce itself circularly,
i.e., ench brnnd activates the other two. At the same time the strength of the connection
between the contextual brand nnme units and the cognitively conspicuous brand name unit is
nssumed to be wenk. If this cognitively conspicuous brand nnme is simultnneously present, the
memory network, based on over time learning nnd experience, probnbly inhibits the nctivntion of
the connection strength between the units of the contextunl brand nnmes and the cognitively
conspicuous brand name. As n result, the cognitively conspicuous brand name is inhibited and has
a lower selection-for-memory probability. This process - the spreading of activations - takes
place within a time-domain. This is consistent with our findings because the inhibition effect is
not observed for the 0.5 seconds exposure duration but only for the 1 and 2 seconds exposure
durntions. Further, the data showed that visually4cognitively conspicuous items have lower
memory nccuracy thnn visunlly conspicuous ítems. It was shown as well thnt the difference in
recognition nccuracy between visunlly~cognitively conspicuous targets and contextual brand
nnmes is Inrger than the difference between visually conspicuous targets and the contextual
brand names. The visuallytcognitively conspicuous brnnd names do stimulate a memory effect but
the effect is límited because the relnted contextual items enhance themselves circulnrly, nnd
thereby inhibiting the nctivntion strengths between the units of these contextual brand nnmes
and the conspicuous brnnd name. In nddition, the PDP npproach to memory offers a conceptunl
framework thnt fits nicely with the unlimited capncity notion. The PDP npproach is consistent
with the view that processing occurs in pnrallel rnther thnn in n serial fashion (e.g., Eysenck nnd
Kenne, 1990). Note that the PDP appraoch npplies only to the Identity Conspicuity Domain (ICD).
Remember that Neumnnn (1980) suggested that the superiority of physical selection criteria
(e.g., the color of the target) is restricted to intentional or gonl-directed tasks whereas
semantic (or identity) selection criteria (e.g., n letter among digits) may at least be efficient in
the cnse of unintentionnl or explorntive selection. Note thnt it wns beyond the present thesis to
study the effect of conspicuity for different selection criterin, i.e. different instructions.
Neumnnn suggestion was based on studies, in which it was found that a subjects' own name had
higher selection probabilities on memory retrieval when no specific selection criterion was given
regnrding their own name (Moray, 1959). In other words, nll stimuli informntion - the subjects'
name included - must be processed up to the level where it cnn be identified. However, the
subjects' own name is not relntively cognitively conspicuous (vis-à-vis the contextunl items) but is
inherently cognitively conspicuous (i.e., is vivid). Becnuse cognitively conspicuous brand nnmes vis-
à-vis their contextunl brand names nre not necessarily vivid it seems thnt items in n visual scene,
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which are cognitively conspicuous vis-à-vis the flanking elements do not facilitnte n memory
effect if no specific a-priori selection criterion is provided. In the case of intentionnl selection,
physicnl stimulus nttributes nre much better selection criterin thnn semnntic attributes. Why
this is so is still unsolved, however (Neumnnn, 1996). A possible answer mny be found in the
default selections of the ASM. In our findings visually and visually;cognitively conspicuous brnnd
names (at the 0.5 second exposure duration) were found to be effective under both visunl
senrch conditions. This suggests that, irrespective of subjects' intention, the defnult solution
provided by the structure of the visual system operates and selects the most conspicuous brnnd
name for memory.
In the larger context of this thesis some very recent literature on emotion is worth seeing. The
renson is that it may provide an ndditionnl nrgument, npnrt from the PDP approach, for
understanding the effects of brand name conspicuity found in the empirical pnrt of this thesis.
Aside, Dmm~sio (1998) suggested that emotions are the major adaptive factor in the human
(consumer) decision-mnking process. He argues that cognition and emotion are not 'oppositional'
nnd that affective menning might even drive cognitive activity. Two papers thnt discuss the
aesthetic response to nrt are reviewed here. This topic - the aesthetic responses to nrt - has
been very recently discussed in a special issue of the Journnl of Consciousness Studies, entitled
'Art and the Brain' (1999). The contributions in this volume came from various authors with
different backgrounds viz. psychology, neurophysiology, nnthropology, evolutionnry biology,
philosophy and art. Two contributions are interesting here. One is by Ellis (1999) becnuse of its
theoreticnlidea regnrding input-output relnted processes, which is consistent with the line of
reasoning presented in this thesis. The other contribution by Rnmachandran and Hirstein (1999)
offers "eight Inws of artistic experience". In particular, two laws nre important viz. (1) the
perceptual grouping or binding rule, nnd (2) the extraction of contrast rule. Both these rules may
provide an additionnl insight in the conspicuity effects found.
Ellis' article entitled 'The dance form of the eyes: what cognitive science can learn from art' will
be reviewed first. We restrict ourselves here to one section of the paper thnt focuses on the
suggestion thnt "totol motivationol purposes of our organisms leod us to see vccording to
exp~ectotions and motivoted interest that precede the presentotion of a given stimulus" (Ellis,
1999, p. 162). Interestingly, Ellis opts for n view that 'reverses a traditional way of looking at
the brain, in whích perception wns supposed to feed information into the brnin, which in turn led
to thoughts about the information and finally action" (p. 162). In fact, he nrgues thnt the
response must precede the stimulus. 'Mnny neurophysiologists (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Posner, 1990;
Luria, 1980; Pnnksepp, 1998; Pribram, 1991) are now beginning to realize that the artists were
right nll nlong, and that the situation is just the reverse: our emotions gear us up for nction, nnd
then we search and scnn the environment for relevant perceptunl cues, which become conscious
to the extent thnt they resonate with imnge schemns (Varela et al., 1991) that were already in
the process of being developed in response to frontal limbic emotionnl purposes (Ellis, 1995) (...)
Being geared up for action does not determíne which nction we wnnt to perform. It only alerts us
that something important is happening, and thnt we need to do something nbout it.' (Ellis, 1999,
p. 162I3). The next citation by Ellis clenrly demonstrates the action related appronch as has
been put forward in this thesis in the context of selective attention.
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"Thus the model of the mind ns a passive receiver of causal work done by stimulus inputs
places the cart before the horse. It is this fundamental shift in the direction of causntion
which is now sometimes referred to as the 'eractivé view of the mind (...) rather than a
stimulus causinga response, it is the response which must occur first, and then acton the
incoming afferent signals to produce a stimulus. We might call this enactive approach the
current 'Copernican revolution' in cognitive theory and neuroscience." (Ellis, 1999, p.167)
The following quote is interesting from severnl perspectives. First, it is recognized that not only
the individual is in control (voluntnry or intentional ncts) but the stimulus environment as well.
Second, it deals with conspicuous objects in a visual scene and selective attention. Third and
most importantly from n methodologicnl point of view, Ellis argues thnt if no specific selection
criterin nre provided of where to act upon (like in our experiments), then subjects simply make
up their own goal.
"In some instances, the emotional motivations not only pre-exists the presentation of the
stimulus, but are also activated in n primitive, preperceptual wny by the stimulus itself,
through direct contact with the emotional brain prior to perceptual processing. (...)
Similnrly in visual perception, we are preprogrammed to treat certain kinds of items as
having nttentive priority - moving objects, objects whose Gestalt makes them seem novel,
unusual or unexpected, and especially objects whose retinal image suddenly increases in
size. This direction in the philosophy of mind is completely consistent with the notion that
most bnsic categories are purposeful, subject-related ones involving value, meaning, gaal,
effort etc. These subject-related cntegories enjoy n certnin priority over incoming
sensory information. The categories of an orgnnism's consciousness are determined, not
just by input from the environment, but also by the purposes of the orgnnism. (...) In light
of the above analysis, to sny thnt art 'moves us' is slightly misleading. It might be more
nccurate to sny thot it presents us with a favorable opportunity to allow ourselves to
move. This would be consistent with the fact that each viewer will get something
different out of the same painting, and the same viewer will get different things at
different times" (Ellis, 1999, p. 168I9)
The iden thnt subjects make up their own goal is important. In the goal-directed visual search
tnsk subjects 'knew' that Inter on n recognition task hnd to be performed. Subjects, like Ellis
(1999) suggested, somehow decide where to act upon in their own gonl-directed manner (and
therefore nny brand name may be selected). The assumption is thnt ench subject will get
something different out of the same stimulus. Therefore, we expected thnt n conspicuous brand
name hnd an equal selection-for-memory probality ns compared to the inconspicuous brand
nnmes. This wns found except for the visunlly and the visuallytcognitively conspicuous brand
names in the 0.5 stimulus exposure duration. Apperantly, an intentionnl nct is allowed to overrule
the default vnlue of the processing system over time.
We now discuss two rules proposed by Ramnchnndran and Hirstein (1999) thnt mny provide nn
nddiditionnl argument to account for the conspicuity effects. To account for our findings we
proposed that the feedback loop from the ICD to the input map inhibits rather than facilitates
the most conspicuous item in n visual scene. The feedback loop from LCM to input map facilitates
the most conspicuous brand nnme in the visual scene. In other words, nt the where level the
conspicuous brand name is fncilitated and increnses the probability to be selected for memory,
and nt the what level the contextunl brand names are facilitated for memory effectiveness. The
PDP appronch mny explain these effects but it is yet unclear whot kind of rules mny guide this
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process. Therefore, the two rules suggested by both authors in the context of aesthetic
experience are here of interest. These two rules are (1) grouping and (2) contrnst.
Grouping is achieved by "two dozen visual [brain] arens, ench of which is concerned with a
different visual nttribute such as motion, color, depth, form, etc. These areas nre
probably concerned with extracting correlation's in 'higher dimensional spaces - such as
'color spacé or 'motion spncé. In a regular topographic map - e.g., in area 17 - features
that are close together in physical space nre also close together in the brain (which is all
that is meant by 'map'). But now think of non-topographic mnps - say a map of 'color spacé
- in which points that are close together in wavelength are mapped close together in the
color nrea of the brnin even though they may be distant from eoch otfrer physicolly
(Barlow, 1986). Such proximity along different feature dimensions may be useful for
perceptual grouping nnd 'binding' of features that are similar within that dimension. (...)
even though the grouping mny be initinlly bnsed on autonomous process in each module
(Mnrr, 1981), once a cluster of features becomes perceptually salient as a'chunk' (...), it
may send a signnl to the limbic centers which in turn causes you to 'hold on' to that chunk
to facilitate further computation. There is physiologicnl evidence that grouping of
features leads to synchronization of the spikes (action potentinls) of neurons that extract
those features ( Singer and Gray, 1995; Crick and Koch, 1998) and perhnps it is this
synchrony that nllows the signal to be sent to the limbic pathways (...). óiven the limited
attentional resources in the brain and limited neural space for competing representntions,
at every stnge in processing there is generated 'Look here, there is a clue to something
potentially object-liké signal that produces limbic activotion ond drows your attention to
that region (or fenture), thereby facilitating the processing of those regions or fentures
at earlier stages. Furthermore, partial 'solutions' or conjectures to perceptual problems
are fed back from every level in the hierarchy to every earlier module to impose a small
bias in processing and the finnl percept emerges from such progressive 'bootstrapping'
(Ramochandran et al., 1998)" (Ramachondran and Hirstein, 1999, p. 22I3).
"Grouping (...) is an important principle, but the extraction of features prior to grouping -
which involves discarding redundant informntion and extracting controst - is also
'reinforcing'. Cells in the retinn, lateral geniculate body ( a relay station in the brain) and in
the visual cortex respond mainly to edges (step chnnges in luminonce) but not to
homogeneous surfnce colors [see also Hubel and Wiesel, 1979] (...) What is frequently
overlooked though is that such contrast extractions - ns with grouping - mny be
intrinsically pleasing to the eye (...). Agoin, though, if contrast is extracted autonomously
by cells in the very enrliest stages of processing, why should the process be rewarding in
itself? We suggest thnt the answer once agaín has to do with the allocation of ottention.
Informotion (...) exists mainly in regions of chonge - e.g., edges -and it makes sense that
such regions would, therefore, be more nttention grabbing - more 'interesting'- than
homogeneous arens. So it may not be coincidental that what the cells find interesting is
also what the organism as a whole finds interesting (...). We do know thnt the attention
grabbing effect of contrast must be very important principle in nnture, since it is often
used ns camouflage device by both predators and their prey" ( Ramachandrnn and Hirstein,
1999, p. 26I7).
For now we leave out the nuthors' notion of attention. Only the two rules, i.e., contrast and
grouping nre of interest. Despite the orthagonal relntion between the two rules, the authors
provide nn interesting marriage of the two rules.
63
CFZapter 4: Results. discussi~n and conclusions
'At first the two principles we have just considered seem antithetical; grouping on the
basis of similarity is rewarding, but if so how can contrnst (the very opposite of grouping)
also be rewarding? One clue comes from the fact that the two mechanisms have different
spatial constraints; grouping can occur between similar features (e.g. color or motion) even
if they are far apnrt in spnce. Contrast, on the other hand, usually occurs between
dissimilar features that are physically close together. Thus even though the two processes
seem to be inconsistent, they actually complement one another in thnt they are both
cancerned with the discovery of objects - which is the main goal of vision. (...) It is easy to
see then why the two should be mutually reinforcing and rewarding to the orgonism."
(Ramochandran and Hirstein, 1999, p. 27).
Building upon Rmm~chnandran and Hirstein (1999) in the context of the distinction between the
where and the what level, it is proposed here thnt grouping operates at the whnt level and thnt
contrnst operates at the where level. In other words, though it is logicnlly plausible that both
rules may operate nt both levels, the simple solution, to the orthogonal relationship between the
rules, is that the rules operate simultaneously but nt different levels. To put it yet differently,
grouping is not bnsed on the location of items in a visunl scene but on the semnntic or identity
relntions between items, i.e., the contents or what the items are all about. Grouping on the basis
if item-cntegory relations account for the facilitation effect for the contextual brnnd names in
the case a cognitively conspicuous brand nnme is present. Contrast is based on the location of
items in n visunl scene, i.e., on the spntinl position or where the items are positioned. Contrast on
the basis of item-visual-dissimilarity accounts for the fncilitation effect for the visually
conspicuous brand nnmes.
In sum, the nttention-selection-model (ASM) was tested using the serinl multi item recognition
(SMIR) tnsk. It was expected that conspicuous brand nnmes vis-à-vis their contextual brand
names had different recognition memory accuracy when subjects ndopt an exploratory visunl
search strategy and thnt if a gonl-directed visual search strategy is adopted, the brnnd nnme
conspicuity effect on the probability for selection-for-memory vanishes. It was found that
visually conspicuous brand nnmes result in higher recognition accuracy, cognitively conspicuous
result in lower recognition nccurncy, nnd visunllytcognitively conspicuous brand names result in
higher recognition accuracy, that is for the exploratory search condition. The recognition
memory effects were not found for the gonl-directed search condition except for the very brief
stimulus exposure durations. These results support the ASM model. That is, we assume that (a)
the feedback loop from ICD to input map inhibits rnther than facilitntes the conspicuous brnnd
names, and (b) that for very brief exposure durntions the nllowed visunl senrch strategy (goal-
directed search) is not able to overrule the defnult selection-for-memory probabilities of the
processing system. We argued thnt the pnrallel distributed processing (PDP) frnmework to
memory in conjunction with the grouping rule nnd contrnst rule nccount for and explain the
observed effects.
In conclusion, the ASM was proposed ns a single model of nttention. It was argued that a single
model is better than a number of clnssic theories of nttention that all cnn be criticized on
inconsistencies. The ASM can be fnlsified on empirical grounds and the SMIR task hns the
advantage thnt it cnn be genernlized to real environments. It cnn be transferred to n number of
different arens of applicntion (e.g., Art). We now turn the implications for consumer research.
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Chapter 5: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMER RESEARCH
In consumer research, attention plays a crucinl role in informntion processin9 models and is
nssocinted with nttention capture (selection) nnd retention (the allocation of resources or
processing cnpacity). The concept of attention is hardly discussed but simply conceptunlized in
terms of a prerequisite for processing in communicntion information processing models. As a
consequence, most resenrch effort wns devoted to examine higher order cognitive processes nnd
affective processes', assuming that selective attention was not the interesting issue (Pieters nnd
Wnrlop, forthcoming). In particulnr, the localization and identification of stimuli present in the
consumer environment hns, to my knowledge, never been an explicit topic for research. In the
nttention-selection-model (ASM), localization nnd identification nre separated and assigned to
two distinct, pnrallel information processing channels (where and what) thnt have their own
properties and characteristics. This ASM is at variance with current theoretical idens in
consumer resenrch. That is, regarding the important aspects of (limited versus unlimited)
cnpncity nnd selection rensons (selection-for-processing versus selection-for-nctíon and
selection-for-memory). It is believed, however, that the ASM provides the possibility to revisit
nnd reformulate interesting and long-stnnding research issues in consumer research and
therefore may stipulate the resenrch agendn in nn unexplored direction. These issues relnte to,
for exnmple, (1) information (over)load, (2) the information processing of visuals and text in nds,
(3) perceptunl salience in stimulus-based shopping situntions, (4) stimulus salience in associntion
with MOA information processing models, (5) brand consideration set inclusions during brief
exposures, (6) consumer information search. In consumer research these issues have been
associated with the concept of nttention. It we assume, for the sake of argument at least, that
the ASM is bnsically correct it must follow that contemporary conceptualization(s) of attentíon
in consumer resenrch is(are) not sufficient to explain the observed data. Unfortunately, and
probably unintentionally, conceptualizations of attention in consumer research are sometimes
very unclenr nnd modified along the way to explain the observed fncts. Hence, every now and
then it seems n small step from the razzle-dazzle conceptualizations of nttention to the twisting
of words to nccount and explnin the findings.
The breakdown of this chnpter is ns follows. The first section examines the current
conceptualizntions of nttention in consumer research. We do this by drawing from the consumer
resenrch literature, which shows that consumer resenrch trnnsferred the three classic theories
of attention viz. Filter theory, Capacity theory, nnd Resource theory from the visual and
nuditory perception aren to the field of consumer research. Some razzle-dazzles will become
evident along the wny as well as two dissident views. The second section deals with some open
research issues in consumer resenrch. The ASM might have important implicntions for both
sections. The ASM is proposed as a single theory of nttention and might stipulate the future
research ngenda in a different dírection.
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ATTENTION IN CONSUMER RESEARCH
Consumer resenrch hns recognized the importance of theories of nttention from psychology.
"Psychological theory of attention (...) has been developed to aralyze the reception of
auditory and visual stimuli in noisy ernironments. Because advertising, too, consists of
messages received in a complex or noisy environment, its aralyses should be able to make
use of the extensive development of attention theory in psychology". (óreenwald and
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Leavitt, 1984, p. 583, footnote)
The view that consumers are limited information processors because they hnve a limited
capacity to process information is widely accepted in consumer resenrch. Moreover, the
acceptance of this point of view has been the starting point of theorizing about attentional
processes.
"(...) consumers have limited capacities to process information" ( Bettman, Johnson and
Pnyne, 1991, p. 57)
"The notion that the human processing system hns an asymptotic limit in "capacity" can be
used as the basis for the investigation of such related constructs and processes as
"attention", "elaborntion", and "mental effort" (Owen, Lord, and Cooper, 1995, p. 84).
"Given the widely accepted model of a capacity-constrained information processor (cf.
Bettman, 1979), ottention serves as an important "tuning" mechanism in the active
selection of information for additional processing (Bargh, 1982; Broadbent, 1977;
Kahneman, 1973; Neisser, 1976)". (Ratneshwar, Mick, and Reitinger, 1990, p.547)
If it comes to the capacity issue of the brain, then there are two possibilities we might consider
on pure logical grounds. One is the brain is limited in capacity to process information. The other
is that there are no capacity limitations to process information. It is clear that in consumer
resenrch the limited capncity to process view is advocated. In contrnst, the ASM is based on the
unlimited capacity to process view.
The issue of selection during perceptunl analyses is widely nccepted in consumer resenrch. The
presumed renson for selection, conceptualized as the functional consequence of limited cnpacity,
as the following two quotes show, is found in consumer literature as well.
"Before and during conceptual anolyses, consumers engage in perceptual aralyses
(Greenwnld and Leavitt, 1984) when devoting focal attention to the stimulus. In perceptual
analyses, consumers examine sensory features, such as shape, color, and size, they
decipher the stimulus into category codes, such as brand nnme, pictorial and textual
information for a brand pockage, and they select certain elements of the stimulus over
others". (Pieters and Warlop, 1999, p. 2, underlined added)
"In view of this capacity limitation, one must selectively isolate, from the enormous set of
stimuli present in the environment, those few which are to become the subject of STM
operations. This selection process may be voluntary (volitional, purposeful) or involuntary
(imposed by some element of surprise or contrast with competing stimuli)". (Lord and
Burnkrnnt, 1993, p. 48)
Though the ASM hns made the nrgument to disagree this position on both these issues, it is the
common view in consumer resenrch. The selective attention issue cnn be found in consumer
research more thoroughly and clenrly in the following citntions. Here the three clnssic nttention
theory viz. Filter theory, Cnpncity theory and Resource theory become evident.
Rntneshwar et al. (1997) posit their view regarding selection, which is in close resemblance with
the theoretical ideas of Broadbent. Filter theory stntes that to overcome information overload,
a filter nt the entrance of the processing system selects the relevant from the irrelevant
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information.
"(...) we posit, that whenever there is potential for information overload, consumers will
selectively attend to those product features (...) that map on to habitual andlor situational
benefits that are currently snlient. (...) Features that map on salient benefits should pnss
through the attentional filter of the consumer, while features that do not map on these
benefits will be'filtered out'" (Ratneshwor, Warlop, Mick, ond Seeger, 1997, p. 245)
Also Krugman (1977) points to Broadbent's filter theory ns n starting point to deal with selective
attention to advertising.
"I recently received a long-awaited copy of a paper by ihe eminent Donald Broadbent of
the Depariment of Experimental Psychology at Oxford University (Brondbent, 1977). In
this paper Broadbent cites resenrch to support the view that the perceptual system
operates in o hierarchical fashion - i.e., the eye (or mind) in selecting from the
environment whot it will attend to must reject a great deal in order to select in what it
will accept. This process of rejection is an octive rather than a passive process, says
Broadbent. Thus, to some small but measurable degree, one must note, perceive, or
identify what one will not attend to in order to reject it (...) One of the main unresolved
tasks for advertising research is to explore the unknown territory between what we now
call attention and nonattention. The selective process of attention involves more levels of
attention than we like to admit (...) In general, let's not shortchange the remarkably
sensitive capacities of the human eye and brain, and let's not shortchange the advertiser".
(Krugman, 1977, p. 12)
Knhneman's capncity theory is found in the work by Pieters et al. (1996), Pieters and Warlop
(1999), and Schoormans and Robben (1997).
"Visual attention is generally conceptualized as (...) "a brain operation producing a localized
priority in information processing - an attentional 'window or 'spotlight' that (ocally
improves the speed and reduces the threshold for processing events" (Deubel and
Schneider, 1993, p. 575)" (Pieters, Rosbergen and Hartog, 1996, p. 242)
"Attention refers to the momentary focusing of inforrration processing capacity on a
particular stimulus (...) The ability of stimuli to attrnct consumer attention is a
prerequisite for information processing" ( Schoormans and Robben, 1997, p. 274)
Broadbent's filter theory, which in fact is a structural single channel information theory, goes
sometimes hand in hand with Kahnemnn's capncity theory of attention. Note the reference mnde
to Broadbent and Kahneman in nssociation with cnpncity theories of attention. Of course,
Brondbent's filter theory is not a capacity theory.
"Capacity theories of attention (see, e.g., Broadbent, 1971; Kahneman, 1973) as well as
information-processing models (see, e.g., óreenwald and Leovitt, 1984; MacInnis and
Jaworski, 1989) assume that ihe attention allocated to an nd is a function of con.sumers'
motivntion, opportunity, and ability, which nre affected by, for instance, physical
properties of the advertisement and consumers' chnracteristics" (Rosbergen, Pieters, and
Wedel, 1997, p. 305)
The trnnsitions from Kahnemnn's capacity theory to variants of the resource theory are best
illustrated by the following citntions.
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'(...) Though in models of attention both focus (our term 'attention') and the extent of
processing (our term'capncity) are considered under the genernl rubric of nttention (see
Kahneman, 1973; Norman and Bobrow, 1975) we separote the two constructs here. In our
view attention more clenrly details that which receives processing resources. This
construct may or mny not predict the extertt of working memory (capacity) allocated to
the task. As is consistent with other integrntive attitude formation models (Batra nnd
Ray, 1985; Greenwnld and Leavitt, 1984; Mitchell, 1981; Petty nnd Cacioppo, 1986a, b), we
propose that allocated processing capacity is a limited resource that is pnrtitioned in
varying degree as a function of motivation" (see MacInnis and Jnworski, 1989, p. 5, italics
added).
This citation exemplifies, how in consumer research attentional theories may be modified, in
particulnr, the phrase 'we separate the two constructs here". Let us first look more closely how
Knhnemnn (1973) handled those concepts since n listed reference to his work suggests that his
ideas were widely borrowed. Besides, note the combination of Capacity and Resource theory in
the references by MacInnis and Jaworski (1989).
"It is not ensy to find out how Knhneman (1973) defined the relationship between the
concepts of attention, capacity and effort (...) (he) gives the impression that he regarded
the three terms as synorryms. On the other hnnd, the title Attention and Effort suggests
thnt he thought of nttention and effort as two different concepts. Indeed, a careful
reading of the text reveals that he used the two terms with different meanings. However,
he did not define their difference consistently, nor did he use the term 'capacity'
consistently. One conceptualization of the relntionship between attention and effort was
bnsed on the distinction between the selective and the intensive nspect of nttention,
which Kahneman (1973) adopted from Berlyne (1969). The selective aspect refers to the
fact that attention can be directed to some contents at the expense of others, while the
intensive aspect refers to the fact thnt a person can deploy more or less attention. Bnsed
on this distinction, Knhneman stated that 'the intensive aspect of attention corresponds
to effort' (Knhnemnn, 1973, p.12). This suggests that Kahnenwn regarded attention as the
more genernl concept, and effort as n term that designed the intensíve, but not the
selective, nspect of attention. Other formulations imply, however, that effort was meant
to be the basis of selective attention as well as of the intensive nspect of attention: '(...)
selective attention is viewed ns the selective allocation of effort to some mental activity
in preference of others' (Kahneman, 1973, p.12). This seems to express a different
conceptualization of the relationship between attention and effort, viz. that 'effort'
refers to the supply that is allocated, while 'attention' is the act of allocoting it. This
interpretation is, however, refuted by other passages in the book where Kohneman refers
to an 'input of attention' (e.g. pp.9 and 12). It is likewise not quite clear how Kahnemnn
conceptualized the relationship between the concepts of 'attention' and 'capacity'.
Sometimes he seems to have used the two terms as synorryms (e.g. pp. 9 nnd 13). Other
passages (e.g. 'n cnpncity theory of ottention', p.7) suggest that he regarded cnpncity as a
theoretical construct that was intended to explain attention." (Neumann, 1996, pp. 401-
402).
Neumann's annlyses point to the inconsistencies regarding the concept of nttention, cnpacity nnd
effort in Kahnemnn's theory. It is therefore not surprising that borrowing concepts ('nttention'
and 'capacity', 'effort') from Knhneman hns led to similar inconsistencies nnd confusions (rnzzle-
dazzles) in advertising communicntion models. These inconsistencies nre best illustrated by the
following citations, in which resources, effort and capacity are used changeably (the relevnnt
passnges are underlined).
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"The motivation, opportunity and ability to process information plny n fundamental role in
determining recipient response to promotional communications. As defined by MncInnis et
al. (1991:34), motivation is the 'desire or readiness to process', opportunity is 'the extent
to which distrnctions or limited exposure time affect (...) attention', and nbility refers to
recipients' 'skills or proficiencies in interpreting (...) information'. The Elaboration
Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981) postutntes that individuals who are high in
processing motivntion, opportunity, and ability will, upon exposure to n persuasive message,
engnge in the purposeful ratioral processing of inessage arguments (central route to
persuasion). The recipient in such scenorio, enjoying the benefit of relatively undistracted
exposure to a message which s~he has both the desire and the requisite skill to interpret,
is viewed as intentionally nllocatingcognitive resources for that purpose. Alterratively, at
reduced levels of motivation, opportunity or ability, any persunsive effect, which emerges,
is presumably associated with the individual's liking or disliking of relatively effortlessly
processed executional elements (peripheral cues) of the messnge (peripheral route to
persunsion). Therefore, those following the centra) route will, according to Petty and
Cncioppo, nllocate greater effort to the processes of nttention, comprehension,
elaboration and integration (incorporation of inessnge elements into existing schemata;
e.g., personalizing the information to the self) than those responding only to peripheral
cues" (Lord and Putrevu, 1993, p. 62)
'(...) Greater allocation of attentioral capacity (...)" (Lord and Putrevu, 1993, p. 69)
The vnriants of resource theory as suggested by (1) Norman nnd Bobrow (1975) and Navon nnd
Gopher (1979), and (2) Wickens (1980, 1984) are illustrated by the next citations. First of all,
resources nre nssumed to be limited in capncity.
"The basic concept is thnt mental processing capacity should be viewed as a scarce
resource" (Bettman, Johnson and Payne, 1991, p. 58)
One of these vnriants is expressed by the iden thnt "persunsion is maximized when the
resources required for messnge processing are motched by those nvnilable: too few resources
inhibit message processing nnd too mnny prompt idiosyncratic thinking - in both instnnces
reducing the processing of the message nnd thus its persuasive impact on attitude chnnge"
(Tybout, 1995, p.2, itnlics ndded). The introduction of antecedent resource conditions in
consumer resenrch is viewed as impressive theoreticvl progress (Tybout, 1995).
"(...) The qunntity of resources of n pnrticular composition can influence an nffective
response to a prenttentively processed stimulus (Jnniszewski, 1990a) (...) Jnniszewski
hypothesized that mvtching octivntion, the incrensed availnbility of resources in one
hemisphere because of an increased processing load in the opposing hemisphere, was
responsible for the effect (...) The matching-activation hypothesis is interesting because
it suggests that there may be a way of manipulating the amount of energy consumers
devote to an incidental task (...) when there is no goal or objectíve nssociated with the
processing of information." (Janiszewski, 1993, p. 378)
Janiszewski's conceptualizntion clearly points to one of the type of pool of resources Wickens
(1980, 1984) had proposed, i.e., brain hemispheres.
"(...) One resource pool is better suited for holistic, inferential processing nnd is
nssociated with the right hemisphere, while a second resource pool is better suited for
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annlytic, sequentinl processing and is associated with the left hemisphere" (Janiszewski,
1993, p. 377)
Also nnd becnuse of the interest in resource theory consumer researchers have been involved in
dual tasks experiments.
'Because the secondnry information dces not receive direct fovenl attention, and since
attentional resources availoble for processing the secondary information are limited, ít is
not surprising thnt the secondary ínformation cannot be explicitly recognized" (Shapiro,
MacInnis, and Heckler, 1997, p. 94)
To my knowledge only Owen (1991, 1992) and Owen, Lord, and Cooper (1995) have seriously
discussed these dual tasks in the context of resource constraints. On the one hand, they
advocate the dual tnsk paradigm but on the other hnnd, they point to some wnrrnnts regarding
the interpretation of the results. Note thnt Owen et al. refers to the 1984 Nnvon resources a
theoretical soup stone paper. To my knowledge only Owen nnd collengues hnve referred to
Navon's paper in the area of consumer research and marketing.
"Owen (1991) outlines a variety of concerns and cautions regarding the attention-related
constructs. The point here is that constructs such as attention, elnboration, involvement,
mental effort, and such, nll seem to be related to the notion of 'capncity", but the full
relationship and distinction between such constructs is not yet clear. The RT-probe
technique [a mensure of response time (latency) to n secondnry tnsk is taken ns nn
indicator of inental attention devoted to a primnry task] merely detects when cnpncity is
near the threshold of being "swamped", nnd conclusions regarding any of a variety of
cnpacity-related constructs always require careful scrutirry. Nonetheless, the fact that
the secondnry task technique dces appear to detect somethingshould encourage us to use
this technique as long as it allows us to make useful inferences regarding nn nttention-
related construct (cf., Navon, 1984; Owen, 1991) (...) Additiorolly, there is evidence thnt
the human processing system consists of more than just a simple, single 'capacity"
resource (cf., Owen, 1991). The foct thnt subjects in high attentionnl lond conditions will
respond to a secondnry task beep after, say, a one second delay dces itself suggest that
there exists an auditory resource that cnn independently nttend to and store incoming
audio stimuli until a general purpose, main processor can nttend to this new input.
Nonetheless, the one-second delny can be used as evidence that some sort of general,
global attentional resource is being used more heavily. The point is thot one must always
maintain caution regarding conclusions thnt can be drnwn about the use of processing
resources." (Owen, Lord, nnd Cooper, 1995, p. 86)
Olshnvsky (1994) really argues for a completely different view on attention. He claims that
"getting attention" cannot be the advertising objective because attention is nn epiphenomenon.
"Within this very general theory of information processing, an importantly different
definition of attention is adopted. Specifically, attention is simply that cognitive process
or behavior by which information is stored in short-term memory (STM) or working
memory: "...So, we will say, more or less synonymously, that information was 'ottended to',
was 'heeded', or was 'stored in STM"' (Ericsson and Simon, 1980, p.217). The important
distinction between Ericsson and Simon's (1980) definition of attention and traditional
definitions, whether "sensory" or "cognitive", is that the behnvior of storing information
in STM is an essential part of every cognitive process that is assumed to underlie the
behavior of interest: it is not a separnte stage preceding these processes as described in
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Mcóuire's (1978) and other traditional models of information processing. That is,
"attending" or "heeding" is simply a by-product of the structure of central processing unit
that is assumed to execute all elementary processes. The elementary informntion
processes that comprise any information processing strategy must look to STM for its
input and to place its output for processing by subsequent elementary processes in the
overall strategy (program). Hence, attention (ns defined here) is a crucial nspect of all
information processing activities; it is an epiphenomenon, because it is "a phenomenon that
occurs with and seems to result from another." (Olshavsky, 1994, p. 99~100).
Owen (1991, 1992), Owen et nl. (1995), and Olshnvsky (1994) clenrly point to some cautions with
respect to the interpretation of results and to some differences in conceptualizations on
attention. To my knowledge these authors nre the only ones that seriously looked at the
conceptualizntion of nttention as such.
In sum, nt the present time the three theories of attention viz. Filter theory, Capacity theory
nnd Resource theory are the explanntory theories for nll kinds of attentional phenomenn denlt
with in consumer research. In the second chnpter some serious theoretical difficulties regarding
the attentionnl theories were illustrated which led to the proposal of the attention-selection-
model (ASM).
We now turn to some issues in consumer research that consumer researchers consider
important. For each of these issues, the same formnt is used. First, the issue is introduced ns n
resenrch problem. Second, the relevant resenrch questions are addressed. Third, some results
nre described. Fourth, the theoretical explnnation is presented. Fifth, some comments are given.
Sixth - and this will be nn important point - the reasonable nssumption is made that the
nttention-selection-model (ASM) may provide an nlternative view or n reinterpretation and an
attempt is made to do so. Finally, nfter the discussion of these issues, some new questions nre
addressed, which mny stipulate the future research agenda. One may interpret this as an
nttempt to persuade consumer researchers to study the functional relntionship between
perception and action. The ASM provides the possibility to encounter these issues.
ZNFORMATION OVERLOAD
The resenrch problem:
The mnrketing and consumer research discipline is concerned with mistakes or error consumers
might make in the purchase of products under conditions of high informational loads. This
sub ject of research is better known as studies on 'information overlond'. "Information overlond
is assumed to have occurred when the prospective buyer is unable to complete the buying task
successfully, as might be evidenced, for example, when an objectively inferior product choice is
mnde by n high proportion of consumers under high load conditions" (Owen, 1992, p. 771).
An issue that is yet of more interest regards the quality of information processing of marketing
communicntions under conditions of high information lond (Owen, 1992). 'People do not alwnys
make some "correct" or 'incorrect" decision choice when receiving a marketing communicntion; it
is more likely that most mnrketing communicntions lend to the remembering of informntion nnd
to changes in attitudes. Such lenrned informntion and nttitudes are likely to affect some choice
decision at a future time and are additionnlly, nnd importantly, likely to nffect perceptions of
product performnnce (i.e., sntisfaction) after the purchase is made" (Owen, 1992, p. 773).
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The effects of information overload on memory, on changes in attitudes, nnd on the qunlity of
future áecisions appenrs to be an importnnt issue to the discipline of marketing and consumer
behavior resenrch.
The relevant question(s):
Is there a point or level at which the information processing system cannot handle more
information? Does incrensing information load change attitudes nnd affect future choice
decisions?
The proposed theoretical explanation:
It is nssumed thnt the underlying cause of this phenomenon is due to a'limited capacity"
processing mechanism nnd thnt appronching this limit results in error. In fnct, from the
perspective of attention theory, multiple processing resources have been proposed to account
for the phenomenon of information load. Each resource has its own capacity limitntions, implying
thnt information overlond mny occur nt different points, depending on what combinntions of
resources (e.g., grnphical, textunl) are engaged for any particular tnsk (Owen, 1992).
Comments:
Owen (1992) refers to Wickens' (1980, 1984) vnriant of resource theory. In particulnr, his
suggestion nbout the combinntion of resources seems most likely to go with Wicken's dimensional
model (see also Chapter 2). Neumnnn (1996), with respect to the dimensiona) model, concluded
thnt the patterns of empirical results do not lend itself to a simple schema of resources.
A second point refers to the question what is exactly mennt by informntion overload? The
theorizing about information overload in consumer resenrch and mnrketing suggests that
consumers are overloaded with a Inrge amount of information (see Bettman, Johnson nnd Pnyne,
1991). The argument is thnt we encounter n few hundred ndvertising messnges per dny (Britt,
Adams á Miller, 1972). The Britt et al. (1972) paper is frequently cited to connect information
lond with selective attention. The point here is that the amount of informntion that is present
over time in the consumer environment is not of interest per se. On the contrary, if one denls
with nttention (and with the cnpacity and selection aspects), then the relevant point is if the
consumer hns in fact limited capacities to process the informntional inputs that renches the
senses at one time. The information that does not rench the sense organs is not to be considered
relevant at nll for the theoretical discussion.
The view according to the ASM:
The ASM ndvocates the view that there is unlimited capacity to process information but there is
limited cnpacity to perform more tasks simultaneously in the same domain. For thnt renson the
selection-for-action view and the selection-for-memory view were introduced. If consumers do
not act in a gonl-directed mnnner, then the default value of the processing system lets visually
conspicuous items take precedence (see results, this thesis). Other items in the consumer
environment nre processed as well (as shown by the difference between visually and
visually4cognitively conspicuous brand names) but do not yield in a higher selection-for-memory
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probnbility. In genernl terms, the dnta suggest that brand name conspicuity effects depend upon
the strntegy adopted by the consumer and upon processing time constrnints.
A new direction of research:
For a new direction of research it may be interesting to investignte the relation between number
of input stimuli on tnsk performnnce under different task instructions. The number of stimuli
cnn be ensily manipulnted. Note, however, that the stimuli should be exposed to the consumers
simultaneously. One may even choose to examine the effect of conspicuous stimuli items by
changing the visunl chnrncteristics or semantic menning vis-à-vis the contextual items. Assuming
that we are dealing with n choice task, the different tnsk instructions inform the subject how to
act nnd where to nct upon (selection-for-action). Given this setup, what kind of choice errors can
be found? Cnn there be differences in choice error between the specific instruction I required
response condition nnd no specific instruction ~ the effectiveness response condition? It is
assumed here that in the absence of a specific instruction, behnviornl chnos exists unless
conspicuous stimuli are present.
CONSUMER INFORMATION SEARCH
The resenrch problem:
Consumer resenrch and mnrketing is concerned with how consumer's search for informntion and
mnke decisions ín todny's supermarkets and media environments. The conviction is thnt
difference between the success and failure of new nnd existing brands, products nnd
ndvertisements Iargely depends on their nbility to cnpture the consumer's attention early, to
retnin it sufficiently long to allow communication of the key nd messnge and brnnd position
(Pieters and Warlop, forthcoming). Despite the crucinl importance of nttention cnpture and
retention for the effectiveness of marketing communication activities, and despite the role thnt
is awnrded to attention and exploration processes in models of consumer behnvior, the amount of
empirical resenrch on the topic has been severely limited until recently.
Webb (1979) in the early dnys of consumer research Inbeled this type of research ns 'initial
processing'.
The study of information processing can be divided into research pertaining to the
acquisition of information necessary to make choices, and research pertaining to how the
information, once acquired, is used to make choices (here desigrated as "central
processing"). The acquisition of information cnn be further subdivided into thnt pertnining
to the active senrch for information nnd that pertaining to cognitive and perceptual
processes at the time the information is ncquired. The former is exemplified in the
macromodels of consumer behnvior (Engel, Kollnt, and Blnckwell, 1968; Hownrd nnd Seth,
1969; Nicosia, 1966), and in the resenrch on decision sets by Bettman (1974) and others.
The latter research, labeled 'initial processing" research by Ray (1974), focuses on those
processes that occur during and just after stimulus exposure to information, up to and
including short-term memory. Further processing of information committed to long-term
memory would fall under the heading of centrnl processing. Thus, a temporal distinction
can be seen between information search, initial processing nnd ceniral processing. (Webb,
1979, p. 225)
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The relevant question(s1:
How do consumers visually explore their environment? In this case, environment should be
viewed brondly and includes newspaperlmagazine ndvertising, Internet ndvertising, product
packaging and in-store displays nnd promotions. Whnt is the impact of the consumers' intention
or motivation on visual orientation? What is the impact of limited opportunity to process stimuli,
or what is the impact of incrensing the opportunity by repetition on visual search behnvior?
The general finding:
Pieters and his colleagues (Pieters, Rosbergen nnd Hartog, 1996; Pieters, Warlop nnd Hnrtog,
1997; Pieters nnd Wnrlop, 1999, Pieters, 1999; Rosbergen, Pieters, and Wedel, 1997; Wedel nnd
Pieters, Z000) have shown interesting findings. He nnd his co-authors in particular make use of
the recent developments in eye-tracking methodologies that have stimulated this line of
research. Eye-movements nre considered a vnlid proxy of nttention (see nlso Krugman, Fox,
Fletcher, Fisher and Rojas, 1994; Tolley nnd Bognrt, 1994; Young, 1984). Pieters and his fellow
researchers gathered eye-tracking datn and elucidnted -over vnrious studies-, three different
visunl scnn patterns. These scan pnths were denoted as (1) nccelerntion, (2) filtration and (3)
strategy shift. Acceleration occurs when consumers speed up information collection nnd
processing. Accelerntion was demonstrated by the reduced average duration of individunl eye
fixations on the stimulus. Filtration occurs when consumers become more selective. Filtration
wns demonstrated by showing that consumers skip certain elements of information about the
brands in the stimulus. Strategy shift occurs when consumers adopt modes of information
ncquisition that are fnster and easier to implement. Snccndes within brnnds, which indicnte
information acquisition by brnnd, and saccades between brnnds, which indicate informotion
acquisition by attribute, demonstrated the strntegy shifts.
The proposed theoreticnl explnnntion:
The theoretical explanntion is found in the functionnl strntegic appronch to nttention. As
pointed out enrlier, this approach deals with the question what determines the next fixntion. Is
the consumer in control or does the stimulus environment take over, respectively known as
voluntary or involuntary attention. Pieters and Warlop (1999) draw the distinction between
control of attention at the global levet and control at the local level. The explanation put forward
is binsed to control nt the globnl level, in which factors such as motivntion and opportunity
influence how the stimulus is scanned. In contrast, local factors, are due to the relntive salience
of individual stimuli. Pieters and colleagues conceptualize attention as a'window or 'spotlight'
that locnlly improves the speed and reduces the thresholds for processing events. This points to
Kahnemnn's (1973) capacity theory of attention as is explicitly referred to in Rosbergen, Pieters,
nnd Wedel (1997).
Comments:
First of all, the main question in the present discussion should focus on whether eye movements
depend on nttentional shifts (see Sanders and Donk, 1996). Logicnlly plausible, eye movements
and attention might be fully dependent or fully independent of each other. Experiments have
shown, however, that 'attention' can be moved to different pnrts of the visual field in the
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absence of overt eye movements (e.g., Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974; Posner, 1980). Experiments
have shown ns well that perception of n stimulus was facilitated when subjects were prepared to
make an eye movement towards thnt stimulus (Crovitz nnd Dnvies, 1962). 'The less extreme
possibility would be that, at some stnge of their execution, the processes involved in generating
eye movements nnd attention shnre a common element; execution of either process might then
be fncilitated or inhibited by the other depending on their spntinl gonls" (Snnders and Donk, p.
60). This position is seemingly adopted in consumer research, "Although there is not n complete
one-to-one correspondence between eye position and attention (VanderHei jden, 1992), it is
generally assumed that "where the eyes go, so goes attention (...)"" (Pieters, Rosbergen nnd
Hnrtog, 1996, p. 242). Instend of the term visual attention the term visual orientation seems
more approprinte [14].
Secondly, the theoretical explanation of the observed dntn, i.e., the eye movement scan paths is
given by Kahneman's capncity theory of attention. From what we have outlined in the second
chapter we have learned thnt most students of attention abandoned the iden that capacity limits
nre due to n scnrcity of general, unspecific capacity (Neumnnn, 1987). In other words, the
theoretical rationale for explaining the experimentnl findings is rather menger. Further, the
terms nssociated with the three scan paths indicate more a(re)description of the observed
facts than to an explanntion of the eye movement patterns. To put it differently, the
terminology viz. filtering, acceleration, nnd strntegy shift suggest an explanation where there
may be actually only n redescription of the same attentional phenomenon.
The view nccording to the ASM:
On the one hand, the ASM does not predict pnrticular scnn paths. On the other hand, the ASM
does predict conspicuity effects of ad attributes under conditions of the opportunity to process
the stimuli and intention (goal-directed or explorntory). The ASM, therefore, explains at the
globnl level, in which factors such ns motivation and opportunity influence how the stimulus is
scnnned (goal-directed or exploratory) nnd predicts effectiveness responses due to the relative
salience of individunl stimuli. In contrnst to attentional explanations at the global or local level,
the surplus value of the ASM is found nt the explanation, prediction, and understanding nt the
global and local level.
A new direction of resenrch:
An important topic for future research is the combination of visunl search behavior (eye
movement mensures) nnd selective nttention. In particular, more focus should be given to the
theoreticnl explanation, rather than description, of eye-movement data patterns. If we nre able
to theoretically understnnd how, when nnd why our eyes move the w~ they do then we might be
able to exnmine the communication value of the consumer environment by mnnipulating its spatial
Inyout (e.g., in-store displnys, a newspaper with ads, supermarket shelves). By rearrnnging the
spatinl Inyout of the items in the display one might influence the consumers visunl orientation
senrch strategy. If one is able to steer the consumer' visual search process into an exploratory
visual search strntegy, one has the opportunity to increase the probnbility for some items, i.e.
14 The term visual orientntion cnme up durirg the 1998 ACR roundtnble discussion regnrding consumer research nnd eye
movement methodoloyies. ~
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the conspicuous ones to be selected (for action, for memory) over others, i.e., the inconspicuous.
Obviously, this may have important marketing implicntions.
THE INFORMATION PROCESSIN6 OF VISUALS AND TEXT IN ADS
The researc~roblem:
Typically, ads contain a few common elements such as n headline, a pictorial, a body text, and a
packshot. At the one extreme these nd elements mny relate to each other; at the other extreme
they mny not relate to ench other at nll. Suppose for now, thnt one of the elements does not
relate to the other elements in the ad. For example, the pictorial is not related to the headline,
the body text and the pnckshot. In other words, the pictorial as compared with the textual
elements in the ad is incongruent. It is important to note that it is the meaning of the pictorial
thnt is different from the meaning of the textual elements. In this cnse, the research problem
relates to what extent congruency or incongruency between elements in an ad m~ impact the
processing nnd effectiveness of the nd. This issue has been addressed frequently in consumer
resenrch líternture and one of the underlying theoretical rationales is found in resource theory
(e.g., Meyers-Levy nnd Peracchio, 1992; Meyers-Levy and Peracchio, 1995; Meyers-Levy and
Sternthal, 1993; Peracchio and Meyers-levy, 1994). Other related research involves the kind of
processes that are put into action to process visual or verbal information (e.g., Janiszewski,
1988). The effects of (in)congruence between nd elements and the processing of visual nnd
verbnl information on changes in nttitudes nppears to be an important issue to the discipline of
marketing and consumer behnvior resenrch.
The relevnnt question(s):
The questions that guide the first type of research are directed to elucidate the effects of
incongruence between ad elements on attitudes and evaluations of marketing communications.
The questions belonging to the second type of research deal with the differential effects
between visual and verbal information in advertisements on brand attitudes and evnluations of
mnrketing communications.
The general findinas and the proposed theoreticnl explanations:
Two kinds of effects nre found in consumer judgements of objects vis-à-vis contextunl fnctors;
these effects nre known as assimilation and contrast effects ( Meyers-Levy nnd Sternthal,
1993). Three different views have been offered to account for and explnin these effects. One
view suggests that the extent of overlap between the target object and context determines
whether nssimilntion or contrnst is found (Herr, 1989). The second view suggests the allocation
and the amount of cognitive resources devoted to the judgementnl tnsk ( Mnrtin, Setn, and
Crelin, 1990). The third view combines the two suggestions. The emerging view is that contrnst
effects occur when there is both a small contextunl - target object overlap nnd people devote
substantial resources to the task. The nssimilntion effect occurs when the resources applied to
the task nre limited, andlor when overlnp between context and target object is large (Meyers-
Levy and Sternthal, 1993).
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The first view explnins both contextunl effects by a cntegorizntion process. Both target object
and contextunl object(s) are cntegorized. If the features of both tnrget and context show
considernble overlap, the target object will be categorized ns a member of the same category
and nssimilation occurs. When the category nctivated by the contextual objects nnd the target
object show little or no overlap in features, contrast occurs (Herr, Sherman, and Fazío, 1983).
The second view suggests that the level of cognitive resources expended in making a judgement
also plays nn important role in determining the nature of the resulting context effect (Martin,
Seta, and Crelia, 1990). "People with a high need for cognition were found to inhibit n contrast
effect, whereas people with a low need for cognition expended the effort necessnry to suppress
nssociations to the contextual cues and to interpret the target object in terms of alternate and
antithetic associations, thereby encouraging a contrnst effect" (Meyers-Levy and Sternthnl,
1993, p.360. Note thnt need for cognition was used ns nn indicator for the nmount of cognitive
resources devoted to the judgementnl tnsk.
The third view "represents theoretical progress by showing that context effects may be better
explained when Herr's notion of overlap and Mnrtin's concept of cognitive effort are integrated
in a two-fnctor theory than when either of these notions is considered in isolation" (Meyers-Levy
nnd Sternthal, 1993, p. 366)
With respect to the processing of visual and verbal informntion as such, a different theoretical
explanation hns been given. Note that here the congruency is not of interest but the simple fact
that nn ad constitutes pictorial and verbal information.
"Though it has been proposed thnt attitude formation is a cognitive process involving
focused conscious attention (Fischbein and Azjen, 1975; Hnstak and Olson, 1989; Lutz,
1975, 1977; Olson et al., 1982), recent literature in psychology and marketíng proposes
that attitudes can also be formed preattentively (Dixon, 1981; Janiszewski, 1988;
Kihlstrom, 1984, 1987; Morelnnd and Zajonc, 1977; Wilson, 1979). In nn advertising
context, for exnmple, Janiszewski (1988) showed that ad attitudes can be influenced when
information in ihe ad is processed at a preattentive level, and that some relationship
exists between the nature of the rtwterial to be processed (visual vs, verbal) and the
dominant hemisphere in which the information is processed (right vs. left). (...) The two
hemispheres of the brain hnve been shown to use two different processing styles (Bouma,
1978; Sergent, 1983). The right brnin is said to Fwve holistic style, allowing the
simultaneously integration of multiple pieces of information. This hemisphere uses a
template matching process, invoking a template to give menning to incomíng information
(Jnniszewski, 1988). Becnuse of this holistic processing style, the right hemisphere is
more compatible than the left with processing pictorial stimuli. The left hemisphere is
described as unit-integrative, as it combines well-learned individual units into a meaningful
whole (Janiszewski, 1988). Becnuse of the unit-integrntive style, the left hemisphere is
more compatible with the processing of verbal stimuli. (...) Contralaternl conduction refers
to the fnct that stimuli observed in the right visual field are processed in the left
hemisphere of the brain, while stimuli in the left visual field nre processed in the right
hemisphere. Combined with the difference in hemispheric processing styles noted above,
this phenomenon implies that visual stimuli presented in the left vísual field should receive
greater processing than verbal stimuli presented in the left visual field. Conversely, verbal
stimuli presented in the right visual field should receive greater processing thnn verbal
stimuli presented in the same field." (Shapiro nnd MacInnis, 1992, p. 50516)
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Comment(s):
In the first type of research, congruence is bnsed upon the meaning of the elements of interest.
The meaning of the textual is compared with the meaning the pictorinl aims to communicnte.
Congruence in these studies focuses on the cognitive processes at the time the information is
ncquired. According to Webb (1979) this research can be denoted as central processing
resenrch. It would be consistent with Webb to suggest similar research in initial processing.
Regnrding the meaning of elements within an ad the pictorial can be textually characterized, so
the textual can be chnracterized visunlly.
The second type of resenrch is clearly initial processing research. It is important to note that
the background of this type of research (nlthough not explicitly referred to in the cited and
related papers) is found in the observations how physical dmm~ge to the brain in different
locations causes (osses or distortions of motives, wishes, skills, feelings. Cerebral
commissurotomy (n division of the corpus callosum), the split-brnin operation, has been
performed to stop non-functionnl neurnl dischnrges going from one hemisphere to the other.
Psychologicnl tests performed by Gnzzaniga nnd others revenled that while the general
psychological stnte and behavior was, in most cases, little affected, there wns a profound change
in the patient's mentnl nctivities. Resenrch with normal subjects shows that individuals vary
greatly in the development if asymmetrícnl functions in their brains and in the ways the
hemispheres are hnbitually nctivated (Gregory, 1987). Experimentnlly one should occlude one eye
to prevent double vision and present the visual stimuli for very short exposure durations nt the
left nnd right of n fixation point. It is mainly in the methods where consumer resenrch studies
slip-up, exposure durations nre too long and verbal and pictorial information is not presented left
and right relative to a fixntion point.
The view nccording to the ASM:
In contrnst with the rather cognitive processing explanation for the first type of resenrch, i.e.,
solving the incongruence, the ASM suggest thnt conspicuous items have different selection
probabilities by default unless processing strategies overrule the default settings. In nddition,
the time consumers are exposed to the mnterial of interest showed thnt the effectiveness of
conspicuous elements mny differ. This might suggests thnt on the bnsis of 'initial processes' an
explanation can be found regarding distinctive or incongruent items in the consumer environment.
Regarding the second type of research, i.e., the processing of verbnl nnd pictorinl informntion,
the ASM considers that both verbal and pictorial information can be selected at the where level
nnd at the what level.
A new direction of resenrch:
First, the inclusion of the following experimentnl conditions can easily extend congruence
research. The (in)congruence between the text (or picture) and the picture (or text) that can be
(1) inconspicuous, (2) visually conspicuous, (3) cognitively conspicuous, nnd (4) visually
tcognitively conspicuous relntive to the text. Second, the extent of (in)congruency between the
items that constitute an ad looks like n promising aren for future resenrch. The ASM suggests
the exnminntion of two kinds of incongruency viz. visual nnd cognitive. The issue of 'extent of
congruency' hns not been denlt with in this thesis. On the other hnnd, suggestions have been
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mnde in the literature to qunntify the level of visually conspicuous items present in a scene (for
good stnrting points see Engel, 1972, 1976, 1977; Kooi and Valeton, 1994; Snnders and Donk,
1996). The applications are found in, for example, traffic and the militnry and deal with the
increasing the conspicuity of individual items (e.g. traffic signs) or decreasing their conspicuity
(e.g., militnry objects) in the visunl scene. These applicntions cnn be easily extended to
advertising and pnckage appenrnnce enbedded in, for example, newspnpers nnd in-store displays,
respectively. To qunntificntion of the degree of cognitive conspicuity of items seems more
complicnted. To my knowledge, these kinds of ineasures are not available. One might think to
mensure reaction times to a tnrget stimulus just presented nfter a set of contextually related
and not relnted items. If the target stimulus is related ( inconspicuous) to the context, then the
reaction time is expected to be faster thnn for not relnted (conspicuous) items. The inverse of
the target's renction time is a possible mensure for its cognitive conspicuity.
Regarding the second type of research, i.e., the processing of verbal and pictorial information, it
would be interesting to examine both distinctions simultaneously, i.e., between where and what
level at the one hnnd nnd left and right hemisphere at the other hnnd. Experimentally, the split-
brnin setup should be followed (mono vision, short exposure durntions). The interest lies more in
the theoretical explanation of the observed findings than in the direct marketing implications
how to renrrange spntial Inyout on the basis of hemispheric processing.
Berlyne regarding works of nrt, nicely describes the importance of this type of resenrch:
'All art hns an importnnt formal aspect, giving rise to syntactic informntion transmission
the appreciator must to some extent be responding to relations between ihe physical
properties of different elements. But many works of nrt also trnnsmits sertantic
information, which is identifiable with whnt we call 'content'; it might be representntional
(as in painting, drama, bnllet, and even in some music) or linguistic ( as in literature). To
some extent, therefore, the appreciotor's responses must also be determined by
properties of the objects or events thot are depicted or described." ( Berlyne, 1971, p.
150I1)
BRAND SALIENCE AND CONSIDERATION SET INCLUSIONS TO CHOICE
The research problem:
The topic of salience, in particular stimulus snlience, is of interest to consumer researchers as
cnn be observed in basically nll textbooks of consumer behnvior. Two kinds of salience are
recognized. There is perceptual salience and memory salience. Perceptual salience is based on the
visunl characteristics of the stimulus (Garber, 1995), nnd the 'level of inemory activation"
determines the salience of items that are stored in memory (Alba and Chattopadhyay, 1986).
Another interesting nspect of salience pertains to the stimulus itself. By their nature, some
events are more salient than others are. One mny argue that there is relative salience,
understood by its visual distinctiveness or level of activntion vis-à-vis its contextunl elements
and absolute salience (or vividness) understood by the inherent properties of the stimulus itself.
We limit ourselves here to relntive stimulus salience.
The concept of salience hns been suggested to be important for (1) ndvertising effectiveness
(Alba, Hutchinson and Lynch, 1991), (2) the effect on visunl search routines (Jnniszewski, 1997),
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(3) the formntion of consideration sets, nnd the formntion of the appearance of brands in their
packages at the point of purchase (Gnrber, 1995), and (4) the design of effective marketing
communication strategies (Ratneshwar, Wnrlop, Mick, nnd Seeger, 1997). The relevant empirical
research on brand name salience is scnrce, however (Alba and Chattopadhyay, 1986). Though we
nll know and nccept the notion that the visual and graphical nspects of the product or service
hnve an impact on consumer choice at the point of purchnse, little is known or understood about
how the effect is produced- there is virtually nothing in the academic literature on the topic
(Gnrber, 1995).
The findings:
Albn and Chattopadhyay (1986) demonstrnted that increasing the memory salience of n single
brand might significantly impair unaided recall of competing brands. Bnrlow and Wolgater (1993),
in empiricnl work on nlcohol wnrnings, found that presentation style in print ads makes n
significnnt difference with respect to whether the wnrnings are seen and remembered. They
concluded that n wnrning must be conspicuous to be seen and remembered (see nlso, Krugman,
Fox, Fletcher, Fisher and Rojas, 1994).
The relevant~uestion(s):
Whnt are the effects of stimulus salience on memory and to what extent does memory salience
nffect the recall of other items?
The proposed theoretical explanation:
Alba nnd Chnttopndhyay (1986) account for their memory salience findings by referring to the
part-category cuing effect ns nn instnnce of n more general phenomenon known ns output
interference. "In essence, output interference refers to the notion that recnll of a subset of
any information results in the decreased probability of recalling the remninder of thnt
information. Part-category cuing represents a special case of output interference in which the
"recalled" subset is provided in ndvance of recnll" (Alba and ChnttopadhyQy, 1985, p. 340).
Perceptual salience effects have been understood by suggesting thnt the significance of a
distinctive item produces grenter cognitive elnboration and, hence, greater influence for the
salient information (cf. Hnstie, 1984). Gnrber (1995) proposes a staged model of choice that
explicitly considers the role of visual perception and package nppearance in formntion of the
consideration set at the point of purchase. More specifically, the formation of a visunlly oriented
attention set is conceived to precede and affect formation of a subsequent product-benefits-
oriented consideration set. The suggestion is that visually typical brand nlternatives are more
likely to be noticed nnd preferred by the consumer (Loken nnd Ward, 1990), nnd will likely be
chosen for purchase unless some distrncting stimulus or event interrupts nnd chnnges the
decision process. The distracting brnnds are cnlled visually novel (Gnrber, 1995). Jones and
Mcóílles (1976) depnrt from the correspondent-inference theory as n meaningful basis for
classifying connotations for mnny commonly used semantic cues. According to this theory,
consumers are more likely to elnbornte (1) infarmation that is inconsistent with previous
information or (2) information that is distinct from other present informatíon. Thus,
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inconsistent nnd distinctive information will have more effect on perceptions thnn information
connoting high consistency or low distinctiveness.
Comments:
Somehow the theoretical explanntions provided seem tnutological - perceptual snlient objects
nffect effectiveness positively because they nre perceptually distinct. The important question
to nddress is why perceptually snlient stimuli stimulnte n memory effect, however (Shanker nnd
Shapiro, 1996). This question is still unaddressed as are the questions how and when salient
stimuli stimulate memory effects. In addition, as the empirical pnrt of this thesis has shown,
differential recognition accurncy effects can be observed if one distinguishes explicitly between
stimuli thnt are visunlly snlient or cognitively salient. Regnrding memory salience the notion of
output interference is interesting and might fit nicely if associated with the idens about the
functional relationship between input and output related processes.
The view nccording to the ASM:
The ASM is related to these types of studies. The question why snlient stimuli stimulnte memory
effects is dealt with in the second chapter. In nddition, the ASM provides nnswers to the how
and when a snlient stimulus stimulates a memory effect question as well.
A new direction of resenrch:
The ASM points to the possibility to examine the stimulus salience effect vis-à-vis contextual
brnnds directly on memory thereby combining the resenrch approaches on perceptunl salience
and memory salience. It is suggested here to study both salience effects when the functional
relationship between input and output relnted processes is considered.
BRAND CONSPICUITY AND MOA INFORMATION PROCESSIN6 MODELS
The problem:
It is well known thnt n myrind of ndvertising research findings showed that numerous advertising
executional varinbles can influence advertising effectiveness (e.g., MacInnis á Jaworski, 1989).
Later on, (pnrallel) related research underlined that advertising effectiveness is preceded by
more generic construct variables, i.e. consumers' motivation, opportunity, and nbility (MOA) to
process commercinl informntion (e.g., Andrews, 1988; Bntrn á Ray, 1986; MacInnis á Jnworski,
1989; Petty á Cacioppo, 1986; Poiesz, 1989, 1999; Poiesz and Robben, 1994; Robben nnd Poiesz,
1993). However, research explicitly linking ndvertising executional varinbles to MOA or,
conversely, MOA to advertising executional varinbles is scnrce (e.g., MncInnis, Moormnn á
Jaworski, 1991; Petty, Unnava á Strathman, 1991).
MncInnis, Moorman d~ Jnworski (1991, see also MacInnis á Jaworski 1989; Petty á Cacioppo
1986) identify two roles for advertising executionnl variables by ndjoining them to MOA. Its
first role can be chnrncterized as 'mntching advertising executionnl vnriables to informntion
processing construct variable levels' to be distinguished from its second role which can be
characterized as 'changing the construct varinble level of processíng through the use of
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advertising executional varinbles'. This menns that advertising executional variables cnn serve ns
nrguments or cues regarding its first role and can nffect the nnture or extent of informntion
processing antecedents regarding its second role (Petty, Unnnva dC Strathman, 1991).
The relevant question(s):
Why and when (e.g., under whnt conditions) does the same advertising executionnl variable serve
ns n cue or an nrgument? Similnrly, why and when does an advertising executional variable chnnge
the construct varinble level (motivation, ability and opportunity to process) of processing?
The proposed theoretical explanation:
The underlying theoretical explnnation is offered by resource theory. The nllocation of
resources depends on the motivation, ability and opportunity to process the commercial stimuli.
In turn, the extent of resource allocation directs the level of information elnboration. The
consumer follows a peripheral (heuristic) processing route under low information elaboration and
a central (systemntic) processing route is followed under a high level of information elaboration.
It is well nccepted in consumer research that resource theory provides an important theoretícnl
explanation to nll different kinds if consumer phenomena (Tybout, 1995).
"Perhaps the most important contribution of the [MOA relnted, note by author] research
is the theoreticnl ínsight it provides concerning elnboration-likelihood theory. Specifically,
the findings show that a single cue - in this case, color - cnn be processed either as n
substantive resource-consuming "central" cue or os n less resource-demanding "peripheral"
cue, depending on a viewer's processing motivation. Thus, the implication is that the same
cue can be either central or peripheral. Further, the finding suggests that resource
demands versus nvailability is the true construct underlying elaboration-likelihood theory
ond the centrnl-peripheral processing notions. Whether a viewer is motivated, able, and
has the opportunity to engage in detailed "central processing" in fact depends on both the
resources available for processing and the resource demands imposed by the stímulus and
context. Accordingly, we observed that when the resource demands imposed by difficult-
to-substantiate ad claims, together with the presence of color, imposed very high
resource demands, highly motivated viewers did not engage in central processing, which
resulted in an undermining of their persunsion". (Meyers-Levy and Perncchio, 1995, p. 136)
Comments:
First, the critical notions concerning resource theory given by Navon (1984, 1985) ns one of the
first proponents of this theory are in strident contrast with the contemporary belief in
consumer research thnt it provides a valid explnnntion. It is unfortunate thnt Navon's papers
were not given the attention in consumer research (see for one rare exception Owen, 1991,
1992) ns they were given in perception resenrch. Second, n puzzling intricacy regarding the
second role of 'changing the construct variable level of processing through the use of advertising
executionnl varinbles' emerges when so-called reciprocnl or trade-otf effects are considered ns
well. Reciprocal or trnde-off effects refer to advertising executional variables, which positively
affect one information processing construct antecedent but at the same time negatively affect
another (MacInnis, Moorman á Jaworski, 1991). Note that the definition nnd operationalization
of the antecedents nre important here. It has been argued that the generic level definitions nre
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frequently operationalized at specific or detailed levels (Robben and Poiesz, 1993). How to
measure these construct antecedents hns been debated ns well (MncInnis, Moorman and
Jaworski, 1991). For exnmple, should we depart from objective mensurements of MOA
constructs or should we assess how consumers subjectively perceive these MOA factors? In the
latter situation a single ndvertising executional variable mny influence all MOA-fnctors positively
or negntively nnd nll combinations in between (Poiesz, 1999).
The view according to the ASM:
The ASM provides the possibility to examine the effectiveness of executional varinbles nt a
detailed level while leaving room for more generic interpretations. It is recognized, however,
that the ASM is limited because it does not hypothesize the total brand name recognition
nccuracy effects, which are predicted by MOA models. On the other hand, MOA models can only
argue that conspicuous brnnd nnmes tnke the role of cues or nrguments on nn ad hoc bnsis. The
renson is thnt given the 'logic' of MOA one must predict higher recognition accuracy effects for
all brnnd names including the conspicuous brand names under high levels of motivation, ability and
opportunity. Like MOA models, the ASM considers the distinction between intentionnl (gonl-
directed) behnvior and unintentional (explorntory) behavior. Depending upon the (evel of
intention (motivation) different brand name conspicuity effects on recognition accuracy were
found. Depending on the level of stimulus exposure durntion (opportunity), different brand name
conspicuity effects on recognition accuracy were found as well. The ability fnctor, here defined
as fnmilinrity with the stimulus brand names, was held fixed. Higher recognition accurncy was
found at generic high levels of motivntion, opportunity, and nbility for all brand nnmes. In other
words, the ASM predicts conspicuity effectiveness at a detailed nnd a generic level nnd MOA
predicts brnnd name effectiveness effects nt n generic level.
The ASM does not nccount for the nrgument presented in consumer resenrch that executional
vnriables such as the conspicuousness of brand nnmes might influence the construct nntecedent
levels. It seems hnrd to find n theoreticnl nccount to explain how a conspicuous brand name mny
influence, for exnmple, the opportunity (stimulus exposure durntion) factor.
A new direction of research:
Future research should explore more cnrefully the underlying processes that are operating,
which nre imperntive for any thorough theoreticnl analysis. MOA models offer n general nccount
in an attempt to understand how consumers with varying degrees of processing motivation,
ability nnd opportunity deal with single ndvertising attributes (Meyers-Levy nnd Perncchio,
1992). óiven prediction over post hoc explanntion, one should focus on hypothesizing
effectiveness regnrding vnrious executional varinbles under different levels of M, O, nnd A. If
one adopts this simple experimental setup systematically one has the advantage to compare
results between studies, which ultimately may enhance theoreticnl progress.
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OVERALL CONCLUSION
First, our findings contribute to consumer resenrch by proposing the attention-selection-model
(ASM) as a single model of attention ns opposed to a number of classic models of attention that
underlie contempornry conceptunlizations of (selective) nttention. The Iatter all cnn be criticized
on inconsistencies.
Second, our findings contribute to consumer research by suggesting how, when, and why
selective attentiom m~y reveal itself.
Third, our findings contribute to consumer resenrch by the examination of brand name
conspicuity on memory effectiveness.
Fourth, our findings contribute to consumer resenrch by suggesting new research possibilities or
other ways to look at findings regnrding some longstnnding consumer behnvior research issues.
Finally, it is recognized that there is nn enormous gap between the structure and strntegies of
the brain nnd the marketer who is confronted with the task of breaking his nd through the
advertising clutter. To be sure, I have done my best to pnrtly fill this gnp and not to omit
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Table 3: Cognítively conspiwous iwgets (b)
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Het aandocht selectie model: de effectiviteit von opvollende merknomen
Samenvatting
Hoofdstuk 1. Binnen het consumentengedragsonderzoek in het bijzonder het
reclameverwerkings- en reclame-effectiviteitsonderzoek speelt het concept oondacht
een zeer belargrijke rol. In proktisch alle voorgestelde communicatie-informatie-
verwerkingsmodellen neemt aandocht een prominente plaats in. Aondocht wordt opgevot
als een noodzakelijke voorwaarde om reclame-effectiviteit te reoliseren. Het is daarom
zeer opmerkelijk dat er binnen het consumentergedragsonderzoek bijna geen
onderzcek naar het concept oandacht zelf is gedaan!
Het huidige denken over aandacht en de modellering van aandacht is in feite
simpelweg overgenomen uit de experimenteel psychologische literatuur dat onderzoek
beschri jft over de perceptie (woarneming) von visueel binnengekomen informatie.
Belangrijk is dot deze overgenomen aandachtsmodellen, het Filter model (jaren 60), het
Capaciteitsmodel (jaren 70) en het Resource model (jaren 80), niet meer of nauwelijks
nog worden gehanteerd binnen het perceptie-onderzoek. Daarentegen hanteren
consumentengedragsonderzoekers deze drie klassieke aandachtsmodellen nog steeds.
De prominente rol die het concept aandocht binnen de reclame-verwerkingsmodellen
krijgt vraagt echter om een gefundeerde theoretische en empirische onderbouwing. Een
reden temeer is de belangri jke paradigmatische verschuiving in het denken over
aondacht die zich in het perceptie-onderzoek (jaren 90) heeft voorgedaan en die niet
lijkt te zijn opgemerkt door consumentengedragsonderzcekers.
Hoofdstuk 2. In het tweede hoofdstuk wordt een overzicht gegeven van de
paradigmatische verschuiving, die een verandering in het denken over selectieve
aandacht binnen het perceptie-onderzoek te weeg heeft gebrocht. Een belangrijk
uitgangspunt binnen het visueel perceptie-onderzoek was dat de
informatieverwerkingscapaciteit van het visuele systeem in de menselijke hersenen te
beperkt is zodat niet alle binnengekomen informatie tegelijkertijd kan worden
verwerkt. Het concept aandacht werd voorgesteld als een proces dot zorgt voor een
selectieve verwerking van de binnengekomen informatie (selectie-voor-perceptie). In
het nieuwe paradigma wordt het visuele systeem niet meer opgevot als gelimiteerd in
informatie- verwerkingscapaciteit. De gedragingen (acties) echter, die tegeli jkertijd
kunnen worden uitgevoerd zijn zeer beperkt waardoor andere functies voor selecties
noodzakelijk zijn (selectie-voor-actie en selectie-voor-geheugenopslag). De selectie-
voor-perceptie functie wordt hiermee dus los gelaten. Bi j de klassieke
oandachtsmodellen werd perceptie an sich opgevat als dé functie von het visuele
systeem. Het nieuwe paradigma stelt dat het visuele systeem dient om richting te geven
aan acties (gedragingen). Deze functionele relatie tussen perceptie en actie is zeer
relevant voor het onderzcek naar reclameverwerking (perceptie) en reclome-
effectiviteit (actie). De visie dat het brein orgelimiteerd is in verwerkingscapaciteit
staat loodrecht op bi jna al het denken binnen het consumentergedragsonderzoek.
Tegelijkertijd sluit ook de fundamentele oard van perceptie-actie-onderzcek niet aan
bij het veel meer toegepaste consumentengedragsonderzoek.
Consumentengedragsonderzcek wordt in hoge mate gekenmerkt door betekenisvolle
stimuli (advertenties) terwi jl de stimuli bij het perceptie-octie-aandachtsonderzcek
veelal betekenisloos zi jn (gekleurde letters, cijfers of geometrische vormen). De
aanbiedingsti jd van een stimulus bij het perceptie-actie-aandachtsonderzoek ligt rond
de 150 milliseconden terwijl een advertentie tijdens een reclame-verwerkingsonderzoek
soms wel enkele minuten wordt aangeboden. Deze impasses en anderen, op het eerste
gezicht onverenigbare tegenstellingen, geven aanleiding tot de conclusie dat de nieuwe
modellen binnen het perceptie-actie-oandachtsonderzoek niet zondermeer naar het
onderzoeksdomein van de reclameverwerking kunnen worden overgebracht. Daarom
wordt in dit proefschrift het oandacht selectie model (ASM) voorgesteld.
Het ASM berust op de perceptie-octie benadering en sluit tegeli jkerti jd aan
bi j het onderzcek naar reclameverwerking en reclame-effectiviteit. Het ASM voorspelt
en verklaart waarom reclame-elementen (bijvoorbeeld merknamen) effectief kunnen
zi jn. Het ASM laat zien waarom (selectie-voor-actie d selectie-voor-geheugenopslog),
hoe (winner-takes-all) en wanneer (exploratieve en dcelgerichte visuele
zoekstrategieën) opvallende merknamen kunnen leiden tot een meer accurate
herkenning. Herkenning wordt in dit proefschift als maat voor merknaam-effectiviteit
gehanteerd. Er wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen merknamen die opvallend zijn
vonwege hun visuele karakteristieken en tussen merknamen die opvallend zijn qua
betekenis. Deze merknamen zijn respectievelijk als visueel opvallende en cognitief
opvollende merknamen aangeduid. We voorspelden dat de opvallende merknamen
accurater zouden worden herkend dan de tegelijkertijd aangeboden contextuele
merknamen wanneer respondenten een exploratieve visuele zoekstrategie hanteren.
Wanneer respondenten een doelgerichte zoekstrategie hanteren voorspelden we dat de
opvallende merknamen even accuraat zouden worden herkend als de merknamen
waarmee zi j werden geflankeerd. De visueel en cognitief opvollende merknomen zi jn dus
alti jd gerelateerd aan de geflankeerde ofwel contextuele merknamen. Merknamen
werden visueel opvallendheid door ze op een witte achtergrond te plaatsen in
vergeli jking met de grijze ochtergrond waorop de contextuele merknamen woren
geplaatst. Merknamen werden cognitief opvallend door ze te kiezen uit categorie A
(bijvoorbeeld autós) en ze te ploatsen naast de contextuele merknamen uit categorie B
(bijvoorbeeld wasmiddelen).
Hoofdstuk 3.In het derde hoofdstuk wordt een methode voorgesteld die de hiervoor
gencemde voorspellingen kan tcetsen en het ASM kan falsifiëren. De seriol-multiple-
item-respons (SMIR) taok wordt géintroduceerd en de onderzceksprocedure wordt
uiteengezet. In de SMIR taak werden 56 keer 4 merknamen tegelijkertijd aangeboden
waarvan steeds 1 merknaom, ten opzichte van de overige 3 contextuele merknamen,
opviel. De respondenten kregen de taak om zo snel mogeli jk een respons te geven (druk
op een knop) op het moment dat er 4 merknamen verschenen. De suggestie werd gewekt
dat de reactietijd vnn de respons werd gemeten. Direct na deze 56 stimulus
aonbiedingen kregen de respondenten een herkenningstoak waorin zi j aangaven de
eerder aangeboden merknamen te hebben gezien of niet. Vervolgens kregen de
respondenten nogmaals 56 keer 4 tegelijkerti jd aangeboden merknamen te zien met
dezelfde reactietijd taak. Wederom werd deze taak gevolgd door een herkenningstaak.
Ti jdens de eerste taak hanteerde de respondenten een exploratieve zoekstrategie (men
lette simpelweg op het verschi jnen van de stimuli zonder weet te hebben dat er een
herkenningstaak volgde) en tijdens de tweede taak hanteerden de respondenten een
doelgerichte zoekstrategie (men wist nu dat er een herkenningstaok volgde waardoor
men intentioneel naor de merknamen keek - al wist men niet welke merknamen
belangrijker waren). Er worden in dit hoofdstuk 10 gerelateerde experimenten
beschreven waarin voor 2 verschillende visuele zoekstrategieën (exploratief en
doelgericht) en voor 3 verschillende aanbiedingstijden (0,5, 1 en 2 seconde) de
herkenningsaccuraotheid van merknaamopvallendheid (visueel, cognitief,
visueel~cognitief) werd gemeten. De manipulatie van visuele zoekstrategie werd
uitgevoerd binnen proefpersonen (within-subjects), en de manipulatie van de
aanbiedingstijd en merknaamopvallendheid werd tussen prcefpersonen (between-
subjects) uitgevcerd. In totaal namen 250 respondenten deel aan deze experimenten.
Hoofdstuk 4. Dit hoofstuk beschrijft de resultaten van de 10 experimenten. Conform
de verwachtingen werd gevonden dat onder de exploratieve visuele zcekstrategie
visueel opvallende en visueel4cognitief opvallende merknamen accuroter werden herkend
dan de contextuele merknamen. In tegensteling tot de verwachting werden de cognitief
opvallende merknamen juist minder accuraat herkend. Onder de doelgerichte
zoekstrategie en bij relatief langere aanbiedingstijden van de stimuli werden de
opvallende merknamen (visueel, cognitief, visueel~cognitief) even accuraat herkend als
de contextuele merknamen. Tenslotte worden deze bevindingen bediscussiëerd in het
licht van het ASM. Het ASM verklaart deels de gevonden resultaten. Aannemeli jk
wordt gemaakt dat met een aanpassing van het ASM alle resultaten kunnen worden
verklaard.
Hoofdstuk 5. In het laatste hoofdstuk wordt het huidige denken over aandacht binnen
het consumentengedragsonderzoek nog eens geillustreerd. Vervolgens wordt bij enkele
relevante en belangrijke onderzoeksvraagstellingen het ASM als alternatieve verklaring
opgevoerd en worden suggesties gedaan voor vervolgonderzoek.
De auteur van dit proefschrift gaat erwn uit dat inzicht en begrip met betrekking tot selectieve
aandacht gezocht moeten worden in de structuren, mechanismen en verwerkingsprocessen van het
menselijk brein, dot interacteert met de omgeving waarin de consument zích bevindt. De auteur von
dit proefschrift beseft dat er op dit moment een enorme kloof bestaat tussen enerzi jds de
structuren en strategieën van het menseli jk brein (theorie) en anderzijds de proktijk wn de
reclamenakers díe zich richten op een effectieve reclameboodschap. Er is een poging gedaan om
deze kloof gedeeltelijk te dichten door oan de ene kont het ASM voor te stellen en aan de andere
kant rekening te houden met zaken die consumentengedragsonderzoekers belangrijk vinden,in het
bi jzonder die onderzcekers die zich bezig houden met de werking en effecten wn reclame.
Stellingen
Behorende bij het proefschrift The ottentfon selection model: The effectiveness of eonzpicuous
brnndnomes door Tohan de Heer.
1. Binnen het consumentengtdrngsonderzoek, in het bijzonder het reclomeverwerkings 6
reclame-effectiviteitsonderzoek, speelt 'aandacht' een opvallende rol. Aandacht wordt opgevat
als een noodzakelijke voorwnarde tot het reoliseren von reclame-efftctiviteit. Dit betekent
overigens niet dat onderzoek met betrekking tot verwerking en effectiviteit von commerciële
stimuli oan de noodzakelijke voorwonrde aandacht besfeedt (dit proefschrift).
2. Reclomeverwerking en reclome-effectiviteit kan olleen worden begrepen vanuit een
theoretisch model over onndachtselecties dot gefalsifiëerd kan en dient te worden (dit
proefschrift).
3. Het centrale uitgangspunt voor iheorievorming binnen het consumentengedragsonderzcek is
dat informotieverwerkingscopaciteit wn de menseli jke hersenen beperkt is. Dat dit
belongrijke uitgongspunt een oanname is wordt níct of nauwelijks bestft (dit proefschrift).
4. Opwllende merkromen zijn niet altijd effectief. De effectivittit hangt af van:
~ het type opv~ollendheid: visueel enlof cognitief;
~ de door de consument gehanteerde visuele zoekstrategie: explorotief of doelgericht;
~ en de aanbiedingstijd van de merknnmen.
(dit proefschrift)
5. Ook onderzoek noor reclame beschrijft een stukje von de werkelijkheid. Derhalve dient
artikel 17 punt 4 van het promotieregelement van de KUB, alwaar wordt gesteld dat het
proefschrift vrij dient te zijn van reclame, te worden aangepast.
6. Het economische gedrag von intelligent agents zi jn niet meer dan dotgene wat, bij zi jn of hoar
baas, een verrassing oproept.
7. De doelstelling van de Psychologie zou moeten zijn 'het wegredeneren van psychologische
constructen'. De toename in het aantal opgenomen psychologische constructen in
woordenboeken van de Psychologie geeft aan dat de Psychologie ver Hon haar dcelstelling is
verwijderd.
8. Ste) ingewikkelde :aken zo eenvoudig mogelijk voor, monr niet té eenvoudig.
9. Het gaat erom een moment von de abstractie oun de werkeli jkheid te ontfutselen zodat je iets
kunt generaliseren (Johan van der Keuken, fotograaf, cineast).
10. Het onontkoombare bewijs voor de nanstoonde moeder wordt gegeven door de combinatie van
een zelftester, huisarts, verloskundige en een echoscopie. De zwongere vader heeft dit bewijs
niet nodig.
Arnhem, Februnri 2001
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